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Preface
Angelomorphic Christology is a helpful descriptive tool that one can use to outline the 
doctrine of Christ set forth in the NT. While it is somewhat anachronistic to speak of 
any “doctrine” appearing in the NT, the language of systematic theology with its 
various and sundry doctrinal formulations provides a way of structuring the first 
century apostolic account o f Christ. We will therefore use such language in this study.
For historical reasons, the personal story of Tertullian opens this investigation. 
R. G. CoIIingwood is renowned for thinking of history as the re-telling o f factical 
accounts. The story we are about to “re-tell” represents one of many narratives 
recounted by ecclesiastical historians. It does not claim to be the last word on the 
subject. In fact, after this inquiry, we are convinced that many aspects o f Tertullian’s 
Christological project remain enshrouded in mystery. The modest goal o f this study is 
simply to provide another perspective with regard to the study of Tertullian’s 
Christology.
We must briefly say a word about the sources used in this thesis. In this study, 
we follow the numbering system used in Evans’ text and translation of Adversus 
Praxean, When citing De Anima, we adhere to Waszink’s numbering schema. The 
works of E. Evans, J. Waszink, J. Pelikan, J. Daniélou, A. Blaise, W. H. C. Frend, F. 
E. Peters, C. Gieschen, P. Carrel 1, E. Fortman, M. Alfs, R. Kearsley, and J. Morgan all 
served as indispensable works during the research portion of this work as did 
Tertullian.org. It has been a didactic experience interacting with the scholars 
mentioned hitherto. This thesis would not have been possible without the previously 
mentioned resources.
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Vita Tertulliani
Quintus Septimius Florens Tertuilianus (Tertullian) was bom ca. 160 CE and died ca. 
220 CE.’ The noted church apologist dwelled in Carthage (North Africa),^ a province 
o f Rome.^ Indeed, it was in Carthage that Tertullian initially received a first-rate 
education,'’ which may have made it possible for him to become a jurist^ before his 
conversion to Christianity between the years 193-197 CE. Upon becoming a Christian, 
Tertullian subsequently produced almost thirty significant theological documents that 
scholars have classified as apologetic, dogmatico-polemic and practico-ascetic.^
Adversus Praxean is indisputably a controversial treatise {liber 
controversialis) that Tertullian wrote in approximately 213 CE.^ It is therefore no 
surprise that this ancient document emphatically serves as a sublime example of 
Tertullian’s; “burning eloquence, biting satire, and forcible \o%\cP^ Adversus Praxean 
contains 31 sections {capita) that Tertullian appears to have structured in a manner
' E. Evans suggests that Tertullian died in 240 CE, based on a passage in Jerome that indicates the 
apologist lived to an advanced age {ad  decrepitam  aetatem ). See Adversus Praxean  (London: SPCK, 
1948), 2. However, Bardenhewer thinks Tertullian fell asleep in death ca. 220 CE. See O. Bardenhewer 
P atrology: The L ives an d  Works o f  the F athers o f  the Church, trans. Thomas J. Shahan (St. Louis: B. 
Herder, 1908), 179.
 ^ M odem  Tunisia.
 ^ Vide appendix V.
Christine Trevett cites Jerome’s dictum {Ep. 70 .5), ""Quid Tertulliano eruditius, q u id  acutius"' when 
relating Tertullian’s well-known facility with rhetoric, Latin, and Greek. See Montanism: Gender. 
A uthority, an d  the Ne^ '^ Prophecy  (Cambridge: Cambridge Lfniversity Press, 1996), 68.
 ^ A t one time, Tertullian’s legal background was a historical given. Historians have since called his 
juristic career into question and now fervently debate the issue. While the “dust” from Timothy Barnes’ 
challenge vis-à-vis Tertullian’s legal training has not yet subsided, Roy Kearsley points out that the 
“apologist’s thought” moves and breathes in the “atmosphere o f  law,” Tertullian's Theology o f  D ivine  
P ow er  (Carlisle, Cumbria: Rutherford House by Paternoster Press), 12. Gerald Bray takes issue with 
Kearsley’s thesis, however, thinking there is hardly any indication that Tertullian was a professional 
jurist. Consult H oliness a n d  the Will o f  God: P erspectives on the Theology o f  Tertullian (Atlanta: John 
Knox Press, 1979), 33-34. While the question is not yet settled. Kearsley’s observation seem s to be a 
perspicacious one.
* O. Bardenhewer, P atrology, 179-180. Evans classifies Tertullian’s literary works as apologetic, 
controversial and disciplinary treatises. Cf. A dversus Praxean, 3. Johannes Quasten’s classifications 
mirror those o f  Evans, P atrology, 3 vols. (Utrecht; Spectrum, 1962-1964), 255-317.
 ^ A loys Grillmeier, C hrist in Christian Tradition: From the A posto lic A ge to Chalcedon  (451), trans. 
J.S. Bowden (London: Mowbray, 1965), 141. W. H. C. Frend, The Rise (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1984), 345.
IX
analogous to ancient rhetorical speeches composed by either Marcus Fabius Quintilian 
(35-95 CE) or Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE). The disputatious treatise thus 
stands as a testimony to Tertullian’s rhetorical adroitness and mental acuity.
Sider notes that Adversus Praxean commences with a standard Hteraiy 
introduction {exordium). We then find Tertullian presenting a customary delineation 
o f preliminary facts {narratiof before he advances his rhetorical case by means of 
logical arguments {confirmatio). Tertullian then proffers counterarguments in order to 
subvert the theological position o f his opponent {reprenhensio). In doing so, he makes 
fervent appeals that employ the rhetorical device of paihos.^^ Ulteriorly, Tertullian 
concludes his treatise against Praxeas with the dynamic expansion {amplificatio) of 
his literary declamation. The fruits o f Adversus Preaxean are accordingly apparent 
and decisive: “Tertullian knew how a rhetorician convinces his hearers, wins them 
over to himself and incites them against others.”” The ancient Carthaginian carefully 
studied his forebears, astutely emulating and reworking their rhetorical styles. Hardly 
any writer of antiquity possessed Tertullian’s ability to manipulate the Latin language 
in such a dynamic and lively manner.'^
After noting the similarities between Tertullian’s exclamatory methods and 
those utilized by other noted rhetoricians of antiquity, Sider concludes that Tertullian 
seems to employ classic literary devices with acute flexibility.’^  Unsurprisingly, one
® O. Bardenhewer, Patrology, 180.
 ^ Sider points out that the narratio  provides an account o f  the events that have serve as the raison  
d 'e tre  o f  the rhetorical treatise. It also serves to indicate “the speaker’s intended manner o f  treatment.” 
That is, the narratio  sets forth the primary areas o f  dispute; though Sider does add that som e students o f  
rhetoric attribute this function to the pro p o sitio  or p a r titio. See Robert D. Sider, Ancient Rhetoric an d  
the A rt o f  Tertullian  (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 21. Quintilian notes that “most 
authorities” {plurim is aucioribus) think forensic speeches have five parts, namely, the exordium, the 
narra tio , confirm atio, refutatio, and the perora tio  {Institutio O ratorio  3.9.1-9).
Aristotle, Rhet 1418a.
“ Hans von Campenhausen, The F athers o f  the Church  (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1998), 10.
Ibid., 8-9.
R. Sider, Ancient Rhetoric, 21-24 . For a classical discussion o f  the need for flexibility in formulating
church historian remarks that it is impossible to suffer ennui while perusing the vivid 
contents o f Tertullian’s literary corpus.’'’ Tertullian avails himself o f rhetorical 
methods that unfailingly sustain the interest of his readers. Especially is this tendency 
evident in Adversus Praxean, where Tertullian displays his entire arsenal of wit, 
scriptural proof-texts and rhetorical devices to overturn the theological reasoning of 
his adversary. It is also in Adversus Praxean that Tertullian vigorously endeavors to 
demonstrate that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not three self-identical divine 
modes o f being but three distinct deific personae}^ The skilled rhetor, however, 
highlights the uniqueness of each divine persona by characterizing the Father as the 
whole divine substance {pater enim tota substantia est) in contrast to the Son and 
Spirit o f God whom he depicts as respective portions of the one divine substance 
(portiones totius)A
Despite the aforementioned, Bethune-Baker maintains that such “crudities of 
thought” do not detract from Tertullian’s overall treatment of the three deific persons 
{tres personae) constituting the Godhead.’^  Baker, along with other historians of 
dogma, considers the pistic’  ^ defense that Adversus Praxean contains to be
speeches, see Quintilian’s Institutio O ratoria , B ook 2 .13 ..5 -8 .
H. Campenhausen, Fathers, 9.
A dv Prax  2.
Ibid., 9. Sydney M ellone echoes the sentiments o f  Tertullian, writing: “The Father is wholly essential 
B eing (substantia): the Son is derived from the W hole as a part thereof (portio  totius),"  in Leaders o f  
E arly  C hristian Thought (Lindsey P, 1954), 178. N evertheless, M ellone cites Souter who thinks that 
though Tertullian does not affirm the eternal generation doctrine and regards the Son as but a portio  
tothis, the Son is still God (according to Tertullian) since “H e came from the essence o f  God Himself, 
thus being from the essence o f  the W hole and part o f  the W hole,” Ibid. But this notion is problematic 
for a number o f  reasons. If the Xoyoç, based on Tertullian’s formulation, possesses the entire complex  
o f  divine properties and is fully God (vere deus), then why is He not an eternal divine person ae!  What 
is more, M ellone elsewhere writes that the Son is subordinated vis-à-vis his essence and not just per 
function. H ow  can this be the case i f  the Son is “the essence o f  the W hole”?
James Franklin Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the E arly llis to iy  o f  Christian Doctrine to the 
Time o f  the C ouncil o f  C halcedon  (London: M ethuen, 1919), 144.
Follow ing the work o f  N icolai Hartmann and Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd posits at least 
fifteen irreducible modal aspects (spheres o f  being), which include the pistic sphere, see A New Critique 
o f  Theoretical Thought, trans. David H. Freeman and W illiam S. Young, 4 vols. (Ontario, Paideia 
Press, 1984), 2:298. Dooyeweerd defines TTtOTiÇ as “the terminal function o f  human existence in the
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prototypical from a doctrinal standpoint and peerless vis-à-vis its rhetorical aspects. It 
is little wonder that Jurgen Moltmann observes: “The Fathers learnt from Tertullian, 
even if they did not mention his name. He perceived the problems more clearly than 
anyone before him, and the brilliance of his language and his skill in definition made 
new answers possible.” ’^  Though he therefore writes (from time to time) in an 
admittedly macabre fashion,^’^ Tertullian permanently shaped Latin theology.^' He is 
the apologist par excellence.
Certain ecclesiastical historians refer to Tertullian as “The most penetrating 
exegete of the whole ancient church.”^^  Others call him: “The greatest o f the early
transcendental direction o f  tim e,” Ibid. TTIGTIS' is thus a universal phenomenon that is not restricted to 
Christian believers. Moreover, the pistic region o f  being is transcendental (being at the root o f  human 
experience), and is thus an “irreducible function in the w hole process o f  knowledge” (Ibid., 2:299), Yet, 
the pistic sphere, as seen in the case o f  Tertullian and other Christian apologists, can acquire a 
soteriological significance when one directs it toward the God who sent Christ and raised Him from the 
dead. One can also v iew  Christ as the object o f  faith (TTIOTIS) since the Son o f  God explains the 
Father to humankind (Jn 1:18).
Jurgen Moltmann, The Trinity a n d  the K ingdom : The D octrine o f  God, trans. Margaret Kohl (N ew  
York: Harper and Row, 1981), 137. Although historians o f  dogma generally consider A dversus 
P raxean  to be “a remarkable foreshadowing” o f  the Council o f  N icea, Bardenhewer notes that 
Tertullian: “does not avoid a certain subordinationism,” P atro logy, 185. Louis Berkhof similarly thinks 
that Tertullian’s treatment o f  the Trinity doctrine is not adequate since it involves “an unwarranted 
subordination o f  the Son to the Father.” See B erk h of s System atic Theology (London: Banner o f  Truth, 
1971), 82. Moltmann also recognizes problematic aspects o f  Tertullian’s Trinitarian definition. He 
notes that w hile Tertullian raised Christian theological discourse to a new level, he also produced more 
questions. See Trinity and  the K ingdom , 137. Pelikan observes possible traces o f  binitarian thinking in 
Tertullian and other early church fathers in The C hristian Tradition: A H istory o f  the D evelopm ent o f  
D octrine, 5 vols. (Chicago and London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1971), 1:197. For tlirther 
information, consult Tertullian’s D e O rat 1.1-2.
Tertullian seem s to take a little too much delight in describing G od’s eschatological judgment: “How  
vast a spectacle then bursts upon the eye! What there excites my admiration? What my derision? Which 
sight g ives me joy? Which rouses m e to exultation? A s I see so many illustrious monarchs, whose 
reception into the heavens was publicly announced, groaning now in the lowest darkness with great 
Jove h im self and those, too, who bore witness o f  their exultation; governors o f  provinces, too, who 
persecuted the Christian name, in fires more fierce than those with which in the days o f  their pride they 
raged against the followers o f  Christ” (D e S pec  30).
H. Campenhausen, Fathers o f  the Church, 5. Certain writers (e.g. Daniélou) would contest 
Campenhausen’s claim. To the contrary, these historians would place Minucius Felix at the beginning 
o f  the Latin Church. The position taken in this work is that Tertullian is the first noted theological 
personality in the West: he essentially shaped Western Christianity. James Morgan fittingly observes: 
“ In doctrine and language he is the great pioneer o f  Western Christianity,” see The Im portance o f  
T ertullian in the D evelopm ent o f  Christian D ogm a  (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1928), ix.
J. Quasten, though thinking certain historical accounts regarding Tertullian are legendary in 
character, nevertheless concedes: “Except for St. Augustine, Tertullian is the most important and 
original ecclesiastical author in Latin,” P atro logy , 247.
H, Campenhausen, Fathers o f  the Church, 5
Latin writers.”^^  Unfortunately, some Christian scholars are motivated to brand part of 
the material found in Tertullian’s Montanist writings “heretical” since they think 
Montanism was a form of Christianity that the Church eventually deemed heretical/'’ 
While Tertullian may have converted to Montanism and the church possibly 
determined that Montanism was a heretical movement, there seems to be little 
evidence that he ever succumbed to heresy. Cyprian of Carthage who considered 
Tertullian “the master” may very well establish this point (De Viris Illustribus 53).
At any rate, we do not know the exact year that Tertullian became a Montanist, 
but it appears that he embraced the New Prophecy (nova prophetia) no later than 207 
CE.^^ His theological treatises certainly begin to show pronounced signs of the 
ecstatic group’s influence after this period. In fact, Adversus Praxean is one so-called 
Montanist document that theologians commonly differentiate from the more catholic 
treatises of Tertullian.^^ As stated earlier, the apologist’s association with the New
Edmund Fortman, The Triune God: A H istorica l S tudy o f  the Doctrine o f  the Trinity (Eugene: W ipf 
and Stock, 1999), 107. Gerald O ’ColIins further writes that Tertullian pioneered the Latin “trinitarian 
vocabulary,” in Christology: A Biblical, H istorical, an d  System atic Study o f  Jesus Christ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 182, This claim is not necessarily invalid, but it seem s more accurate to 
say that the church appropriated the Latin theological vocabulary that Tertullian em ployed, though he 
h im self did not apply the term trin itas to the Christian deity per se (J. Morgan, The Im portance o f  
Tertullian, 103). Tertullian’s language deals with the divine economy (G od’s historical arrangement for 
reconciling humanity to H im self through Christ Jesus) and does not really begin to concern itse lf with 
the inner constitution o f  the Godhead in se . W hile Morgan concludes that Cyprian was the first to use 
the term trin itas  as a “name o f  the D eity” in On the L o r d ’s  Prayer, it appears that not even Cyprian uses 
the word in this fashion. See On the L o rd ’s  P ra yer  7 .22. Cyprian may, however, com es close to 
attributing the name trinitas to God in Ep. 72 during his exposition o f  Mt 28:19-20.
Scott Butler, Norman Dahlgren and David Hess. Jesus, Peter and the K eys  (Santa Barbara: 
Q ueenship Publishing, 1996), 216-217.
C. Trevett thinks that Tertullian became a M ontanist no later than 207. His sentiments, however, 
could have predated this time. Trevett also notes that Tertullian called Montanism, nova prophetia , but 
the M ontanists no doubt used the expression self-referentialiy as well. See Trevett, M ontanism , 71. 
D avid A une concurs with this assessm ent in P roph ecy in E arly Christianity and  the Ancient 
M editerranean  W orld  (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 313. Tertullian also endowed Montanism with 
“an impact on the writing o f  church history which otherwise it would not have had.” Trevett, 
M ontanism , 67. The opponents o f  the nova p ro p h etia  also gave them the designation, Cataphrygians. 
Only later did the ecstatic m ovem ent com e to be known as the Montanists. Consult Ronald E. Heine. 
The M ontanist O racles and  Testimonia  (Patristic Monograph Series 14. Macon: Mercer University 
Press, 1989), x.
Tertullian’s allusions to the Paraclete in A dversus P reaxean  may well have reference to Montanus, 
w ho evidently thought he was an inspired instrument o f  God.
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Prophecy occasionally has resulted in some Christian historians minimizing the one
who accomplished so much for Christian orthodoxy during his lifetime. Yet,
regardless o f his personal “demise” in later years, Robert’s analysis of Tertullian’s
contribution to Christianity is insightful:
When, with an imagination that is vivid enough to reproduce the 
situation, the circumstances, and the temperament o f the man, and a 
judgement that is based upon a calm review of his theology in its 
historical setting, we draw near to Tertullian, we shall recognize in 
him, despite his failings and limitations, one of the noblest characters 
and greatest thinkers o f the Christian Church.
While there are a number o f prominent figures one could focus on when investigating
the Christological outlook o f the early Latin Church, the major luminary in this
movement is Tertullian. He is the preeminent dramatis persona in early Latin
Robert Edwin Roberts, The T heology o f  Tertullian  (London: Epworth, 1924), 252. Timothy Barnes 
writes: “Tertullian’s later writings receive abuse and condemnation in subsequent ages. Many o f  the 
charges are unmerited.” See Tertullian: A H istorica l an d  Literary Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), 83. He concludes that Tertullian was bold enough to sound forth an “unpalatable truth,” namely, 
that “the church is not a conclave o f  bishops” but functions as the locus o f  the Holy Spirit. In other 
words, where the Spirit o f  G od is, there is the church. See De Pudi 21.17: ecclesia  sp iritu s p e r  
sp irita lem  hominem, non ecclesia  numerus episcoporum .
W illiam  Tabbem ee believes it is “highly unlikely” that Tertullian “ever separated from the 
catholic church at all” and he avers that he surely did not found the group known as the Tertullianists, a 
post-M ontanist sect. He documents these points in M ontanist inscriptions an d  Testimonia: E pigraphic  
Sou rces Illustrating the H istory o f  M ontanism  (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997), 475-476. 
W hile Pope Gelasius supposedly condemned Tertullian’s works in the Decretum  Gelasianum , patristic 
scholars note that this document could be the result o f  a forgery. For a penetrating critique o f  Barnes’ 
overall historical project, however, see W. H. C. Frend’s article in the C lassical R eview  24 (1974) pp. 
72-76  Timothy David Barnes: Tertullian, a  H istorica l an d  L itera ty  Study.
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Christianity. This ancient North African skillfully shaped western theology in a lasting 
way.
Introduction
This study will seek to answer three questions related to Tertullian’s doctrine of 
Christ. The three queries we will explore in this study are; (1) Did Tertullian eradicate 
every vestige of angelomorphism from his doctrine of Christ? (2) Does Tertullian 
think there is a gaping ontological abyss that separates Christ and the holy angels? (3) 
Why was Tertullian reluctant to identify the Son as an angel?
In order to answer the third question, we will attempt to document and discern 
how Tertullian and other pre-Nicenes exegete the “minoration”^^  saying at Ps 8:5; 
“You have made him a little lower than the heavenly beings [i.e. angels]” (NIV). It is 
significant that Tertullian only applies this Bible verse to the Messiah, Jesus Christ. 
Moreover, we think that this investigation will demonstrate how Tertullian not only 
refers Ps 8:5 to the incarnate Son o f God, but further applies it to the preincamate 
Christ, who experiences being subordinate to God and the angels before He becomes a 
man. Chapters 2 and 5 will elucidate these claims and serve as supporting evidence 
that Tertullian believes the preincamate Son was made inferior to the angels.
Throughout this study, we will be using terms such as Angelomorphic 
Christology, angelic Christology and angelophanic Christology. It is necessary to 
define these terms at the outset, and that is what we will do at this time.
Mentally grasping the nomenclature of Angelomorphic Christology is vital 
since a number of contemporary studies that explore the doctrine of Christ articulate 
His unique person and work in terms o f angelic or Angelomorphic Christology.^^ We
The term “minoration” refers to the subordinate position o f  Christ. In particular, this study uses the 
term to delineate the result o f  the Father making the Son less than the angels. The Son becom es inferior 
to the angels by virtue o f  the Father’s lowering him in status.
Som e studies include: L.A. Brighton. “TAe A ngel o f  Revelation: An A ngel o f  G od  an d  an Icon o f  
Jesus Christ"' (Ph.D. D iss. St Louis University, 1991); Robert Gundry. “Angelomorphic Christology in 
the B ook o f  Revelation,” SBL Sem inar P apers  33 (1994) 662-78. Loren T. Struckenbruck, Angel 
Veneration an d  C hristology. A Study in E arly Judaism  and in the Christology o f  the A pocalypse o f
have not found any recent inquiry, however, that extensively deals with the presence
or absence o f Angelomorphic themes in the writings of Tertullian. Most works only
provide a summary treatment of Tertullian’s Angelomorphic Christology, briefly
citing one or two of Tertullian’s apologetic works in passing.^’’ Therefore, this inquiry
should contribute to future investigations of Christ’s relationship with the holy angels
o f  God in an innovative and meaningful way.
Biblical scholars and theologians generally categorize the study o f Christ as
angel qua angel in three primary ways:
(1) Angel Christology is the sort o f Christological doctrine posited by Martin
Werner. He maintains that Christ is essentially an angel. That is, Christ is a creaturely
essence produced in the same fashion as other holy created spirit beings. Alluding to
Justin Martyr, Werner notes:
What has provided historians of doctrine for more than a century with 
an occasion for discussion has been the fact that Justin could conceive 
in one category the Logos-Son together with the "host of the other good 
angels, o f like being to him’, and that he set this angel-host, together 
with the Logos-Christ, before the (prophetic) Spirit.^'
Needless to say, historians o f dogma have not embraced Werner’s reconstruction of
the pre-Nicene doctrine of Christ’s person and work. They have adamantly resisted his
suggestion that angelic Christology is a primordial way of referring to Jesus, the Son
o f  God. Chapter 1 will discuss Werner’s contribution to the study of Christ as an angel
qua angel. It will then review the responses to Werner and demonstrate what recent
studies have concluded about Werner’s work.
John  (Tubingen. J. C. B. Mohr, 1995), We might add that Stuckenbruck prefers to speak o f  
“angelophanic” as opposed to “angelomorphic Christology” (Ibid.,, 209ff). This study will consistently  
refer to Angelomorphic Christology, although w e will use the terminology “angelophanic Christology” 
intermittently and interchangably.
Even the comprehensive work by Charles Gieschen only provides a brief treatment o f  Tertullian’s 
work. See A ngelom orphic C hristology: A ntecedents and E arly Evidence  (Leiden: Brill. 1998). 193-94.
The F orm ation o f  Christian D ogm a: An H istorical Study o f  Its Problem , trans. S. G. F. Brandon
(2) Angelomorphic Christology refers to the doctrine or complex of doctrines 
that teach Christ assumes the form (pop(|)q) of an angel during angelophanies. 
However, this kind of Christology further contends that Christ is not an angel per 
substance. Struckenbruck fittingly notes that Christ is sometimes “made to appear 
among a series of angels” or “as one who incorporates features frequently attributed to 
angels.”^^  Angelomorphic Christology is thus phenomenologically oriented.^^ It is 
concerned with providing a descriptive account of the Son’s appearances in angelic 
settings without pronouncing judgment on His being (o v t c o s -).
(3) Struckenbruck prefers to employ the nomenclature “angelophanic 
Christology” over against discoursing about Angelomorphic Christology. Rowland 
and Struckenbruck, who both advocate this terminological usage, seem to argue that 
Christ only appears to be an angel in certain OT and NT angelophanies. He is not, 
they aver, really an angel as to His being. Struckenbruck limits the term 
“Angelomorphic Christology” to Christ either appearing among a series of angels or 
momentarily incorporating the attributes of created heavenly beings.^'’ He uses the 
terminology “angel Christology” to speak of times when the Scriptures either identify 
Christ as an angel (ex offico) or when the sacred writings supposedly highlight His 
angelic nature. Struckenbruck also argues that it is more accurate to speak in terms of 
Angelomorphic or angelophanic Christology when referring to the doctrine of Christ 
delineated in the NT. He appears to use the previously mentioned two terms 
somewhat synonymously as we will do throughout the course o f this study.^^
(London: Black, 1957), 135.
L. Struckenbruck, A n gei Veneration, 208.
Darrell D. Hannah, M ichael and Christ: M ichael Traditions and  Angel C'hristologv in Early  
C hristianity (Tubingen: Mohr Si check, 1999), 13.
Struckenbruck, A ngel Veneration, 208.
Ibid.
(4) A broader category that aptly describes what we find in the documents of 
ancient and Second Temple Judaism as well as certain early Christian works is 
angelomorphism simpliciter, Angelomorphism describes the phenomenon wherein 
exalted divine figures occasionally assume angelic or divine forms. Such appearances 
are not limited to the angelophanies of Christ.
Before continuing, we must also note that Jean Daniélou employs the 
nomenclature "Angelomorphic Christology" where other scholars use the terminology 
"angelic Christology." This investigation argues that Daniélou is possibly culpable of 
semiotic imprecision or catachresis. The reason we deem this point significant is 
because o f what Daniélou contends regarding Tertullian's view of Angelomorphic 
Christology. He writes that Tertullian rejects all forms of Angelomorphic Christology. 
The results that derive from this investigation indicate otherwise. We will therefore 
initiate this analysis of Tertullian’s body of writings with a critique of Daniélou’s 
work regarding Latin Christianity.
Daniélou further maintains that Tertullian is averse to calling Christ an angel 
since the Latin apologist allegedly believes there is a radical distinction between 
Christ and the holy angels of God. Not only Daniélou, but also other historians impute 
this view to Tertullian. However, we will contend that Tertullian’s use of monarchia 
allows us to fuse the ontological divide that purportedly separates Christ and the 
angels. We will also examine this point in Chapter 1 of the present study.
This investigation will suggest that it is the Son as such and not the Word 
(Sermo), whom the Father makes inferior to the angels. In order to be au fa it  with the 
main argument that we will essay in the following pages, one will need to make a 
formal distinction between the Word of God and the Son qua Son. In this regard, 
Tertullian’s Christology is somewhat challenging and formidable. That is why chapter
4 will attempt to sort out the Christological titles that Tertullian uses to formulate his 
doctrine o f Christ.
Subsequent to our examination of Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, we will 
submit that while Tertullian is reluctant to call the Son an angel, it is not because he 
thinks there is a radical ontological differentiation between the Son qua Son and 
God’s holy angels. To the contrary, Tertullian believes that the preexistent, 
preincarnate and pretheophanic Son as such is actually lower than the angels are by 
virtue o f His heavenly temporal generation from God’s substance, implying that the 
ontological divide suggested by Daniélou may not be that extensive. The Son’s 
ontological relationship to the angels as well as His relationship with the Father will 
serve as a theme that we will develop throughout the course of this study. It is now 
time to analyze Daniélou’s treatment of Tertullian’s view toward Angelomorphic 
Christology.
Chapter 1
Daniélou and the Angelomorphic Christology of Tertullian
Two o f this investigation’s aims are to show that (1) Tertullian’s Christology contains 
Angelomorphic elements; (2) Tertullian does not posit a vast ontological divide (i.e. a 
radical distinction) between the preexistent Son and the holy angels o f God. This 
chapter will consequently examine Daniélou’s two suggestions, namely, that 
Tertullian both rejects all Angelomorphic Christology and believes that the Son is 
radically distinct from the angels. We will undertake this critical analysis in order to 
ascertain the historical viability of Daniélou’s argument. First, however, we will 
briefly review details concerning studies that precipitated the historian’s ambitious 
project vis-à-vis Angelomorphic Christology. O f course, we do not intend for the 
summary presented in this study to be comprehensive. Its purpose is merely to provide 
the reader with selected background information on the subject of angelomorphism as 
it relates to the doctrine of Christ. One can find comprehensive summaries of 
Angelomorphic research in Gieschen and Carrel 1.^ ^
A. Recent Christological Studies Involving Angelomorphism 
Two types of nomenclature that students o f Second Temple Judaism and early 
Christianity have devoted a considerable amount o f attention to in recent years are the 
linguistic formulae “angelic” and “Angelomorphic” Christology.^^ The expression 
“angelic Christology” usually refers to the doctrine that maintains Christ is an angelic 
being per nature.^^ Angelomorphic Christology^^, on the other hand, proposes that the
Peter R. Carrell, Jesus an d  the Angels: A ngelo logy and  the Christology' o f  the A pocalypse o f  John 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Christology Is the doctrine o f  Christ. The term thus refers to the theological dogma that 
system atically focuses on the person and work o f  the one whom Christians universally consider the 
elect and divine Messiah o f  God. One o f  the most influential Christologies in church history is the 
doctrine o f  Christ carefully worked out by Tertullian o f  Carthage in the third century.
We say “usually” since scholars such as Hannah employ the terminology “angel christology” to
Son o f God temporarily assumes the form (jJop<[)ri) of an angel in divinely inspired 
visions such as those contained in the NT book of Revelation (Apoc 1:13-16)/° 
Additionally, ancient Hebrew narratives that historically recount the awe-inspiring 
theophanies of YHWH (the God of Israel) also include data that contributes to the 
study of Angelomorphic traditions (Genesis 16:7-14)/'
The difference between angelic and Angelomorphic Christology therefore 
seems to be one of descriptive emphasis: one formula delineates the nature of a certain 
entity (%) while the other type of terminology places stress on a particular function of 
X. Scholars employ both expressions to account for the otherworldly phenomena 
recorded in the holy writings of Judaism and Christianity. However, the nomenclature 
“Angelomorphic Christology” has taken on greater prominence since a very 
controversial study authored in the 1940s. We will now review details relating to this 
much talked about work.
The terminology “angel Christology” particularly came to the fore when 
Martin Werner authored the book, Die Emtehung des Dogmas, in 1941 Admittedly, 
scholars produced learned delineations of early angelic Christology prior to Werner’s
describe all Christologies that have been markedly influenced “by angelological ideas.” See Hannah, 
M ichael a n d  Christ, 12-13, wherein Hannah notes that angelic Christology particularly “defines Christ 
as an angelic being,” however.
W hile relating that Daniélou is evidently the first writer to use the terminology, “Angelomorphic 
Christology,” D. Hannah also informs his readers that this type o f  Christology is “phenom enological.” 
That is, “It refers only to visual portrayals o f  Christ in the form o f  an angel.” See M ichael an d  Christ, 
13. The emphasis here is on Christ being depicted in terms o f  His angelic jJOptj)!]. He therefore 
possesses the external appearance o f  an angel although he may not be an angel in an ontological sense. 
For more information on how the early church fathers use |J0p4)fi, vide  Lampe. One will find an 
extended definition o f  Angelomorphic Christology in C. Gieschen, Angelom orphic C hristology, 28-29.
L. Stuckenbruck provides evidence for Angelomorphic elements in A poc 1:13-16. Refer to 
Stuckenbruck, Angel Veneration, 211-213.
It is difficult to improve on C arrelfs precise definition o f  angels. He describes them as “heavenly 
beings distinct from God and human beings, who exist to serve Deity as messengers, as the heavenly 
congregation in worship, and as agents o f  the divine will fulfilling a variety o f  other functions,” in Jesus 
a n d  the A ngels, 14. A ngelology thus involves prepositional declarations concerning angels and it 
system atically treats the heavenly spirit creatures that dutifully minister to Almighty God.
The Form ation o f  Christian D ogm a: An H istorica l S tudy o f  Its Problem , trans. S. G. F. Brandon 
(London: Black, 1957).
formative study/^ Nevertheless, Werner’s opus garnered especial attention by virtue 
of the negative scholarly response it received in toto. More importantly, Wilhelm 
Michaelis {inter alios) immediately criticized Werner’s controversial monograph, 
doing so authoritatively and decisively in 1942/'' Consequently, Die Enstehung des 
Dogma, a publication that outlines a highly disputed form of Primitive (urchristlich) 
Christology-mever recovered from the learned theological offensive that the 
influential German scholar Michaelis initiated. The scholastic world never accepted 
Werner’s general thesis and the majority o f patristic, ecclesiastical, and NT scholars 
continue to reject it today.''^
While most ecclesiastical historians presently believe that Michaelis and those 
who followed in his path soundly overturned Werner’s argument concerning angel 
Christology, we do well to remember that other historians of dogma have expressed 
scholastic praise for his historical presentation of Judaeo-Christian evidence 
ostensibly demonstrating the existence o f Primitive angelic Christology. Admittedly, 
these scholars usually deny Werner’s primary overarching thesis.''^ Nevertheless, in 
recent times, Charles Gieschen’s magisterial study has highlighted distinctive 
elements of Angelomorphic Christology from early Jewish and Christian witnesses 
that no doubt shaped and influenced Primitive and post-apostolic Christianity.
G. H. D ix wrote two articles contending that Primitive Christology originated from Judaism’s notion 
o f  the m alak YHWH  and Son o f  Man concepts. These articles were respectively published in 1925 and 
1927. The details are contained in D. Hannah, M ichael an d  Christ, 3.
Hannah recounts how scholars replied to Werner’s study in a “swift and decisive” fashion. For 
instance, Joseph Barbel presented a critique o f  Werner’s thesis in 1941. Then came M ichaelis’ Zitr 
E nglechristologie im Urchristentum: A bbaii d er  K onsim ktion  M artin Werners. Barbel lauded the 
evidence that Werner marshaled, although he did not think that the Primitive community o f  faith 
possessed  an authentic angel Christology. See D. Hannah, M ichael an d  Christ, 4-5.
Werner h im self seems to consider Barbel’s study more significant than M ichaelis’. He 
certainly spends more time replying to the former than to the latter in his second edition o f  Formation. 
Interestingly, Barbel thought that the pre-Nicenes held to a form o f  angel Christology but he did not 
find evidence for its existence in the Primitive congregation. See Hannah, M ichael an d  Christ, 4ff.
P. Carrell, Jesus an d  the Angels, 3.
D. Hannah, M ichael an d  Christ, 5.
Gieschen’s painstaking examination o f the issues appertaining to angelic or 
Angelomorphic Christology suggests that Werner’s problem may have been primarily 
methodological and not factual per se. That is, the historian may have simply 
exceeded the bounds of the evidence that he presented
Gieschen brackets ontological issues when he examines the antecedents of 
ancient Angelomorphic traditions to avoid difficulties that have plagued past studies. 
How well Gieschen succeeds in this endeavor, though, is somewhat debatable."^^ In 
any case, Gieschen’s research in connection with Angelomorphic Christology is 
groundbreaking. Ergo, we deem it proper to evaluate the data he has compiled in his 
analysis o f Angelomorphic texts. It is also imperative to examine other contemporary 
works that deal with the theological areas of angelology and Christology. Although we 
primarily will appeal to Gieschen’s study in this chapter so that we may systematically 
analyze Tertullian’s doctrine of Christ’s person and work, we will also review 
Daniélou’s treatment concerning the absence or presence of Angelomorphic 
Christology in Tertullian’s literary corpus.
C. Gieschen judges Werner’s documentation for the existence o f  t'lrst century angelic Christology 
(the doctrine that Christ is a created angel) “meager” in Angelom orphic C hristology, 13. Martin Hengel 
offers a similar analysis: “At any rate, in his great work The F orm ation o f  Christian Dogma, Martin 
Werner much exaggerated the role o f ‘angel C hristology’ in early Christianity {M artin W erner hat a u f  
je d e n  Fall in seinem  grossen  Werk 'Die Enstehung des christlichen D ogm as' d ie  R olle der  
'E ngelchristologie ’ f i ir  das jrü h e  Christentnm w eit iiberschatzt). See D er Sohn Gottes: D ei Enstehung  
d er  C hristo logie und die jüdîsch-hellen istische R eligionsgeschichte. (Tübingen: JCB Mohr [Paul 
Siebeck], 1975), 131; The Son o f  God: The O rigin o f  C hristology an d  the H isto ty  o f  Jew ish-H ellenistic  
R elig ion  (London: SCM Press, 1976), 85.
C. Gieschen thinks that ontological concerns (questions concerning the being o f  Christ) have 
“ inhibited” Angelomorphic studies undertaken in the past. He proposes that we should now ask another 
question in place o f  the ontological ones, namely, “Where and how  did early Christians use the 
variegated angelomorphic traditions from the OT and other sources to express their Christology?” 
Consult G ieschen, A ngelom orphic C hristology, 349. G ieschen’s new  formulation o f  the Angelomorphic 
question is designed to show that Angelomorphic traditions significantly influenced early Christology 
qua  high Christology. Gieschen further maintains that traditions portraying Christ as the visible  
manifestation o f  God (the m alak YHWH) actually paved the way for later Christological affirmations 
such as “Jesus is Lord” (1 Cor 12:3) or YHWH. See ibid., 350. W hile he tries to downplay questions 
concerning the being o f  Christ in his study, it is evident that Gieschen espouses a high Christology, 
linking the Son in his role as angel with a visible manifestation o f  YHWH.
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B. The Question of Angelomorphic Christology in Tertullian ’s Writings
Daniélou maintains that Tertuilian assumes an antagonistic stance vis-à-vis “Judaeo-
Christian angelology.” For instance, he observes that the seminal Carthaginian thinker
firmly rejects a noted Jewish teaching that postulates angels sharing in the creation of
the first two human beings {Adv Prax 12.2). Daniélou further argues that Tertuilian
repudiates the alleged Judaeo-Christian concept of potestates ianithces, that is, the
notion that there are angels who purportedly judge the souls of humans, who having
died, subsequently appear before the divine judgment seat in h e a v e n .W ith
characteristic irony, Tertuilian writes:
Doubtless, when the souls have departed from their bodies, and begun 
to be put upon trial in the several stories o f the heavens, with reference 
to the engagement (under which they have come to Jesus), and to be 
questioned about those hidden mysteries o f the heretics, they must then 
confess before the real powers and the real men, the Teleti, to wit, and 
the Abascanti, and the Acineti o f Valentinus!^®
It seems certain that Tertuilian does not put faith in the notion of angels judging
human souls. Does this mean that he rejects Angelomorphic Christology or Judaic
angelology as a whole, however?
In view of the foregoing citation from Tertullian’s work, we have no problem
believing that the Christian rhetorician from North Africa is antipathetic towards any
gnoseological elements contained in so-called Judaeo-Christian angelology.
Nevertheless, it is also clear from a careful reading of Tertullian’s writings that he
does not repudiate Jewish angelology in toto. For example, when one consults
Tertullian’s inimitable discourse concerning the soul, he or she finds him affirming
the existence of a natality angel^' (a putative Second Temple Judaic notion) in
Tertuilian might have based his animus for this doctrine on what w e read in Hermas, Visions 1.1; 3.2; 
4.1 and Sim  9 .2  (written ca. 145).
Scorpiace  10.6-7
D e Anim a  37.1-2 reads: "Now the entire process o f  sow ing, forming, and completing the human
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addition to accommodating the theory o f a heavenly spirit being that dutifully escorts
the soul “on its journey” after death occurs:
Undoubtedly, when the soul, by the power of death, is released from its 
concretion with the flesh, it is by the very release cleansed and 
purified: It is, moreover, certain that it escapes from the veil o f the 
flesh into open space, to its clear, and pure, and intrinsic light; and then 
finds itself enjoying its enfranchisement from matter, and by virtue of 
its liberty it recovers its divinity, as one who awakes out o f sleep 
passes from images to verities. Then it tells out what it sees; then it 
exults or it fears, according as it finds what lodging is prepared for it, 
as soon as it sees the very angel's face, that arraigner of souls, the 
Mercury of the poets.”^^
It is evident from the passage quoted above, that Tertuilian does not eschew all forms
of Jewish angelology. Nonetheless, Daniélou does not simply think that Tertuilian
evinces antipathy towards Judaeo-Christianity by casting off certain vestiges of Jewish
angelology: He makes the stronger contention that “Tertuilian rejects all
Angelomorphic Christology.”^^  While Daniélou’s work is certainly first-rate and quite
innovative in many respects, we believe that it also contains certain problematic
features with reference to Tertullian’s concept of Angelomorphic Christology. We
will now discuss these seeming problemata.
embryo in the womb is no doubt regulated by som e power, which ministers herein to the w ill o f  God, 
whatever may be the method which it is appointed to employ. Even the superstition o f  Rom e, by 
careftilly attending to these points, imagined the goddess Alem ona to nourish the foetus in the womb; as 
w ell as (the goddesses) Nona and Decim a, called after the most critical months o f  gestation; and 
Partula, to manage and direct parturition; and Lucina, to bring the child to the birth and light o f  day. 
W e, on our part, believe the angels to officiate herein for God. The embryo therefore becom es a human 
being in the wom b from the moment that its form is completed" {Omnem autem hom inis in utero 
seren di s tn ien d i fin gen d i paraturam  /  a liqua utique po tes ta s divinae voluntatis m im stra modulatur, 
quam cum que illam rationem  agitare sortita . H aec aestim ando etiam  superstitio Rom ana deam  fin x it 
A lem onam  alendi in utero fe tu s et Nonam et D ecim am  a  sollicitiaribus mensibus et Partulam, quae  
partum  gubernet, et Lucinam, quae p rodu ca t in lucem. Nos officia divina angelos credimus. Ex eo  
igitur fe tu s  in utero homo, a  quo fo rm a  com pléta  est). Jan H. Waszink, D e Anim a  (Amsterdam: 
M eulenhoff, 1947).
J. W aszink, D e Anim a  53.6. P rocu l dubio cum vi m ortis exprim itur de concretione carnis et ipsa  
expressione colatur, certe de oppanso corporis erum pit in apertum  a d  meram et puram  e t suam  lucem, 
statim  sem etipsam  in expeditione substantiae recogn oscit e t in divinitatem  ipsa  liberta te resipiscit, ut 
de som nio em ergens ab im aginibus a d  veritates. Tunc e t enim tiat e t videt, tunc exultât aut trépidât, 
p ro u t para turam  devorsorii su i sentit, de ipsius statim  angeli facie , evocaloris animarum, M ercurii 
poetarum . Compare Lk 16:22.
J. D aniélou, O rigins o f  Latin C hristianity, trans. David Smith and John Austin Baker (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1977), 149.
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C. Problemata Associated with Daniélou’s Historical Method
There is one methodical problem that directly affects the phenomenological 
(i.e. descriptive) efficacy of Daniélou’s retelling (laxopia) of Latin dogmatic history 
{Dogmengeschichte). First, it is doubtful whether Judaeo-Christianity, as delineated by 
Daniélou, ever truly existed: “Jewish Christianity in the early centuries was a 
remarkably diversified phenomenon.” "^^ Therefore, one cannot faciiely 
compartmentalize early Christianity into categories such as the dogmatic historian 
employs (Jewish, Latin and Hellenistic) and expect justly treat the forms of 
Christianity that actually obtained in antiquity. The three putative types of Christianity 
actually overlap one another and contain homogeneous features that in some ways 
render the previously mentioned distinctions superfluous from an ontological 
(structural) standpoint. John A. Baker (editor and translator of Daniélou’s magnum 
opus) recognizes the difficulty with the late historian’s paradigm, while appropriately 
affirming the overalll value of his historical account.
Additional methodological problemata still linger. After all, what phenomena 
qualify as Jewish Christianity? What is the chronological ab initio that should one 
take into consideration when he or she embarks on an examination of Jewish Christian 
religious phenomena? Gieschen, while lauding Daniélou’s general contributions to the 
field of Angelomorphic Christology, also thinks there is a slight methodological 
difficulty with his work. He believes that Daniélou may need to revise his model of 
Judaeo-Christianity in view of the way that he assigns certain forms of Christianity to
Bart Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption o f  Scripture: The Effect o f  Early C hristological 
C ontroversies on the Text o f  the Agtr Testament (Oxford; Oxford Univcrsit)' Press. 1993). 5 0 -5 1,
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this category.H ow ever, there are other aspects of Daniélou’s approach that we need 
to address. We will continue to examine his historical paradigm in the next paragraph.
Bray discusses a number of relevant problematics that are associated with 
Daniélou’s thesis.^^ He concludes that Daniélou’s historical reconstruction of early 
Christianity is not wholly convincing since the late historian appears to arbitrarily 
argue that Tertullian’s work Scorpiace is dependent on Adversus Judaeos even though 
there is evidently no substantial evidence to support this proposal. Moreover, 
Daniélou considers the Passio Perpetuae a second century document. This suggestion 
is highly unlikely, however, in view of the martyrology that this literary work 
contains. Lastly, Daniélou also defines early Jewish Christianity in extremely broad 
terms, mistakenly equating much o f it with G nosticism .B ut this approach overlooks 
the cross-fertilization that Martin Hengel so thoroughly demonstrates obtained 
between Second Temple Judaism and Hellenism.
The textual evidence appears to show that Tertuilian does not expunge every 
vestige o f angelomorphism from his doctrine of Christ, one witnesses the “burning 
man” {vir ardensf'^ himself depicting the pre-incarnate Son as the Angel of the Lord 
{malak YHWH) in Adv Prax 16. The Son is rightly called an angel, “For he it always 
was who came down to converse with men, from Adam even to the patriarchs and 
prophets, always from the beginning preparing beforehand in dream and in a mirror
C. Gieschen, Angelom orphic C hristology, 15.
G. Bray, H oliness and  the Will o f  G od, 131-132.
Ibid. J. Daniélou also appears to make a fa u x  p a s  when he argues that Tertuilian assumes a perpetual 
p rise  de position  against Judaism. Tertuilian actually rails against certain forms o f  Judaism or particular 
gnoseological Judaic practices, not against Judaism sim pliciter. Daniélou’s problematic reading o f  
Tertuilian no doubt plays a part in his construal o f  Tertullian’s Christology. Despite the criticisms 
leveled here, however, we concur with Kearsley who acknowledges the impressive array o f  data that 
Daniélou amasses to highlight specific characteristics o f  Jewish Christianity. See R. Kearsley, 
Tertuilian's Theology, 4.
Martin Hengel, Judaism an d  Hellenism: S tudies in their Encounter in Palestine diming the E arly 
H ellenistic Period, 2 vols. (London; SCM Press, 1974).
Jerome, Ep. 84.2.
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and in an enigma that course which he was going to follow to the end.”®® Tertuilian 
shows that he accepts Angelomorphic Christology in two primary ways.
One apparatus that Tertuilian utilizes is the Biblical malak YHWH motifs. 
According to the Latin writer, God’s pre-existent Son is an angel in the sense that he 
functions as the Angel of the Lord {malak YHWH).^^ He is therefore the same spiritual 
being who appeared “in an enigma” {in aenigmate) to Adam, the patriarchs and the 
Hebrew prophets {ah Adam usque ad patriarchas et prophetas). Indeed, Tertuilian 
believes that the one whom Genesis portrays deambulating in the Garden of Eden 
about the time of evening {Et cum audissent vocem Domini Dei deambulantis in 
paradiso ad auram post meridiem) is none other than the pre-incamate and pre- 
theophanic Son of God.®  ^ Tertuilian lucidly affirms that from the very inception of 
human history, God’s only-begotten Son faithfully functioned in the capacity of the 
angel or messenger {nuntius) o f YHWH®^, ever communicating the divine will of 
deity while simultaneously learning how to be a man by means of His intermittent 
discourse with humans {Adv Prax 16). It is apropos, therefore, that Tertuilian again 
employs the malak YHWH xnoûï in Adv Marc 2.27: “Now we believe that Christ did 
ever act in the name of God the Father; that He actually from the beginning held 
intercourse with (men); actually communed with patriarchs and prophets; was the Son 
of the Creator; was His Word.”
^ A d v Prax  16.28-32. Ipse enim e t a d  Humana sem per colloqu ia  descendit, ab  A dam  usque a d  
pa triarch as et prophetas, in visione in som nio in speculo in aenigm ate ordinem suum praestruens ab  
in itio sem per quem erat persecuturus in fin em
Margaret Barker proposes that first century Palestinian Jews clung to a putative OT worldview  
{W eltanschauung) that conceived the malak YHWH  in terms o f  a son o f  God who has the potential to 
temporarily embody him self in human form. She writes concerning Christ: “It was as a manifestation o f  
Yahweh, the Son o f  God, that Jesus was acknow ledged as Son o f  God, Messiah and Lord.” See The 
G reat Angel: A Study o f  Israel's Second G o d  (London: SPCK, 1992), 3. Jewish monotheism, as Barker 
understands it, did not prevent YHWH  from having a number o f  angelic sons, one o f  whom served as a 
visible manifestation o f  the Deity Him self.
“ Gen 3:8 (Vg).
“  D e Carne 14.5.
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Contra Daniélou, there then appears to be ample evidence that Tertuilian 
identifies the Angel of the Lord {malak YHWH) with the theophanic Son o f God. The 
motifs that he utilizes in his anti-heretical treatises demonstrate that one can find 
Angelomorphic themes throughout his literary corpus. The pre-Nicene consistently 
maintains that Christ assumes the form of an angel when the will o f God deems it 
necessary. When making such observations, however, we do not mean to minimize 
the fact that Tertuilian clearly ascribes the moniker “angel” to Christ. In fact, we will 
now review a text wherein Tertuilian explicitly attributes the appellative “angel” 
{angelus) to the Son.
A second way that Tertuilian exhibits his acceptance of Angelomorphic 
Christology is by directly calling the Son an angel. Tertuilian applies the term “angel” 
to Christ in De Came 14.17-20: “Certainly he is described as the angel o f great 
counsel, ‘angel’ meaning ‘messenger’, by a term of office, not of nature: for he was to 
announce to the world the Father’s great project, concerned with the restitution of 
man.”®'^
When reading De Came and other treatises of Tertuilian, one has to concede 
that the apologist is extremely reluctant to call Christ an angel. He goes to great 
lengths in order to stress that the Son is not an angel in the same way that Michael and 
Gabriel are angels. Furthermore, he explicitly states that Christ is only an angel per 
function and not according to his substance.®® Nevertheless, these concessions do not 
vitiate Tertullian’s portrayal o f the Son as an angel. There are manifest 
Angelomorphic elements contained in his writings whether he explicitly calls the Son 
“angel” or incorporates malak YHWH motifs. It thus does not seem quite accurate to
^  D ictus e st quidem  magni consilii angelus, id  est nuntius, officii non naturae vocabulo: magnum enim  
cogitaium  pa tris, super hominis sc ilicet restitutionem , adnuntiaturus saeculo erat.
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maintain that Tertuilian rejects all Angelomorphic Christology. Maybe there is one 
issue relating to this subject matter that we should consider before concluding, 
however.
It is quite possible that Daniélou is working with a rather narrow definition of 
Angelomorphic Christology. If by “Angelomorphic Christology” Daniélou means a 
doctrine o f Christ that teaches the Son is an angel as to substance (ouata), then he is 
correct to contend that Tertuilian rejects “all Angelomorphic Christology,” for the 
ancient Carthaginian does not believe that Christ possesses the entire complex of 
angelic properties.®® Nevertheless, it does not seem that the nomenclature 
“Angelomorphic Christology” adequately expresses the concept that Tertuilian 
repudiates. In fact, there is ample evidence that both Angelomorphic themes and 
language are contained in his works. Hence, it would be much more preferable to say 
that he does not affirm angelic Christology, that is, the theological doctrine posited by 
Werner which teaches that Christ has an angelic nature or posesses the entire 
composite o f properties that putatively constitute an angelic being. In this case, 
Daniélou’s shortcoming would most likely be the result o f semiotic imprecision or 
catachresis and not misrepresentative historiography per se.
Based on the foregoing, however, it seems safe to conclude that one must 
nuance Daniélou’s observations regarding Tertullian’s Angelomorphic Christology in
“  C. Gieschen, A ngelom orphic C hristology, 193.
^  The historian may be using the nomenclature in this way since he contends that “strictly Jewish 
Christian conceptions o f  Angelom orphic Christology” depict the Son as an angel according to nature 
and not simply as an angelus per his divine m ission (J. Daniélou, Jewish Christianity, 146). The Jewish 
Christian delineation o f  Angelom orphic Christology is said to be accomplished by means o f  angelic 
imagery since it evidently depicts the Son as an angel in substance or in his very eternal being.
The present writer’s comm ent about angelic properties assumes that there are truly mind- 
independent spiritual entities that possess certain objective (mind-independent) properties (qualities, 
characteristics and attributes) that allow  such spiritual entities in relation to collectively belong to the 
class o f  being that som e call angels. An extensive discussion o f  properties sim pliciter is outside the 
bounds o f  this study. Suffice it to say that a sophicated account o f  a priori contingent {per accidens) 
properties and a posteriori necessary (essential) properties appears in Saul Kripke’s Naming and
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order to delineate adequately his doctrine o f Christ’s person and work.®  ^ We have
good reason to believe that Tertuilian does not reject “all Angelomorphic
Christology.” Even when he is reluctant to call Christ an angel, we think that the
overall argument presented in this study accounts for such times o f reticence.
Consequently, we contend that there are discernible traces o f Angelomorphic
Christology in the writings o f Tertuilian. Gieschen concurs with this assessment
because he writes:
The idea that all visible manifestations of God are the Son had a 
pervasive influence on many of the church’s leading exegetes. 
Tertuilian, whose writings date from ca. 193-220 CE, is also guided by 
this principle. He, too, assigns all judgment and revelatory activity, 
including that carried out by the Angel o f the Lord, to the Son.®^
It thus seems that the following conclusions are tentatively warranted. The pioneer of
Latin Christianity explicitly writes that Christ is not an angel per substantiam but only
as to to function {De Carne 14.17-20). Such passages, however, do not undermine the
fact that vestiges o f Angelomorphic Christology appear in the writings o f Tertuilian.
Therefore, while the noted pre-Nicene’s doctrine of Christ is admittedly complicated
and resists reductionistic explanations, it is sufficient to note that Daniélou’s argument
regarding the absence of Angelomorphic Christology in Tertullian’s work simply will
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 1980), 106-34.
“  P. Carrell is a little more cautious in his wording. He notes that Tertuilian “was suspicious o f  angel 
Christology” although he calls Christ “the Angel o f  Great Counsel” (Jesus an d  the A ngels, 101).
Despite his remarks concerning Angelom orphic Christology being contained in Tertullian’s writings, 
w e must note that Gieschen is quick to point out Tertullian’s terminology does not imply that the 
apologist believes Christ possesses an angelic nature. N evertheless, Justin Martyr (A pology  1 6.1-2) 
evidently does think that Christ is an angel p e r  substantiam . Gieschen explains the famed Justinian 
passage that w e find in A po logy  1 as follows: "What is striking about this text is both Justin's 
acknowledgement that angels are made like Christ (i.e ., o f  the same nature) and the inclusion o f  angels 
as receiving 'worship and adoration' (GE^opEGcx KOI TTpoaKUVOUjJEV) in a sequence after the Father 
and the Son and before the (prophetic) Spirit" (A ngelom orphic C hristology, 193-194). Gieschen further 
suggests that Tertuilian may be reacting to Justin’s angelomorphic Christology when he stresses 
Christ’s function as an angel over against Christ actually being an angel, though there may be reason to 
believe that there are other factors governing his emphasis o f  Christ’s function (his ex officio  status) as 
an angel over against his possessing an angelic nature. N ote Talbert’s discussion concerning the 
incorporation o f  the m alak YHWH  concept in Tertuilian and his “distaste” for the “docetic implications”
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not hold up under scrutiny. It is better to say that Tertuilian does not believe the Son is 
an angel in the manner o f Gabriel and Michael than to maintain that he rejects 
Angelomorphic Christology in Accordingly, let us now discuss a second related
claim o f Daniélou that appertains to our study. This contention involves the 
ontological relationship between Christ and the angels.
D. The Ontological Chasm and Tertuilian’s Angelomorphic Aversion 
Although it seems that the difficulty with Daniélou’s reading of Tertuilian is primarily 
semiotic, we will continue using the terminology “Angelomorphic Christology” in this 
section to describe the doctrine that Daniélou thinks Tertuilian repudiates. Having 
established that the pre-Nicene is not averse to all Angelomorphic Christology, 
however, we will now explore whether Tertullian’s rejection of what is, in reality, 
angelic Christology stems from his elevated ontological notions concerning the Son of 
God.
When perusing the sundry theological works of Tertuilian, one observes that 
he does not prefer to identify Christ as an angel. Furthermore, he explicitly declares 
that the Son is only an angel in the sense that Christ is a messenger {nuntius) for the 
Father: He is not an angel as nature {ut naturd). Nevertheless, we do well to ask why 
the Latin apologist par excellence apparently does not attribute angelic properties to 
the preeminent Son of God. Why is he so hesitant to impute angelhood to Christ? In 
the attempt to obtain an answer to such queries, we will review Daniélou’s discussion 
QÏ Adv Prax 3.4-10 and analyze the ontological divide that he posits between Christ 
and the angels.
o f  angelomorphic Christology. See C.H. Talbert, “The Myth o f  the Descending-Ascending Redeemer in 
Mediterranean Antiquity,” NTS 22 (1976): 418-40 .
P. Carrell, Jesus an d  the Angels, 101.
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E. Critiquing Daniélou’s Analysis of Adversus Praxean 3
Tertuilian allegedly rejects all Angelomorphic Christology since he supposedly
believes there is a “radical distinction” between the ministering angels o f God {igitur
si et monarchia divina per tot legiones et exercitus angelorum administratur sicut
scriptum e stf^  and the three persons o f the Trinitarian Godhead that Tertuilian teaches
share one divine substance {tres personae una substantia).^^ The pre-Nicene
purportedly makes this distinction for two primary reasons.
Daniélou first appeals to Adv Prax 3.4-10 so that he may demonstrate the
marked distinction that he thinks Tertuilian makes between the innumerable holy
angels o f deity and the three divine persons of the Trinity (tres personae trinitatis).
Adv Prax 3.4-10 states that the angels administer God’s single rule {monarchia) but
do not thereby destroy it.^  ^ Furthermore, it may indicate that the angels are not
consubstantial {consubstantialis) with the Father. In fact, Daniélou believes are
possibly alienated from His very substance:
Therefore if also the divine monarchy is administered by the agency of 
so many legions and hosts o f angels (as it is written, Ten thousand 
times ten thousand stood before him and thousand thousands 
ministered unto him), yet has not ceased to belong to one, so as to 
cease to be a monarchy because it has for its provincial governors so 
many thousand authorities, how should God be thought, in the Son and
A dv Prax  3.35ff: “Therefore i f  also the divine monarchy is administered by the agency o f  so many 
legions and host o f  angels, as it is written.”
J. D aniélou, The O rigins o f  Latin C hristianity, 149-150. Tertuilian h im self {Adv Prax  2 .3 -7) writes 
that the person ae trinitatis are three as regards sequence, aspect, and manifestation o f  power, yet one 
with respect to quality, power and substance. The three sequences, aspects and manifestations o f  power 
are “reckoned out in the name o f  three persons” (tres autem  non statu se d  gradu, nec substantia  sed  
fo rm a , nec po testa te  se d  specie, unius autem  substantiae e t unius status et unius postesta tis, qu ia unus 
deus ex quo et g radu s isti e t fo rm ae e t spec ies in nomine p a tr is  e t f i l i i  et spiritus sancti deputantur).
J. Moltmann, Trinity an d  the Kingdom , 130-134 contains pertinent information concerning the 
history o f  the term m onarchia. Moltmann points out that this “curious hellenistic word-formation” is a 
Greek com pound o f  jJOVGF  and p tC t CCpXL}. Moltmann consequently states that this term originates 
with Pythagorean terminology used in Alexandria. He observes that we also witness the concept o f  
G od’s m onarchia  in Philo, Justin, and Tatian where it respectively refers to God’s lordship (Justin), the 
“monarchical constitution” o f  the cosm os (Tatian) or G od’s universal sovereignty (Philo). Tertuilian 
appears to employ the signifier in order to reference G od’s supreme empire or rule (130-131). 
M oltmann notes that the pre-Nicenes thus replace the biblical concept o f  ^ a o iA e ia  with what he 
calls, “an uncommonly seductive religious-political ideology” (131).
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in the Holy Spirit occupying second and third place, while they are to 
such a degree conjoint of the Father’s substance, to experience a 
division and a dispersion such as he does not experience in the plurality 
o f all those angels, alien as they are from the Father’s substance/®
The rhetorical period {rrspioôos) constructed in the previously quoted passage is
somewhat protracted and relatively intricate. Nevertheless, the general thesis
communicated by this text is for the most part unambiguous. Although the divine
monarchy {monarchia) is the sole government (single empire) of God, the Almighty
Sovereign permits His heavenly subordinates to administer the cosmic Kingdom in
His behalf without the said rule of Deity suffering any monarchical diminution
whatsoever. Tertuilian portrays God’s absolute decision in the following terms: “The
divine monarchy is administered by the agency of so many legions and hosts of angels
(as it is written, Ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him and thousand
thousands ministered unto him), yet has not ceased to belong to one.”
The comments of the apologist further reveal why Jesus of Nazareth could
speak o f summoning twelve legions o f angels (a multitude of holy spirit creatures)
who possess the God-given puissance to deliver the incarnate Son from the life-
threatening thralls of His prima facie formidable opponents. There are myriads of
angels that attend the Father’s heavenly throne. Consequently, the Son: “ordains for
his disciples a kingdom even as he declares that one has been ordained for him by his
Father: and he has power to ask his Father for legions of angels to help him, if he
wished.” "^^ These angels, Jesus o f Nazareth was fully aware, compose the heavenly
A dv P rax  3. Igitur s i et m onarchia d ivina  p e r  toto legiones e t exercitus angelorum adm inistretur 
sicu t scriptum  est, M ilies centies centena m ilia  adsisteban t ei, nec ideo unius esse desiit, ut desinat 
m onarchia esse quia p e r  tanta m ilia virtutum procuratur, Q uale est ut deus divisionem  et dispersionem  
p a ti  v idea tur in f i l io  e t in spiritu  sane to secundum  e t tertium sort it is locum, tarn consortibus 
substan tiae pa tris, quas non pa titu r in to t angelorum  numéro et quidem tarn alienorum a  substantia  
pa tr is .
A dv Prax  26 .11-14 . D isponens regnum discipu lis quom odo et sib i dispositum  dicit a  patre, habens 
po tes ta tem  legiones angelorum  postu lan di a d  a m iliu m  a  p a tre  s i vellet.
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army o f YHWH often referred to in the Hebrew Scriptures by means of the formula 
YHWH Sabaoth (Ps 68:17)/® They are akin to mighty winds (TruEupaTa) or flaming 
fires (TTupoç 4>Xoya), figuratively speaking (Heb 1:7, 14). Such ones fittingly wield 
the divine power of God’s monarchia.
Despite administering the divine Kingdom dilligently, the innumerable legions 
o f supernal beings, whom both Jesus and Tertuilian allude to, never cause any 
dissolution to the suzerainty o f God. They are concomitantly God’s servants {exercitus 
angelorum administretur) and spiritual sons.^® Therefore, God the Father has 
graciously allowed his “family connections” {pignoraf^ to administer His supreme 
monarchical arrangement in the capacity of submissive heavenly officials 
{officiales) This arrangement in nowise impugns or diminishes His divine unicity. 
As Tertuilian so avidly insists.
Tertuilian recalls the words of the prophet Daniel: “As it is written, Ten 
thousand times ten thousand stood before him and thousand thousands ministered 
unto him.” Daniel, in the manner o f John’s NT Apocalypse (Apoc 7:11-12), vividly 
depicts myriads upon myriads o f angels surrounding the awe-inspiring throne of The 
Most High {altissimus) in a resplendent deific vision (Dan 7:10).^® Yet the thousands 
and thousands o f angels that John or Daniel describe do not threaten the sole cosmic
The N T  Epistle o f  James also appears to em ploy this expression in 5:4 o f  that work. For details o f  
Jam es’ use o f  the Hebraic formula, see Martin D ibelius, James: A Comm entary on the Epistle o f  Jam es, 
rev. Heinrich Greenven, ed. Helmut Koester (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976).
A dv M arc  5 .18 .14 . Tertuilian identifies the “sons o f  God” in Gen 6 as angels (D e Idolatria  9). 
Reference D e Virg 7.2; 11.2. Athenagoras also believes the angels are “ministers” treated in Christian 
th eo log ia  along with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit (L eg p ro  10). This functional identification 
evidently fo llow s that utilized elsewhere in the N T  (H eb 1:14; Rev 22:9) and Philo. Crehan however 
stresses that Athenagoras did not necessarily copy Philo in this regard in Presbeia p e r i Christianon, 
trans. and annot. Joseph Hugh Crehan, Westminster: Newm an Press and London: Longmans and Green, 
1956), 134.
E. Evans writes that p ign ora  are sons o f  the Emperor. This is another point Indicating that the angels 
possibly share the substance o f  the Father and are actually part o f  His monarchy.
A dv Prax  3.4.
See S.M . Olyan, A Thousands Thousands S erved  Him: Exegesis and the Naming o f  Angels in Ancient
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rule o f Almighty God. Tertuilian thus forcefully reminds Praxeas: “Do you account 
provinces and family connections and officials and the very forces and the whole 
trappings of empire to be the overthrow of it? You are wrong if you do” {membra et 
pignora et instrumenta et ipsam vim ac totum censum monarchiae eversionem députas 
eius? Non recte)}^ A fortiori the angels (Tertuilian reasons) uphold God’s sole rule as 
loyal servants and sons (“family connections”). Their task is simply to administer the 
supreme monarchy as God wills without imperiling His sovereignty or ontological 
unicity.
Basing our thoughts on the language used in Adv Prax 3.4-10, it seems 
appropriate to conclude that the countless subordinate divine beings (i.e. the angels) 
existing in the heavens o f God’s presence are actually part of the divine monarchy; 
they serve as eminent administrators of the the Father’s Kingdom. Daniélou, 
nonetheless, argues that Tertuilian radically distinguishes these angelic ministers of 
God from the only begotten Son o f the Most High Deity and the Holy Spirit, who 
(according to Tertuilian) respectively occupy second and third place in the Godhead 
{videatur in filio et in spiritu sancto secundum et tertium sortit is lo c u m ) .What are 
we to make o f his suggestion in view of the present discussion concerning Adv Prax 
3.4-10? What are Daniélou’s reasons for epistemically excluding the angels from 
God’s monarchia?
Judaism  (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1993).
A dv P rax  3.4. Clement o f  Rome comments on Daniel 7:10 as follows: “Let our glorying and our 
confidence be in him; let us submit ourselves to his will; let us consider the w hole multitude o f  his 
angels, how  they stand by and serve his w ill. For the scripture says. Ten thousand times ten thousand 
stood  beside him, and thousands o f  thousands served him; and they cried, Holy, holy, holy Lord o f  
Sabaoth! A ll creation is full o f  his glory” (I Clement 34 .5-6).
A dv Prax  3.6.
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While the latter personae (according to Tertuilian) share the Father’s 
substantia (being extensions thereof)/^ Daniélou observes that the former (the angels) 
are aliens o f the Father’s substance {alienorum a substantia patris)P  Consequently, 
he thinks we have one line of evidence that indicates Tertuilian makes a marked 
distinction of being (i.e. an ontological differentiation) between the angels and the 
pre-eminent Son of God. These arguments do not convice the present writer, however, 
for the following three reasons.
(I) As we have implied above, Adv Prax 3.4-10 suggests that the angels are 
actually part o f God’s monarchy in a manner analogous to God’s Son and His Spirit of 
holiness being part o f the monarchy. Tertuilian indicates that the angels serve as 
eminent dignitaries (“provincial governors”) of the divine Kingdom. The supreme 
empire, “has for its provincial governors so many thousand authorities” {quia per tant 
milia virtutum procuratur) since the angels share in its benevolent sphere of 
influence.^"^ In this exalted capacity, they faithfully oversee the single rule 
{monarchia) of the supreme Monarch, being an integral part of God’s peerless empire. 
Tertuilian in fact attributes a highly exalted position to the angels in relation to Deity, 
for he thinks that the “angels rank next to God.” ®^
A dv P rax  8. George C. Stead, in his magisterial study concerning the notion o f  divine substance, 
points out that Tertuilian has no problem applying substantia  to God. He notes that Tertuilian uses 
su bstan tia  in A dv Prax 9 to refer to uncreated spiritus, which is differentiated from created finite 
sp ir itu s  by its inherent “purity, subtlety and power, which was at first concentrated in the Father, then 
distributed to the Son and Spirit,” see D ivine Substance  (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1977), 161.
A dv P rax  3 .8-9. R. Kearsley concurs with D aniélou’s reading o f  this text. He writes that Tertuilian 
believes: “The Son and Holy Spirit (Adv P rax  3) enjoy the status o f  equal possessors (consortes) in the 
substance o f  the Father (substantiae p a tr is )  and not mere sharers (participes). By contrast, Tertuilian 
supposedly pegs the angels as alien to the Father’s substance (alienorum a substantia  patris),"' see 
T ertu llian ’s  Theology, 124. E. Osborn offers a smilar analysis o f  Tertullian’s Christology with these 
viv id  statements: “God delegates authority to the angels; but each member o f  the trinity possesses 
w ithou t lim it the family property. The father comm unicates all that he has to Son and Spirit, so that they 
too are omnipotent (Prax. 7 .3 ),” see Tertuilian: F irst Theologian o f  the West (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 131.
A dv P rax 2.^-5.
D e R es 5.2; CCSL 2:926. A ngelos p o s t deum  novimus. Translation found in J. Pelikan, The Christian  
Tradition, 1:197.
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(2) The reading, alienorum a substantia patris, is possibly a corrupt one/® 
Evans himself only essays it as a possible reconstructed lection. Consequently, we do 
not think that Daniélou’s contention is absolutely probative. Tertuilian may or may 
not think the angels are consubstantial {consubstantialis) with the Father. However, it 
does not seem that one can rigidly appeal to Adv Prax 3.4-10 in order to establish this 
view. The reading alienorum a substantia patris may very well be inauthentic since 
later in Tertullian’s treatise, he insists that God has created humans from His very 
substance. Man is thus the imago D e i^  Why then, cannot the angels who apparently 
surpass humans in power and strength (2 Pet 2:11) also share in or originate from 
God’s substance? Nevertheless there is yet another reason why we take issue with 
Daniélou’s construal of the textual evidence in this case.
(3) A careful evaluation of Tertullian’s literary corpus demonstrates that he not 
only applied Ps 8:5 to the incarnate Son of God, but he also assigns this text to the 
minoration of the Son within the G o d h ead .T h at is, Tertuilian believes that the pre­
incarnate and pre-theophanic Son of God by virtue of His temporal generation in 
heaven {nativitas perfecta) was actually lower than the angels before He became a 
man or manifested Himself to the prophets and patriarchs via visions and enigmata. 
We put forth this proposition as one of the main reasons that Tertuilian does not prefer 
to identify Christ as an angel ut natura. We submit that he actually believes the Son 
qua Son was lower than God’s holy angels previous to His enfleshment. Now that we
A em ilii Kroymann records the follow ing textual information for Adv Prax 3.4ff: “e/ quidem  tarn 
<alienorum >  Gel: e t quidem  tarn PMF, e t quid'! Demta Eng, ecqu id  m ta .  Oehlerus. See Corpus 
Scriptorum  E cclesiasticorum  L atin om m  Editum C onsililio Et Impensis, Tertuilian's O pera Ex 
R ecensione, vol. 47 (Vienna, 1906).
A dv Prax  5.
After a brief overview  o f  how  Tertuilian interprets Ps 8:5 in other passages, Evans concludes: “The 
present passage {Adv Prax  9] therefore stands alone in regarding the minoration as the subordination o f  
the Son to the Father within the Godhead” (E. Evans, A dversus Praxean, 248).
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have evaluated Daniélou’s view, however, thus setting the stage for our treatment of 
Tertullian’s work, we will now examine how the pre-Nicenes employ Ps 8:5.
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Chapter 2
The Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 in the Pre-Nicenes
This chapter will concern itself with the pre-Nicene exegesis of Ps 8:5. However, the 
interpretation of the text did not occur in vacuo. Accordingly, Colish’s observation 
regarding Tertuilian applies to each ante-Nicene theologian: “His thought must thus 
be understood in its particular historical, cultural, and existential setting.” ®^
With Colish’s words in mind, we will not simply review the way that the pre- 
Nicene writers (including Tertuilian) exegeted Ps 8:5. This study will also take the life 
situation (Sitz im Leben) o f select pre-Nicenes into consideration as it investigates 
how writers preceding 325 CE understood the saying concerning the Son of Man 
becoming lower than the angels. This approach will necessitate a brief overview of 
Gnosticism since the influential amalgam of philosophico-religious ideas often served 
as the backdrop for scriptural explanations put forth by Tertuilian to counter heresy. 
Furthermore, it is imperative to review the orthodox response that anti-Gnostic writers 
produced in defense of the historical Christian faith. Only after presenting this 
material and providing a much need existential and cultural context for Tertullian’s 
interpretation of Ps 8:5 will this investigation then demonstrate how the pre-Nicenes 
understood the pivotal hymnodic text.
A. Overview of Gnosticism 
The nomenclature “Gnosticism” refers to an assortment of “religious systems and 
ideas” that evidently thrived from the first century CE onward^® with some forms of
Maria L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition fro m  Antiquity to the E arly Middle Ages, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 
1985), 2:12.
^  Pokorny is no doubt correct when he observes that the evidence for a first century form o f  Gnosticism  
is  not “unequivocally attested.” But w e can surmise that an incipient form o f  Gnosticism obtained in the 
first century in view  o f  the data contained in John’s Gospel and the Pauline Epistles. See Petr Pokorny, 
C olossians: A Com we/i/a/y (Peabody; Hendrickson, 1991), 117.
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the movement actually surviving until the medieval period/’ These variegated 
systems and concepts®^ were “both highly syncretistic and contemplative” in that they 
extracted speculative elements from diverse Jewish and pagan religio-philosophical 
sources®® while promoting the notion that humankind, though provisionally subsisting 
in a state of spiritual darkness, is still capable of attaining psychic liberation through 
the personal acquisition of
One distinctive teaching of Gnosticism is the notion of divine aeons that 
emanate from the ungenerated silence (i.e., God). For some Gnostics, God as Silence 
qua Silence signifies the ineffable and ineomprehensible “perfect, preexistent aeon, 
dwelling in the invisible and unnamable elevations.”®® Therefore, Silence is the 
“prebeginning and forefather and depth” or “deep solitude for infinite aeons.”®® 
Conversely, other Gnostic thinkers such as Valentinus think that “depth” is a deific 
attribute as opposed to a separate hypostatic entity, and they maintain that the aeons 
are prolations “immanent with God.”®^
Additionally, dualistic and anti-worldly tendencies characterize Gnosticism.
See Stanley M . Burgess, The H oly Spirit: A ncient Christian Traditions (Peabody: Hendrickson, 
1984), 35; Paul T illich, A H isto ty  o f  Christian Thought (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1968), 33. Kelly 
is reluctant to call Gnosticism a movement. H e considers the term “m isleading” when applied to the 
G nostic religion. The terminology implies, Kelly thinks, that Gnosticism was a “Concrete organization 
or church.” Even he has to concede, however, that the systems or schools labeled Gnosticism have 
enough in common to be categorized in som e form or fashion. This study thus takes the position that the 
syncretistic religio-philosophical phenomenon known as Gnosticism qualifies as a movement in a 
sociological sense. See John N .D . Kelly, E arly Christian D octrines (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 
1978), 25.
Olson also prefers the terminology “schools” or “m ovem ents.” He recounts that Irenaeus studied 
twenty o f  the Gnostic schools and set out their similarities and differences in detail. Vide Roger Olson, 
The S tory  o f  Christian Theology: Twenty C enturies o f  Tradition and  Reform  (Downers Grove:
Inter Varsity Press, 1999), 37ff,
P. Pokorny, C olossians, 117.
S, Burgess, H oly Spirit, 35.
J. Pelikan, Christian Tradition, 1:85 
^  Ibid.
Ibid. Richard M elick also cites Lohse who contends that Valentianian Gnosticism teaches that God 
does not belong to the TrXqpCOpcc in Philippians, C olossians, Philemon: An E xegetical and  
T heological E xposition o f  H oly Scripture, N AC  (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1991), 223. This 
statement is not necessarily dissonant with Pelikan's observations. It is logically possible that the aeons 
are immanent in the D eity without the Deity being one o f  the aeons.
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One reason for the Gnostic’s anti-worldly demeanor was the plenitude o f evil that the 
Gnostics, like modern theoreticians, observed in the cosmos. We will now discuss the 
manner in which these speculative systems attempted to solve the logical problem of 
evil. In so doing, we will focus on Valentinian ontology and Christology. This inquiry 
will also review the background of the noted Gnostic from Egypt.
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B. Valentinian Ontology and Christology
Valentinus (ca. 140) was originally a renowned member of the catholic community 
located in Rome.®® Epiphanius reports that he arrived from Egypt, having been 
schooled in Alexandria; the celebrated Gnostic supposedly later broke with the church 
because he was not appointed to the office of bishop. Unfortunately, we only have 
fragments of his literary corpus and this situation requires that one piece together his 
ontology (theory of being), Christology and the account of Valentinus’ alleged 
ecclesiastical defection.®® Elaine Pagels casts doubt on the latter point, arguing that his 
defection is essentially a fiction of zealous heresiologists like Tertuilian.'®®
Despite the fragmentary status of the textual evidence, however, we may justly 
infer that Valentinus believed God created Adam in accordance with a “heavenly 
model of the angels.” '®' He also taught that Jesus only appeared to be human and did 
not really assimilate the food or drink that he reportedly ingested or imbibed during 
the period o f His enfleshment on earth. According to Irenaeus, Valentinus also posited 
the notion of a nXrfpcûfja composed of thirty supernal aeons ordered in fifteen pairs 
called syzygies,'®^ including a maternal figure that supposedly brought forth Christ 
and the Creator {ôrjiJioijpyos) of the material order since the Gnostic Christ and 
Demiurge apparently existed outside o f the pre-cosmic nXqpcopa}'^^
Valentinus was considered an intelligent and well-spoken individual. He claimed that he received a 
secret Christian tradition from Theudas, one o f  the apostle Paul’s disciples. Consult E. Pagels, The 
G nostic G ospels  (N ew  York; Random House, 1978), 36. Paul putatively only taught such wisdom to a 
select few  (Ibid., 37).
^  See De C a m e  24  for a list o f  Christological heresies. This particular caput outlines the aeons o f  
Valentinus.
Tertuilian reports that Valentinus became disgruntled when he was not appointed as bishop o f  Rome 
Historians usually discount his story, however, for two reasons; (I )  The characteristic rhetorical nature 
o f  polem ic writings; (2) Historically, the orthodox seem  to have parted ways with the Gnostics rather 
than the other w ay around (E. Pagels, Gnostic G ospels, 39). However, Tertullian’s story does shed light 
on the nature o f  the orthodox response during his time.
See Riemer Roukema, G nosis and Faith in E arly C hristianity  (London, SCM Press, 1999), 129.
Bruce M. Metzger, The Canon o f  the New Testam ent (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1997), 81.
R. Roukema, G nosis an d  Faith, 130.
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Prend observes that the following characterizes Valentinian Gnosticism: God 
is one, transcendent, incomprehensible and originates from the Depth {pu6os) or 
Primal Cause.'®'' Depth (the absolute Father) subsequently brings forth Silence 
{aiyera) and these two metaphysical principles (one masculine and the other 
feminine) prolate Understanding {uous) and Truth {aXrjdEicf). Altogether, thirty aeons 
proceed, with some pleromatic entities being masculine and others being femine in 
nature. These prolations (i.e. emanations) collectively constitute the hidden nXrfpcojja 
(fullness o f divine powers) of Gnosticism. The ultimate aeon is Sophia who lapses 
“into the darkness o f despair,” giving birth to a “malformed infant” named laldabaoth 
(“Child of Chaos).'®® The material cosmos then derives its existence from this chaotic 
fallen deity otherwise known as the Demiurge.
An intra-pleromatic conflict {ayojv) ultimately occurs between Sophia and 
laldabaoth. Valentinus thinks that this aycou is the aetiological basis for the 
concomitant existence of good and evil.'®® In view o f the cosmic evil pervading the 
cosmos, however, the Gnostics argue that Sophia sent a Savior (Jesus) to redeem 
those who come to know themselves (yvcoois aeau T O u) through the medium of 
yvcoaia deou. Fucooto dsou (knowledge of God) is mystical and intuitive awareness; 
a “direct beholding of the divine reality” functioning as “an earnest o f the 
consummation to come.”'®^  Such self-knowledge is the vehicle of salvation for the 
Gnostic. Knowledge of the god within liberates the initiate’s soul from the defective
See W. H. C. F rend, Rise o f  C hristianity, 207; R. Olson, Story o f  Theology, 37.
Frend, Rise o f  Christianity, 207.
Hom er’s Iliad  contains myths that parallel the Gnostic explanation for the logical problem o f  evil. 
See Mark P. O. Morford and Robert J. Lenardon, C lassica l M ythology  (N ew  York: Longman, 1999), 
370-371.
Hans Jonas, The G nostic Religion: The M essage o f  the Alien G o d  and the Beginnings o f  C hristianity  
(Boston: Bacon Press, 1963), 285. Gilbert Murray adds that y v c o o t F  ÔEOIA “is not a mere intellectual 
knowledge. It is a complete union, a merging o f  beings,” see Five Stages o f  Greek R eligion  (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1955), 154.
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body that is composed of evil matter.
Before concluding this study’s synopsis of Gnosticism and Valentinian 
thought, we must further treat the ontology and Christology of Valentinus. In 
particular, it is vital to highlight the dualism and conflict that constitutes the 
substratum of the nXrjpcofja.
Sophia is temporarily expelled from the locus of divine plentitude to a lower 
material realm, which actualizes as a consequence of Sophia’s propensities for change 
and flux. The Valentinian irAqpcopa is thus dialectical in that there is both a potential 
and actual tension that characterizes its constitutional makeup. The Divine (according 
to the Valentinian Weltanschauung) is both feminine and masculine: there are two 
principles o f the nXqpcoija (the fullness of divinity). One metaphysical substrate (the 
Father) experiences divine plenitude in an absolute sense. The other deific source of 
divinity (ao<t)ta) is marginal and prone to sin. Valentinus’ notion o f divine plenitude 
is therefore structurally dualistic, yet differs from Plato’s transcendent realm of Ideas 
since the eternal and immutable world of Valentinianism assumes or sublates 
{aufheben) the temporal and inferior realm of becoming. The result is that the world 
and the Creator (ôqpioupyo^) o f the cosmos are both inherently malignant. 
Additionally, evil originates with the Godhead instead of having its beginnings with 
humankind. Flence, one must ask how successful the Gnostic theodicy is, since it links 
evil with both intra and extra-pleromatic divine entities.
In conclusion, we can safely state that the Valentinian Christology resembles 
the Gospel of Truth {Evangelium Veritatis) in some respects. For instance, Valentinus 
posits a K a ra fa a is  for Christ the Redeemer who descends from on high and unites 
with Jesus, an entity who appears to be human, but is really spiritual: “Thus for these 
Gnostics Jesus only seemed to be human. His entire earthly existence was a charade in
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which he pretended to be flesh and blood for his disciple’s sake.” '®® When Jesus of 
Nazareth dies on the crux, the Gnostic Christ raises His mortal body and carries it to 
the spiritual realms above. In this manner, he prepares the way for others to enter the 
divine nÀrjpcoiJa, thereby functioning as a forerunner (TTpoÔpoiJOs) in behalf of the 
“elect.” '®® This type o f Christology manifestly devalues the flesh, however. It is no 
wonder that certain phenomenologists of religion have described it as “exilic” or anti- 
worldly."® The pessimistic tendencies and heresiarchal nature of the Gnostic schools 
undeniably accounted for the orthodox rejoinder to the syncretistic movement.
C. The Orthodox Response 
Gnosticism posed a formidable challenge to the Christian faith. It was an acute 
religious threat that could have distorted, beyond recognition, the unique character of 
historical Christianity. Paul Tillich accordingly expresses the view of many 
ecclesiastical historians when he observes; “If Christian theology had succumbed to 
this [Gnostic] temptation, the particular character of Christianity would have been 
lost. Its unique basis in the person of Jesus would have become meaningless.” " ' 
However, orthodox Christian theologians offered a successful riposte to the Gnostic 
challenge. These anti-Gnostic polemicists “fought against gnosticism [sic] and 
expelled it from the church.” '
The three great anti-Gnostic theologians are Irenaeus, Tertuilian, and
R. Olson, The S tory o f  Theology, 38.
Robert M. Grant, Gnosticism  an d  C hristianity  (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1966), 136fT. B. 
M etzger (The Canon o f  the NT, 81) relates that the G nostics categorized human beings into three 
groups, the TTVEUJJaTlKOl (genuine Gnostics), tpUXlKOl (ordinary and unenlightened Christians), and 
the uXlKOl (those exclusively com posed o f  matter and destined for eternal condemnation).
Merold Westphal, G od, Guilt a n d  Death: An E xistential Phenom enology o f  R eligion  (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987), 173-175.
" ' p .  T illich, A H istory o f  Christian Thought, 36.
" H b id .,3 7 .
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Hippolytus."® Irenaeus (130-200 CE) stands out as the preeminent Christian 
polemicist, who opposed the Gnostic schools. He was a Greek speaker from Asia 
Minor, became bishop o f Lyons, learned about Christianity from Polycarp of Smyrna 
(a student of the apostle John)"'' and possessed an in-depth knowledge of Scripture, 
having the ability “to systematize ideas and sum up an argument in a few pungent 
sentences.”"^ Moreover, he was the greatest anti-Gnostic theologian since he 
seemingly understood the significance of Pauline theology in relation to the church."® 
Most notable among Irenaeus’ achievements, however, is his inimitable and 
significant work, Adversus Haereses {The Unmasking and Refutation o f  Falsely So- 
Called Gnosis). He penned this book in approximately 185 C E .'"  It is both a 
constructive and deconstructive treatise that elucidates and simultaneously dismantles 
Gnostic theosophy.
Irenaeus’ significant theological composition consists of five books that 
answer the Gnostic philosophico-religious claims by placing stress on episcopal, 
traditional, and canonical data."® Opposing the Gnostics, Irenaeus resists speculative 
notions regarding the inner life of the Godhead."® His work also vigorously counters 
the inherent Docetism and manifest ontological dualism of the Gnostic movement.'^®
T w o other early theologians who offered powerful rejoinders to the contentions o f  Gnosticism are 
Clement o f  Alexandria (Strom ata  3 .4 .30) and Origen (Com m entary on John). Clement describes the 
G nostics thus: Talia etiam  statuunt P ro d id  quoque asseclae, qui seip,sos fa lso  nomine vacant 
G nosticos.
Harold O. J. Brown, Heresies: H eresy an d  O rthodoxy in the History o f  the Church  (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1998), 78.
W. H. C. Frend, Rise o f  C hristianity, 244.
P. T illich, Christian Thought, 37.
Howard F. V os, Exploring Church H istory  (Nashville; Thomas N elson, 1994), 17.
Ibid.
H. Brown, H eresies, 80.
G nosticism  influenced the dualistic m etaphysics o f  Docetism. See Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis: The 
N ature an d  H istory o f  an Ancient Religion, trans. Robert M. W ilson (Edinburgh: T  & T Clark, 1983), 
372. Countering Docetism, Irenaeus writes: “Fasting forty days, like M oses and Elias, He afterwards 
hungered, first, in order that we may perceive that He was a real and substantial man -  for it belongs to 
a man to suffer hunger when fasting; and secondly, that His opponent might have an opportunity o f  
attacking Him” (Adv H aer 5.21.2).
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Yet, Irenaeus not only deconstructs the Gnostic s y s t e m I n  addition, he spends time 
clarifying Christian dogmata, clearly setting out pragmatic theological principles that 
function as established control beliefs o f orthodoxy.A ccordingly, Brunner sums up 
the theological contributions of Irenaeus as follows; “So the enterprise of theological 
dogmatics begins with a work which, in its very title, suggests its polemic and 
apologetic aim, the Elenchus of Irenaeus. The first great work of Christian theology is 
a controversial work against Gnosticism.” '^  ^ Another anti-Gnostic, one who also 
manifested schismatic tendencies, namely, Hippolytus, faithfully sustained the eristic 
project of Irenaeus.
1. Hippolytus
Hippolytus (ca. 160-236 CE) wrote a document entitled Refutatio omnium haeresium 
{Refutation o f  All Heresies). Scholars have also given it the appellative 
fiÀoootpUfJGva {Philosophical Teachings) based on the content of the first book 
contained in the work.*^ "^  Hippolytus’ <j>iAooo<pV}jevc( actually contains two parts: 
books {capita) one and four as well as a subsequent section detailing various and 
sundry aspects of the Gnostic system.
Hippolytus borrows concepts from Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses but expands 
upon the arguments presented therein.’ For instance, he believes that the Àoyoç 
fully becomes Son when he assumes humanity. The polemicist writes: “Now what
Irenaeus castigates the numerological tendencies o f  the Gnostics, observing: “Moreover, they 
possess no proof o f  their system, which has but recently been invented by them, som etim es resting upon 
certain numbers, som etim es on syllables, and som etim es, again, on names; and there are occasions, too, 
when, by means o f  those letters which are contained in letters, by parables not properly interpreted, or 
by certain [baseless] conjectures, they strive to establish that fabulous account which they have 
devised’' (Ibid. 2.28.8).
H. V os calls Irenaeus the “Father o f  Church Dogm atics” because o f  his constructive tendency vis-à- 
vis Christian theology {Exploring, 17).
Emil Brunner, The Christian D octrine o f  G od. vol. I o f  Dogm atics, trans. O live Wyon (London: 
Lutterworth, 1949), 94. The term Elenchus denotes a refutation or cross-examination.
K. Rudolph, G nosis, 13.
H. Vos, Exploring, 17
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Son of his own has God sent down through the flesh if not the Word, whom he 
addressed as Son in view of the fact that he was going to become such in future?” 
Hippolytus thus incorporates Aoyos- theology to demonstrate the manifest errors of 
Gnosticism and other putative heresies. Furthermore, Hippolytus exposes the 
problematic nature of Docetism while simultaneously affirming the authentic 
humanity o f the Aoyos- enfleshed. The Docetae, he avers, perpetuate both error and 
heresy when they teach the virtual humanity of Jesus C h ris t.H ip p o ly tu s  argues that 
humans actually saw the Christ o f history (the Aoyos' become flesh). They touched, 
felt and heard the man that God made lower than the angels.U nderstandab ly , 
Hippolytus is determined to uphold this basic tenet of orthodox Christianity. But the 
full expression of the anti-Gnostic theologian’s Aoyo^- theory is ultimately actualized 
in Tertullian’s treatises. We now turn our attention to this heresiologist.
2. Tertulliao
Since we will evaluate Tertullian’s exegesis o f Ps 8:5 below and discuss his anti- 
Gnostic activities in the same section, we will only briefly summarize his avid 
opposition to Gnosticism highlighted in Adversus Valentianos {Against the 
Valentinians).
TertuIlian portrays the Valentinian Gnostics as distorters of truth and 
mythmakers. They officiously guard their doctrine, he maintains, in order to betray 
their own objective guilt before God and men.*^  ^ In the manner of the Eleusinian 
mysteries, the Valentinians make silence, secrecy and esotericism, cardinal virtues.
Contra N oet 15.6.
Refutatio  8:1-4.
The apostle John affirms the genuine humanity o f  Christ. He testifies in the opening passage o f  his 
First Epistle (RSV): “We declare to you what was from the beginning, what we have heard, what w e  
have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, concerning the word o f  
life .”
Ach Val 1.
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Tertullian thus writes that the Valentianian Gnostics are intractable elitists who
preserve their sacred mysteries at all costs:
If you intimate to them that you understand their opinions, they insist 
on knowing nothing themselves. If you come to a close engagement 
with them they destroy your own fond hope of a victory over them by a 
self-immolation. Not even to their own disciples do they commit a
secret before they have made sure of them. They have the knack of
persuading men before instructing them; although truth persuades by 
teaching, but does not teach by first persuading.
Nonetheless, one of the most objectionable aspects of Valentinian philosophy is the
Christological Docetism it espouses. The Gnostics teach that Christ was not fully
human: he only appeared to be a man so that other men might see and touch him and
witness his seeming death. Ergo, Tertullian’s aversion to Valentinianism probably
explains his dislike of Angelomorphic Christology.'^’ Even so, as we have contended
throughout this study, there are Angelomorphic elements contained in his writings.
Having provided a historical context for Tertullian’s Christology and his exegesis of
Ps 8:5, we will now examine how the pre-Nicenes interpret this key passage in order
to illuminate Tertullian’s exegesis of the eighth psalm in Adversus Praxean. First, we
will introduce the problemata associated with interpreting this verse. Subsequent to a
look at the common problematic aspects related to this passage, we will review the
pre-Nicene exegesis o f Ps 8:5.
D. Problem ata Associated with Psalm 8:5 
One scriptural text that plays a significant role in Tertullian’s delineation of the 
preexistent and incarnate Son of God is Ps 8:5. We encounter this verse in Adversus 
Praxean 9 when Tertullian writes, “he was made a little less on this side of the
130 Ibid.
See Talbert, “Redeemer” 434; P. Carrell, Jesus an d  the Angels, 101.
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angels.” There are many other occurrences o f the passage in Tertullian’s literary 
corpus that we will review in this chapter. There are also certain difficulties associated 
with the text, however. Those interpretational difficulties need not detain us for long. 
For while Ps 8:5 is somewhat obscure and has occasioned no little controversy among 
OT scholars, its meaning is transparent enough in Tertullian’s treatises. 
Nevertheless, certain preliminary matters need to be treated at this point of the 
investigation.
One method that this study will utilize to support the contentions put forth 
herein is appealing to the ante-Nicene exegesis of the eighth psalm. We have looked 
up, read and reflected on every early church usage (before 325 CE) of Ps 8:5 listed in 
Biblia Patristica and considered each patristic interpretation of the text. There seems 
to be an interesting phenomenon in writers such as Tatian and Clement o f Alexandria. 
Neither theologian believes that Christ is the referential subject of the psalmist’s song 
of praise to God. Tertullian, however, consistently applies Ps 8:5 to Christ, but he 
refers it to him in three different ways. We will deal with these instances below as we 
analyze the pre-Nicene exegesis of Ps 8:5.
1. Tatian
Tatian (120-173 CE)’ '^’ exegetes Ps 8:5 in his hortatory treatise addressed to the 
Greeks thus’^^ :
V g (Ps 8:6) reads: M inuisti eum pau lo  minus ab angelis, g lo r ia  et honore coronasti eum. The writer 
o f  Hebrews, evidently quoting from the LXX, renders the psalm thus: “TGV Ô6 Tl Trap’
ayyeXous qXaTTcopEUOV.
p. Craigie contends that the translation “God” for the Hebrew elohim  in Ps 8:5 “is almost certainly 
con'ect” and probably alludes to the image o f  God in humankind, see Psalm s 1-50, WBC (W aco: Word. 
1983), 108. However, it is important to note that the LXX, the Syriac OT, the V g and the Targumim all 
understand elohim  in Ps 8:5 to mean “angels” (Ibid). T he early church fathers also prefer the formula 
“angels” over against the translation “God” for Ps 8:5.
Tatian was bom in Assyria and became a student o f  Justin. The O ratio  is his best and most useful 
work, according to Eusebius, according to O ratio a d  G raecos and Fragments, trans. M olly Whittaker 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), x. He converted to Christianity by carefully perusing the “barbaric 
writings” (i.e. the Scriptures) o f  Judaism and Christianity. See O ratio  30. Later, he supposedly became
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“O f their own free will they [the demons] have handed down the laws of death to men, 
but after their loss of immortality men have overcome death by death in faith, and 
through repentance they have been given a calling, according to the saying: ‘since they 
were made for a little while lower than the angels’. It is possible for everyone defeated 
to win another time, if he rejects the constitution making for death; what this is can 
easily be seen by those who wish for immortality.”’^^
The rhetorical Assyrian explains that the angels who ceased glorifying God and 
subsequently became agents of the Devil possess free will. Nevertheless, these unholy 
spirits have utilized their God-given freedom to hand down morbidity-inducing 
statutes that severely enslave or restrict humankind. Although humanity has lost the 
divine gift o f immortality, however, Tatian does not believe that humans are 
hopelessly condemned to lives of progressive mortification. The apologist declares 
that men “have overcome death by death in faith” even though they have been “made 
for a little while lower than the angels.” To whom is Tatian applying Ps 8:5? How did 
God temporarily make men lower than the angels are?
Tatian believes that man forfeited the potential for deathlessness in the Edenic 
Fall. But Tatian also thinks that humans can regain “ultimate immortality” through the 
salvific activity of the Logos.’ Hence, he rejects the inherent immortality of the soul 
doctrine espoused by Greek philosophers such as Plato and Socrates. Moreover, the 
Stoic doctrine of immortality does not seem to fare any better in Tatian’s address to
an ascetic heretic. We cannot conclusively substantiate the heretical nature o f  Tatian’s teachings (Little, 
A pologists , 179-180). Whittaker also thinks that it is hard to determine Tatian’s orthodoxy or heretical 
status on the basis o f  the Oratio  alone {O ratio , xvi). Tatian, while emphasizing y v c o o iS ,  does not 
mention intermediary agents (aeons) who are part o f  som e divine TrAqpco[JOC nor does he juxtapose 
the M ost High {altissim us) with a mere demiurgical creator, see ibid., xvii, Tatian also received trained 
as a rhetor like Tertullian. He eventually settled in Rome.
O ratio  15.4-10.
6 t  5e av0pGûTToi psxa rqu xqs aGavaaïaç arropoAqv Bavarcq t o o  Ôta 
moTEoof Tov 6a va TOO vEViKqKaaiv kai 5ia pExavoias kAqais auroiç deôcopqrat 
Kara tov EiirovTa Aoyou ETTSiSq ppa%u xi Trap’ ayyEAouç qAaxxcoÔqaav 
ôuvaxou 5e rravxi xcp vsviKqpEVop rraXiv viKav xou Savaxou xqv ouoxaaiv 
TrapaixoupEVOv xiç 5e eoxiv auxq euouvottxov Eoxai xois PouAopEuois 
avépcoiTois xo a0avaxov.
Jaroslav Pelikan, The Shape o f  Death', Life, D eath, an d  Im mortality in the Early Fathers (London: 
M acmillan, 1962), 18.
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the Greeks. There is no such thing as cyclic time, according to the apologetic 
Assyrian. Greek thinkers are therefore in error. Life, for Tatian, ultimately forms an 
“arc” of existence.
The arc (a geometrical metaphor invoked by Pelikan) represents the
boundaries and limits of human e x i s t e n c e . A  finite existent does not possess a
rational or immortal soul, contra the Stoics, but differs from the beasts in that he or
she is made in God’s image:
Man is not, as the croakers teach, a rational being capable o f 
intelligence and understanding (for according to them even the 
irrational creatures will be proved capable of intelligence and 
understanding), but man alone is “the image and the likeness of God.” 1 
mean by man not one who behaves like the animals, but one who has 
advanced far beyond his humanity towards God himself,
Tatian does not link the image of God with the immortal or rational soul.’"” One
evidences the image of God in humans when a particular finite existent advances: “far
beyond his humanity toward God himself.” Immortality is consequently worthless if
one lives an immortal life separated from God. Humans overcome death by submitting
to death in faith, that is, by offering themselves to God as martyrs.''’^  Most
importantly, Christ submitted to a death in faith so that other men and women might
be set free from enslavement to mortality. We can then see that Tatian applies Ps 8:5
to redeemed humans and does not interpret it as a reference to Christ. He is not alone
in this regard.
2. Clement of Alexandria
Clement of Alexandria (d. 215) also believes that Ps 8:5 is a prophecy foretelling the 
pistic activity of learned or advanced Christians: the ones whom Clement labels “true
Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 22.
O ratio  15.10-16.
J. Pelikan, The Shape o f  Death, 22.
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Gnostics.” He declares:
And what, I ask, is it in which man differs from beasts, and the angels 
of God, on the other hand, are wiser than he? "Thou madest him a little 
lower than the angels." For some do not interpret this Scripture of the 
Lord, although He also bore flesh, but of the perfect man and the 
gnostic, inferior in comparison with the angels in time, and by reason 
of the vesture [of the body]. I call then wisdom nothing but science, 
since life differs not from Hfe.’'’^
Clement suggests that humankind is set apart from the beasts and angels in that God
elevated humanity above the animals when He created man and woman but made
them “lower than the angels.” Clement’s application is more precise, however. In
particular, he reports that certain unidentified Christians of his time do not apply Ps
8:5 to the Messiah, although they believe that he became flesh and resided with
humans for a time. Instead, they propose that “this Scripture” refers to “the perfect
man and the Gnostic.” The Gnostic Christian, Clement explains, is inferior (lower)
than the angels are vis-à-vis “[the] angels in time, and by reason of the vesture [of the
body].” Hence, Clement appears to say that some of his Christian contemporaries
thought that although believers are lower than the angels now, they will not be inferior
to the angels when they divest themselves of the imperfect body that poignantly
weighs them down in this age. Clement’s further comments in this section o f his work
Stromata bear out this understanding o f the Clementine text:
Accordingly it is said, "God talked with Moses as a friend with a 
friend." That, then, which is true being clear to God, forthwith 
generates truth. And the gnostic loves the truth. "Go," it is said, "to the 
ant, thou sluggard, and be the disciple of the bee;" thus speaks 
Solomon, For if there is one function belonging to the peculiar nature 
of each creature, alike o f the ox, and horse, and dog, what shall we say 
is the peculiar function o f man? He is like, it appears to me, the 
Centaur, a Thessalian figment, compounded of a rational and irrational 
part, of soul and body. Well, the body tills the ground, and hastes to it; 
but the soul is raised to God: trained in the true philosophy, it speeds to
Ibid., 27  
Strom ata  4.8.7
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its kindred above, turning away from the lusts of the body, and besides 
these, from toil and fear, although we have shown that patience and 
fear belong to the good man.''^'’
True to his neoPlatonic orientation, Clement conceives the true Gnostic in dualistic
terms. The alethic Gnostic is a compound of rationality and irrationality, o f soul and
body, o f spirit and flesh. The body is inferior to the soul. It is a requisite temporal
medium permitting Christians to exist in the here-and-now. Nonetheless, the temporal
corpus hurries to the ground, eventually returning to the dust. Nevertheless, Clement
argues that God raises the soul trained in “true philosophy.” The soul o f the authentic
Gnostic consequently hastens to its eternal and actual home, finally free from worldly
lust, toil and fear. The advanced believer, in imitation of God (as Clement and the pre-
Nicenes envisage Him), accordingly masters the divine quality of anadeta. The
avant-garde Christian is only lower than the angels are while he or she subsists in the
flesh. However, God eventually crowns the advanced believer with eternal honor and
glory, exalting such Gnostics above the angels.
E. T ertullian’s Exegetical Approach to Psalm 8:5 
Tertullian may have been familiar with how Clement of Alexandria and Tatian 
exegeted Ps 8:5. He certainly knew that not all believers interpreted the text as a 
prophecy regarding the Lord Jesus Christ. Yet, Tertullian consistently applies the 
biblical passage messianically, in three diverse ways. We will now examine 
Tertullian’s construals of Ps 8:5 in order to set the stage for how he uses the text in 
Adversus Praxean.
First, one finds that Tertullian associates the saying in Ps 8:5 concerning the 
minoration of the Son with the preexistent intermediate agent through whom the 
Father produced the cosmos. He writes:
144 Ibid.
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“For we claim also that Christ has always acted in God the Father’s 
name, has himself ever since the beginning associated with, and 
conversed with, patriarchs and prophets. He is the Son o f the Creator, 
his Word whom by bringing him forth from himself he caused to be his 
Son. From then onwards he put him in authority over his whole design 
and purpose, reducing him a little below the angels, as it is written in 
David. By this reduction he was brought by the Father to these <acts 
and experiences> which you disapprove of as human: for he was 
learning even from the beginning, by so early assuming manhood, to be 
that which he was going to be at the end.” ''^ ^
Tertullian, reminiscent o f Lactantius, believes that Christ*'*  ^ has functioned as the
Father’s representative {in dei patris nomine) since the beginning of God’s creation.
As the expressed Logos (Aoyoo Trpo(j)optKos) begotten before and for the purpose of
creation, the preincarnate being who became flesh in the first century of our common
era discoursed with the ancient Hebrew “patriarchs and prophets” and in this capacity
fulfilled His exalted role as Sermo or Ratio dei. Tertullian repeats a familiar theme in
a passage culled from his treatise against Marcion. He reiterates the fact that God
caused His own Word “to be his Son.” There was consequently a time when God did
not have a Son as such {Adv Herm 3.18).
Before his temporal generation, the Son was the Wisdom, Word and Ratio
Dei. That is. He was probably an impersonal divine attribute or at least, not fully
personal with regard to his being. Subsequent to the “complete nativity o f Discourse”
{nativitas perfecta sermonis),^^^ however, God placed the entity that became the Son
A dv M arc  2.27. hlam et profitem ur Christum sem per egisse in dei p a tr is  nomine, ip s tm  ab initio  
conversatum, ipsum congressum  cum pa triarch is e t prophetis, filium  creatoris, serm onem  eius, quem  
ex sem etipso  proferendo filiu m  fec it, et exinde om ni dispositioni suae voluntatique praefecit, diminuons 
ilium m odico citra  angelos, sicu t apu d  D a v id  scriptum  est; qua dim inutione in haec quoque dispositus 
est a  p a tre  quae ut humana reprehenditis, ed iscens iam inde a pnm ordio , iarn inde homniem <indutus, 
id  esse> qu o d  erat fu turus in fin e .
Tertullian believes that the title Christ is a name given to the Son during G od’s reconciilatory 
dispensation or economy: “The name o f  Christ, however, does not arise from nature, but from 
dispensation; and so becom es the proper name o f  Him to whom it accrues in consequence o f  the 
dispensation” {Adv M arc 3.15).
See Institutes 4 .14. Origen also calls the preexistent Christ G od’s “minister” in the preface o f  De 
Prin.
A dv Prax 1.3.
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“in authority over his whole design and purpose” {exinde omni dispositioni suae 
voluntatique praefecit). The Father appointed Him as the protological mediator of 
creation. Nonetheless, by coming forth as the Son of God, the Aoyos became lower 
than angels are so that he might both govern creation and appear to the patriarchs and 
prophets in order to provide a foregleam of the enfleshment that would function as the 
divine basis for reconciling humankind to God, This minoration of the Son, his 
becoming lower than the angels as the preexistent Son qua Son, further made it 
possible for him to learn through intercourse with men, how to be a man.
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1. Tertullian’s Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 and the Angelophanic Son
Tertullian not only assigns Ps 8:5 to the pre-existent Son of God; he further applies 
this verse to the angelophanic Son. Specifically, Tertullian believes that another way 
in which the Son became lower than the angels was by entering into discourse with 
men via visions, dreams, and other forms of divine manifestation. Tertullian explains 
this form of filial minoration in Adv Prax 16. We will offer an extended analysis of 
this caput in the study’s final chapter. For now, we note that Tertullian identifies the 
one who talked to Adam, the patriarchs and prophets with the Son as he appears in 
various divine media. By appearing as an angel to the patriarchs and prophets, Christ 
was made lower than the angels.
2. Tertullian’s Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 in Relation to the Incarnate Son 
Tertullian’s third application of Ps 8:5 pertains to the incarnate Son of God. In fact, he 
predominantly refers the passage to the enfleshed Logos, who for a time became lower 
than the angels. We will now consider how Tertullian utilizes this passage when 
discussing the incarnate Christ.
We have already observed that Tertullian concedes the Son is an angel “by a 
term of office” and not per nature as are the angels Michael and Gabriel (dictus est 
quidem magni consilii ange lus, id est nuntius, officii non naturae vocabulo). He is an 
angel in that “he was to announce to the world the Father’s great project, that [plan] 
concerned with the restitution of man” {magnum enim cogitatem patris, super hominis 
scilicet restitutionem, adnuntiaturus saeculo erat)}^'^ Conversely, Tertullian reasons 
that the Son must not ontological ly be reckoned with the angels simply because he 
functions as an angel in God’s economy {dispositio). Nevertheless, he employs the 
designation angelus vis-à-vis the Son to refute the doctrine of Ebion: It is at this point
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that he again invokes Ps 8:5, applying it to the human Son of God:
So I shall find it easier to say, if  I have to, that the son himself was the 
angel (that is, the messenger) of the Father, than that there was an angel 
in the Son. But seeing that the Son himself is the subject o f the 
pronouncement. Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, 
how shall he be thought to have clothed himself with an angel when he 
is made lower than the angels by being made man (as being flesh and 
soul) and the Son of Man? For as the Spirit o f God, and the Power of 
the Most High, he cannot be held to be lower than the angels, seeing he 
is God, and the Son o f God. So then, even as he is made less than the 
angels while clothed with manhood, even so he is not less if clothed 
with an angel.
The Ebionites contend that an angel took the place of Christ’s human soul when He 
became flesh. To combat this concept, Tertullian maintains that “as Spirit o f God, and 
the Power o f the Most High,” Christ is not lower than the angels are.’^ ’ This 
perplexing statement implies that Tertullian, at this stage in his career and even 
possibly later, adhered to a form of binitarianism and was not a Trinitarian as such. 
Indeed, we agree that as Spirit and Power o f God, the person who became the Son was 
not initially lower than the angels are. But Tertullian’s statement becomes even more 
perplexing when we detect him paralleling Spirit o f God and Power of the Most High 
with God and Son of God.*^^
Tertullian is evidently less than precise here since he elsewhere makes marked 
distinctions between the Son qua Son and the Xoyos as God’s Ratio. Furthermore, he 
explicitly declares that the Son as such has been lower than the angels ever since He
D e C am e  14.17.
D e C a m e  14.17-32. magnum enim cogita tem  patris, super hominis sc ilicet restitutionem, 
adnuntiaturus saeculo  erat. Non ideo tam en sic  angelus intellegendus ut aliqui G abriel aut Michael. 
Nam e t ftliu s  a  dom ino vineae m ittitur a d  vinitores, sicu t et fam uli, de fructibus petitum : se d  non  
pro p terea  untts ex fam u lis depu tabitur ftliu s  qu ia  fam ulorum  successit officio, fac iliu s ergo dicam, si 
forte , ipsum filiu m  angelum  (id  est nuntium) pa tris, quam  angelum  in filio . s e d  cum de [filio ] ipso sit 
pronuntiatum , M inuisti eum m odicum  qu id  c itra  an gelos deminutus dum homo fit, qua caro et anima, 
e t ftliu s  hom inis? Q ua autem spiritus dei e t virtus altissim i non po tes t infra angelos haberi, deus 
sc ilice t et dei ftliu s. Quanto ergo, dum hominem gesta t, m inor angelis fac tu s est, tanto non, dum  
angelum  gesta t.
De C am e  14.29-30  
‘^Hbid.
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became God’s filial consort. Hence, he can hardly mean here that the Son of God in 
His capacity as Son is not inferior to the angels. The passage in De Carne 14 evidently 
focuses on His incarnate state. Other treatises written by Tertullian seem to support 
this suggestion.
Finally, Tertullian also cites Ps 8:5 when attempting to refute the Valentinians 
and Jews. The next quotation illustrates how he utilizes this Biblical passage 
apologetically:
They find it written, Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, 
yet they deny the inferior substance of Christ, though he declares 
himself not even a man but a worm, though he had no form nor 
comeliness, but his aspect was ignoble, worn out more than all men, 
and he was a man under chastisement, and knowing how to bear 
weaknesses. They acknowledge a man, mingled with God, yet deny the 
manhood: they believe he died, yet that which died they claim was 
born of incorruption—as though corruption were anything else but 
death . . . Have patience. Christ has not yet put down all his enemies, 
so as to triumph over his enemies, with his friends to share his 
victory.
In total contradistinction to the Valentinians, Tertullian affirms the humanity of Jesus 
Christ, what he describes as the Lord’s “inferior substance” {inferiorem substantiam). 
The Psalms proclaim that the Messiah was not even a man but a worm. He was made 
lower than the angels for a time that God might subsequently crown him with glory 
and honor. The fact that the Psalmist indicates the Christ would be lower than the 
angels are serves as evidence of His genuine manhood and provides a rejoinder to the 
Docetists.
Ibid., 15.29-38. Legunt denique, M inorasti eum m odico  citra  angelos, e t negant inferiorem  
substantiam  C hristi nec hominem se se d  vernem  pronuntiantis, qui nec form am  habuit nec speciem , se d  
fo rm a  eius ignobilis, defecta citra  om nes homines, homo in p la g a  et sciens ferre  imbecilHtatem. 
Agnoscunt hominem deo mixtum, e t negant hominem: mortuum credunt, et qu od  est mortuum ex 
incorruptela natum esse contendunt, qu asi corruptela  a liu d  s it a  morte. ‘"Sed et nostra caro statim  
resurgere debebat.' Exspecta: nondum inim icos suos Christus oppressit, ut cum am icis de inim icis 
trium phet.
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In conclusion, this analysis o f the pre-Nicene exegesis of Ps 8:5 demonstrates 
that while not all Christians thought the passage referred to the descent (K axapaaiç) 
o f the Messiah, Tertullian consistently employed the text to refute what he considered 
unorthodox Christological formulations. He further invoked the verse to establish the 
true humanity of Jesus Christ. Additionally, Tertullian spoke of the Son becoming 
lower than the angels are when He as the malak YHWH appeared to the ancient 
Hebrew patriarchs and prophets such as Abraham and Jacob. Most important for our 
purposes, however, Tertullian shows that he believes the pre incarnate Son was made 
lower than the angels by virtue of His becoming Son when God uttered, lux {Adv
Marc 2:27). We will return to this point in chapter 5 of this study.
Excursus: Ebionites
Ebion (ca. 175 CE) allegedly believed that Jesus was an ordinary man {nudum 
hominem) bom in King David’s family line. According to this distinctive form of 
Jewish Christianity, Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of David. He was not, however, 
“the Son o f God” {et tantum ex semine David, id est non et dei filium)}^‘^ The 
Ebionites were adoptionists, affirming neither the preexistence nor the Virgin birth of 
the Son.*^  ^ Jesus was simply a “normal human” (kjviAog avSpcoTros) whose 
generation was unnatural or unspectacular: He was a creature exalted by God when a 
heavenly angelic being united with Him at his b a p t i s m . H i s  righteousness is what 
set him apart from other humans as well as his God-given vocation.*
On the other hand, at least one form of Ebionitism taught that Christ is more 
exalted than the Old Testament prophets, because an angel speaks through Him.
D e C am e  14.32-33.
B. Ehrman, The O rthodox C orruption, 51; P. Carrell, Jesus an d  the Angels, 102.
A. Grillmeier, C hrist in Christian Tradition, 92.
B. Ehrman, The O rthodox C orruption o f  Scripture, 51. For information on the Epistida A postoiorum  
(a second century CE document possibly o f  Egyptian provenance) which “envisages Christ appearing as
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Nevertheless, Tertullian offers the following retort to this type of adoptionist 
Christology: “For he was himself the Lord, declaring openly and on his own authority, 
But I say unto you” {ipse enim erat dominus, coram et ex sua auctoritate pronuntians, 
Ego autem dico vobis)}^^ There was no need for Christ to speak through an angel. He 
is God’s messenger {angelus) sent to effect reconciliation between God and 
humankind and can therefore speak based on His own authority. There is also a sense, 
Tertullian writes, in which the Son is God. Whether Tertullian believes Christ is flilly 
God remains to be seen.
In any case, the Ebionites received their designation from those who opposed 
the Jewish movement. The appellation given to the group may denote “those who are 
poor,” although we cannot be indubitably certain o f the etymology behind the 
descriptive t i t l e . T h e s e  Jewish Christians, however, were not monolithic but 
heterogeneous in nature.*^® Tertullian countered their Christological claims by 
appealing to Ps 8:5.
Gabriel,” see  P. Carrell, Jesus an d  the A ngels, 103.
D eC a rn e  14.38-39.
Grillmeier lists four reasons for certain Jewish-Christian adoptionists being called Ebionites. He 
attributes it to their purportedly scant intelligence, to the destitute state o f  the law they follow ed, their 
poor opinions o f  Christ, and their poor comprehension, hope and works (Christ in the Christian  
T radition, 90). But even Grillmeier recognizes that the opponents’ claim concerning the Ebionite 
Christology o f  Christ qua  aUTpCOTroç (“a mere man”) is mistaken since the Ebionite
doctrine o f  Christ had a transcendent dim ension to it (ib id ., 91). Daniélou writes that the Ebionite tag 
did not derive from the man named Ebion (contra Epiphanius) but actually originated from the Hebrew  
word ebyon  meaning “poor” (Ibid., 55-56). Both Irenaeus (Adv H aer 1.26.2) and Origen (C ontra  
Celsurn  2 .1) also mention this so-called heretical group.
B. Ehrman thus disputes D aniélou’s account since the latter depicts the Ebionites as a clearly 
demarcated movement in Primitive Christianity, see The O rthodox Corruption, 56.
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Chapter 3
Formal Introduction to Adversus Praxean 
The identity of the purported heretic, Praxeas, has often proved to be elusive for 
historians o f Christian dogma. Exactly who was the religious figure that managed to 
provoke Tertullian’s ire? What did he teach? Why did the Latin writer from Carthage 
fervently oppose Praxeas’ particular form of Christian teaching {ôtSaxrj)^ We will 
now address these three questions while formally examining capita 1 and 2 of 
Adversus Praxean.
A. The Identity of Praxeas
The only ancient heresiologists to mention Praxeas are pseudo-Tertul I ian, * 
Augustine and Gennadius.*^^ Some scholars consequently think that Tertullian 
invented the name Praxeas to protect the identity of bishop Zephyrinus (199-217) or 
his mysterious successor Callistus (217-22).'^^ One problem with this identification, 
however, is that none of the extant data suggests that either cleric came from Asia, as 
Tertullian seems to say about his r i v a l . O n  the other hand, the fact that neither 
bishop hailed from Asia may not be an impediment to viewing one of these men as the 
real Praxeas since Tertullian does not actually state that his antagonist personally 
came from Asia. It was only Praxeas’ unorthodox Christological doctrine that 
emanated from that place.
A dversus Omnes H aereses 8.4 by Pseudo-Tertullian. Sed  p o st hos omnes etiam Praxeas quidam  
haeresim  introdiixit, quam  Victorinus corroborare  curavit. Hie deum p a t re m om nipotentem  lesum  
C hristum  esse dicit, hunc cm cifixum  passum qtie contendit e t mortuum, praeterea  se ipsum sib i sedere  
a d  dexteram  suam, cum proph ana et sacr ilega  tem eritate proponii.
E, Evans, A dversus Praxean, 184.
Ibid., 185.
A dv Prax  1.
Ibid., 1.21-22. Nam iste prim us ex A sia  hoc genus perversita tis intulit Romam. Daniélou thinks that 
the type o f  Monarchianism espoused by Tertullian’s antagonist, Praxeas, evidently originated in 
“Judaeo-Christian circles” moving about in the proximity o f  A sia Minor (Latin Christianity, 157).
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While the exact referential significance of Praxeas remains indeterminate,*^^ 
we can contend with some degree o f certainty that Praxeas apparently taught that the 
Father and Son are hypostatically identical {duos unum volunt esse, ut idem pater et 
filius habeatur)}^^ Furthermore, Praxeas and his companions simultaneously 
propagated the notion that the Father co-suffered with the Son since the second Person 
o f the Trinity (according to the Praxeas) was the man Jesus o f Nazareth. Praxeas 
identified Christ (the divine in Jesus) with the Father.*^® In other words, the 
mysterious antagonist of Tertullian taught a form of Modalistic Monarchianism: the 
belief that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are self-identical divine modes o f being.*^^ 
Does the historical record indicate that Zephyrinus was a modalist, however?
Frend cites Hippolytus who describes Zephyrinus as “an uneducated 
simpleton.”*™ The “unsophisticated” bishop supposedly believed that God and Jesus 
Christ constitute an undifferentiated metaphysical unity. Although he did not think 
that God is able to suffer and die, Zephyrinus nonetheless had difficulty distinguishing 
the tres personae of the Trinity. Frend considers the works of Hippolytus and Pseudo- 
Tertullian independent testimony supporting the notion that bishop Victor, Zephyrinus 
or maybe even Callistus inclined toward the theological views of Praxeas. Moreover, 
he reports that Modalism remained “deeply ingrained” in Roman Trinitarian thought 
well after the time of Tertullian.*^* It was most certainly the belief of the simplices, 
who constituted the majority of believers in Rome. Nevertheless, having made such
Barnes recounts that though one can find a number o f  coincidences between Callistus’ theology and 
personality and Tertullian’s Praxeas, when it com es to the exact identity o f  Tertullian’s adversary, 
“Certainty is unattainable” {Tertullian, 279). Barnes thinks that the moniker “Praxeas” looks like a 
Greek nom  de plum e  meaning “busybody.”
K elly, E arly Christian D octrine, 121.
Ibid. A dditionally, see A dv Prax  21.
The first writer to state this b e lie f in formal terms was Noetus o f  Smyrna (J. Kelly, E arly Christian  
D octrine, 120).
'™ W. H. C. Frend, The Rise o f  C hristianity, 344.
Ibid. Frend’s independent testimony consist o f  Pseudo-Tertullian 8.4 and Hippolytus’ polemical
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observations, we must admit that the identity of Praxeas remains unknown. It is now 
time to examine why Praxean theology provoked Tertullian’s indignation. We will 
cover this issue in the next section.
B. Tertullian’s Opposition to Praxean Christology 
Tertullian essentially portrays Praxeas as an unwitting pawn of the Devil: a demon- 
inspired instrument who manifestly (albeit unknowingly) opposes Christian truth in a 
variety o f ways {varie diabolus aemulatus est veritatem)}^^ One method that the Devil 
employs to oppose Christianity, writes Tertullian, is the modus operandi of pretending 
to defend Christian verity {Varie diabolus aemulatus est veritatem. adfectavit illam 
aliquando defendendo concutere) in order that he might subvert it.'^^ The chief 
adversary of God {ha Satan) occasionally plays the part of a genuine theistic apologist. 
He then concomitantly obfuscates passages in sacred Scripture, especially those 
Biblical verses, which specifically delineate the divine intentional unity'*"'* that obtains 
between the Father and the Son. Conversely, Tertullian formulates the divine unity in 
terms o f intentionality and functionality: “By means of the works [performed by the 
Son], then, the Father will be in the Son and the Son in the Father, and thus by means 
o f the works we understand that the Father and the Son are one” {Adv Prax 22.26-8). 
Utterly disregarding the intentional unity of the Father and the Son, Satan attempts to 
overthrow God’s truth by utilizing unwitting pawns in the vein of Praxeas to 
accomplish his ignoble ends. Hence, Tertullian is determined to expose the invidious
treatises.
A dv Prax  1.1
Ibid.
Early church fathers such as Tertullian, Novatian and Hippolytus explain Jn 10:30 in terms o f  
intentional or functional concord (i.e. unity as to purpose or intent): “We become one virtually, by our 
disposition towards singlemindedness. W ell, in the same way the Son, sent and not recognized by those 
who are in the world, maintained that he is in the Father— virtually, as a disposition. For the Son is in 
the Father’s ‘single M ind,’” see C ontra  N oet 7.3. However, it must be admitted that Tertullian also 
affirms the “unity o f  susbstance” between the Father and Son (A dv Prax  25). What he means by this 
phrase, w e will discuss below.
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demonic machinations actualized in the person of the Adversary’s human agent, 
Praxeas.
As we have hitherto observed, Tertullian informs his readers that Praxeas 
makes illegitimate appeals to the apostle John’s Gospel account concerning the Father 
and Son’s oneness so that he may establish his unique form of Modalistic 
Monarchianism (Jn 10:30). Praxeas evidently conscripts Jn 10:30, inter alia, to 
buttress the notion that Jesus is hypostatically identical to the Father and consequently 
the Omnipotent Father incarnate. Yet, the implications of this daring theologumenon 
are quite stark since Praxeas’ teaching implies that the Father “himself came down 
into the virgin [Mary], himself was bom of her, himself suffered, in short himself is 
Jesus Christ” {ipsum dicit patrem descendisse in virginem, ipsum ex ea natum, ipsum 
passum, denique ipsum esse lesum Christum)
In contrast, Tertullian thinks this concept is both logically absurd and 
scriptural ly untenable. It also militates against the antiquitous “rule o f faith” {régula 
fid e if^^  that the apostles handed down {tradere) to the congregation of God.'™ The 
majority o f post-Nicenes concur with his theological assessment. These theologians 
later employed elements of Tertullian’s pistic defense so that they might further 
develop orthodox Christology in the face of similar heresiarchal challenges.'™ But 
Tertullian’s theological refutation {refutatio) against Praxeas has just begun. Maurice
A dv Prax  1.7-8. Hippolytus {Contra N oet 3 .2) relates that Theodotus the shoemaker (OKEUTEUS) 
“quite sham elessly” (a v o u o x u V T O ^ ) stated: “The Father him self is Christ; he is h im self the Son; he 
h im self was born, he h im self suffered, he h im self raised h im self up” (aUTOÇ EOTI 
XpioTos- 6  TraTTip a u r c ç  u ios auTos EyEvvqSq auTos ETraSev 
auT os EauTov qyEipEV).
Appealing to the primary sources, Bray demonstrates that Tertullian uses the Latin régula  to signify 
a  summarization that Christ’s followers can avail them selves o f  to understand and interpret Scripture 
{H oliness a n d  the Will o f  G od, 102-104).
S ee R ebecca Lyman’s compact but insightful comments on the role o f  tradition and traditions in 
Christianity in E arly Christian Traditions (Cambridge: Cowley, 1999), 3-8.
Pelikan develops this theme in The C hristian Tradition, 1:172-277.
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Wiles aptly sums up the powerful effect that section {caput) one of Adversus Praxean 
commonly has on its readers when he writes: “The heart of his attack upon Praxeas is 
summed up in the jibe that his theology involved the blasphemous concept that the 
Father was crucified. This was the shaft that went home more surely than any 
other.” '™ Indeed the charge of Patripassianism is enough to render the heresy of 
Praxeas essentially inoperative. Nonetheless, Tertullian does not desist with the 
powerful imputation that Praxean Christology implies that finite mortals put the 
transcendent and unapproachable Father to d e a t h . T o  the contrary, Tertullian 
continues to build his case against the one whom he believes is the Devil’s minion, in 
the following manner.
C. Tertullian’s Extended Case against Praxeas
Tertullian, still focusing on the tested wiles o f the Devil as well as his propensity to
subvert Christian truth by dissimulating a defense in its behalf, insists that if the
Adversary really thinks the Father is also the Son, he possesses a faulty memory in
light o f the extant historical narratives of Jesus’ life. The two Synoptic Gospels of
Matthew and Luke™' both record the Devil openly acknowledging the filial status of
the Lord Jesus Chr i s t ' dur ing  the time that he temporarily dwelled among humanity:
The serpent has forgotten himself: for when he tempted Jesus Christ 
after the baptism of John it was as Son of God that he attacked him, 
being assured that God has a Son at least from those very scriptures out
Maurice W iles, The M aking o f  Chrstian Doctrine'. A Study in the Principles o f  E arly D octrinal 
D evelopm en t (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 215.
Bethune-Baker thinks Tertullian’s inference from the Praxean self-identical divine m odes o f  Being is 
“unfair” and he points out that the so-called Patripassians them selves manifestly did not accept 
Tertullian’s inference, even if  they did think Jesus Christ was identical with God {Early H istory, 103- 
104). There are, however, legitimate logical conundrums that attend Modalism. Bethune-Baker him self 
relates how difficult it is to account for the M odalistic thesis that says the Son’s suffers, although God is 
im passible.
Mt 4 and Lk 4.
M atthew’s Synoptic account (4:5-6), according to the Vg reads: Tunc assum it eum D iabolus in 
sanctam  civitatem  e t statu it eum supra pinnaculum  tem pli e t d icit ei: 'Si Filius D ei es, mitte te deorsum. 
Scriptum  est enim: A ngelis suis m andabit de te, e t in manibus tollent te, ne fo r te  offendas a d  lapidem  
p ed em  tuum?  ”
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of which he was then constructing the temptation.
Tertullian then quotes Ps 91:11-12, the verse that the Devil utilized when attempting 
to deceive Jesus of Nazareth. The apologist consequently reasons that the Devil either 
misspoke when he called Jesus God’s Son or the Synoptic Gospels that Matthew and 
Luke wrote are guilty of unfairly vilifying the Devil-a thought that Tertullian is 
utterly unwilling to countenance for one moment. Not surprisingly, the apologist 
retorts by accusing both the Devil and Praxeas of inalethicity. Moreover, he resolutely 
contends that both deceptive entities are exceedingly culpable since the Devil has 
inspired Praxeas to simultaneously; “drive out prophecy and crucify the Father {ita 
duo negotia diaboli Praxeas Romae procuravit, prophetiam expulit et haeresim 
intulit, paracletum fugavit et patrem crucifixit)}^^ Therefore, while Adversus Praxean 
seems primarily concerned with the Praxean teaching of Patripassianism (the doctrine 
that the God the Father became his own Son and subsequently suffered and died at 
Calvary in the first century of our common era), we need to say a brief word here 
about the purported heresiarch’s efforts to expel prophecy from Rome.
It may be significant that Tertullian mentions the expusion of prophecy before 
the crucifixion o f the Father. He relates that Praxeas “drove out prophecy” in that he 
“put to flight the Paraclete " (prophetiam expulit et haeresim intulit, paracletum 
fugavit)}^^ In what sense did he drive out prophecy and chase away the Paraclete? We 
will discuss this matter in the following paragraphs.
A dv Prax  1.9-11. Excidii sib i coluber, quia lesum  Christum post baptism a loannis tem ptans ut 
filiu m  dei adgressus est, certus filium  deum habere ve l ex ipsis scripturis de quibus tunc tem ptationem  
s tm eb a t.
Ibid., 1.31-33.
Ibid.
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D. The Praxean Attempt to Expel Prophecy from Rome
Earlier in the Adv Prax 1, Tertullian relates that the bishop of Rome was on the verge 
o f acknowledging the charismatic prophecies that Montanus (fl. 170 CE), Prisca and 
Maximilla articulated until Praxeas promulgated fictitious reports concerning the 
Montanist spokespersons and their respective churches.™^ Montanus™^ appears to 
have believed that the Johannine promises concerning the Paraclete sent from the 
Father through the Son were uniquely fulfilled in him (Jn 14:16; 15:26; 16:7-13). But 
he did not think that he himself was hypostatically or ontologically identical with the 
divine Paraclete.™* All the same, Montanus was eschatologically oriented, being 
purportedly “gifted with visions and special revelations” that influenced his doctrine 
of the last things.™^ Tertullian testifies to the charismatic nature of the Cataphrygians, 
as opponents also called the Montanists, writing:
Felicity and Perpétua were no doubt Montanists. See E. Evans, A dversus Praxean, 188. The Roman 
church has never discredited these matyrs. In this connection, Barnes also observes that Montanus 
embarked upon his prophetic career in 170 CE. Subsequent to this period, the N ew  Prophecy spread 
rapidly and alm ost gained favorable recognition from the church. Barnes concludes: “There is no reason  
entirely to disbelieve the explicit statement o f  Tertullian that the bishop o f  Rome recognized the 
prophecies o f  Montanus, Prisca and M axim illa as genuine utterances o f  the Holy Spirit, and was on the 
point o f  comm unicating his acceptance to the churches o f  A sia and Phrygia,” see Tertullian, 82. Barnes 
additionally confirms that the reports purportedly propagated by Praxeas concerning the Montanists 
were indeed fictitious. Nevertheless, the N ew  Prophecy actually remained “acceptable” even after the 
year 203 CE. Yet, evidently because o f  the Roman bishop’s disapprobation toward Montanism, 
believers in in Carthage began to defect from the ecstatic movement {Tertullian, 83).
O lson reports that Montanus was a “pagan priest” in A sia Minor (Phrygia) before he becam e a 
Christian in the middle part o f  the second-century. See Story o f  Christian Theology, 31. M ontanus’ 
turning point vis-à-vis his relationship with the church seem s to have been his insistence that the 
bishops do not have divinely ordained “special authority,” see ibid.
Pelikan thinks that the concept o f  the Johannine Paraclete actually played an insignificant part in 
early M ontanism. He also notes that Montanus did not believe that he was the Paraclete per se, but that 
G od’s TTapaK ÂqTO Ç worked through him in the sense that it divinely inlluenced Montanus. 
Pelikan’s position is clearly contra Epiphanius’ as stated in Panarion  48.11. Lastly, it is difficult to 
determine when Tertullian uses the word Paraclete to denote Montanus and when he is using it to refer 
to the Holy Spirit, see Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 1:102-104. Cf. Eusebius’ H.E. 5 .16.17.
Tabbernee relates, however, that the term Paraclete used with reference to the Holy Spirit, was 
not exclusively confined to the Montanists. An inscription that is supposed to be Montanist in nature 
which em ploys the term Paraclete may w ell be Donatist in origin according to Montanist Inscriptions, 
543-544 . For more evidence suggesting Montanus did not think he was a human manifestation o f  the 
Paraclete, see  ibid., 32-33. Cf. Aune, Prophecy, 3 14-315.
Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 1:102-104.
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Likewise the holy prophetess Prisca preaches that the holy minister 
should know how to administer purity of life. “For purification 
produces hamiony,” she says, “and they see visions, and when they 
turn their faces downward they also hear salutary voices, as clear as 
they are secret.”
The divine spirit manifested in visions, oracles and Scripture ostensibly inspired the 
Montanists to believe that the New Jerusalem foretold in John’s Apocalypse would 
descend from heaven to Pepuza during their very time period: “In view of this, 
Christians should dissolve the bonds of wedlock, fast strictly and assemble in Pepuza 
to await the descent o f the New Jerusalem.”™' The Montanists were also ecstatic, 
hearing “salutaiy voices” {etiam voces audiunt sahitatares) esoteric in nature but clear 
in tone. In view o f the group’s stress on holiness and divine inspiration then, we are 
justified in asking what Praxean accusations irreparably tarnished the eschatological 
movement’s image in the eyes of Rome’s bishop?
As indicated above, the most intimate disciples of Montanus were women, and 
these feminine adherents filled prominent prophetic roles in the Montanist camp."^^ 
Montanus’ willingness to use females in his group, however, undoubtedly contributed 
to rumors that suggested the prominent leader broke up marriages and wrongly 
appointed women to ecclesiastical offices.'^'* Enemies further accused Montanus of 
“handling large sums of money” and paying his fellow charismatics hefty stipends.'^'*
D e exhorlatione  10.5, Cited in Heine, M ontanist O racles, 4-5.
Item p e r  sanctam  prophetidem  P riscam  ita  evangelicatur, qu od  sanctus minister sanctim oniam  noverit 
ministrare. Purificantia enim concordat, ait, e t visiones vident, et ponentes fa c iem  deorsum  etiam  
voces audiunt salutares, tarn m anifestas quam et occidtas.
Reinhold Seeberg, Textbook o f  the H istory o f  D octrines, trans. Charles E. Hay (Grand Rapids; Baker 
B ook House, 1966), 105; Aune, Prophecy, 313. Pepuza, a town located in Phrygia, was the place where 
Montanus and the two principal female spokespersons o f  the N ew  Prophecy constructed their 
“com m une.” See Olson, Story o f  Theology, 31. Therefore, it was only fitting that the N ew  Jerusalem 
would descend there.
E. Pagels, Gnostic G ospels, 60. Tertullian also provides evidence o f  Montanus' w illingness to use 
wom en in De Anim a 9. There, he speaks about the charismatic experiences o f  one female Cataphrygian.
H. Brown reports that Montanus thought marriages should be dissolved and future marriages should 
be postponed since the end o f  the age was imminent. When the N ew  Jerusalem did not descend as 
expected, Montanus and his disciples “broadened” the concept o f  the Last Day into “a concept o f  Last 
Days, during which Montanus called upon his followers to live a life o f  strict discipline and self-denial”
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While certain accusations directed at the Montanists probably had merit, 
“Some of the orthodox smears on him are manifest inventions.”™^ Johnson concludes 
that the Montanists were likely genuine, holy, meek and self-restrained people that 
certain members o f the orthodoxy simply misunderstood.™^ Such “manifest 
inventions,” however, appear to have been employed with some frequency against 
seeming heretical groups in the early church.™^ The Montanists belonged to a group 
of persons that moderns collectively classify as the Other,™* a detail that Tertullian 
thoroughly outlines in the opening chapter o f Adversus Praxean. The Praxean reports 
conveyed to the then ruling bishop o f Rome were unmistakably scurrilous and 
completely lacking in alethic content. They too were “manifest inventions” designed 
to subject the Montanists to ill-treatment and marginalization, among other things ™^
The bishop of Rome, having heard such scandalous rumors about Montanus 
and the Cataphrygians, promptly recalled the pacific missives that he had earlier 
dispatched and immediately expressed his disapprobation of the “heretical” 
charismatic group. Consequently, harmful “false assertions” {falsa de ipsis prophetis 
et ecclesiis eorumadseverando et praecessorum eius auctoritates defendendo 
coegitf^^ concerning the New Prophecy {nova prophetia) earned Praxeas merited 
condemnation from the person o f Tertullian. Moreover, Tertullian argued that the
(Brown, H eresies, 67). Orthodoxy also had to adjust its eschato logy in view  o f  the seem ing delay o f  the 
M essiah’s TtapoUOICt.
Paul Johnson, A H istory o f  C hristianity  (N ew  York and London: Simon Schuster, 1976), 49.
Ibid.
Ibid., 50.
For similar cases, consult Elaine P agels’ G nostic G ospels.
Insightfully, Terry Eagleton describes the Other as not just a “theoretical concept’’ but an actual 
category delineating movements or peoples “written out o f  history, subjected to slavery, insult, 
mystification, genocide” in his work L iterary Theory: An Introduction  (Minneapolis: University o f  
M innesota Press, 1998), 205.
O lson’s account o f  the Montanists is not quite as sympathetic as Johnson’s. He locates the root o f  the 
M ontanists’ troubles in their open defiance o f  bishops throughout the Roman Empire. Furthermore, 
M ontanus claimed to be the instrument through which the Holy Spirit spoke, an assertion that placed 
Catholic claims in jeopardy. This is the proposal o f  Olson, Story o f  Theology, 32. Nonetheless, there
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Praxean willingness to malign sincere, abstemious, and disciplined visionaries served 
as further evidence that he unknowingly accomplished “two pieces of the devil’s 
business” in Rome {ita duo negotia diaboli Praxeas Romae procuravit)?^^ Thence 
while the crucifixion of the Father may function as the focal point of Tertullian’s 
assault, his concern over the coerced flight of the Paraclete is also evident in 
subsequent sections o f Adversus Praxean. Indeed, it is a prominent issue in this work. 
With an overview of caput 1, however, we will now recapitulate Tertullian’s 
argument contra Praxeas before we examine his particular brand of Christology.
Findings
(1) Tertullian takes issue with Praxean theology for the following three reasons. First, 
Praxeas’ doctrine of God and Christ inadvertently results in the crucifixion of the 
Father (Patripassianism).™^ Bart Ehrman highlights what Tertullian found 
objectionable about Praxean Christology: “Christ was divine, and as such his activities 
could be attributed to God; but he was not himself God the Father. The fine line 
[between Patripassianism and Adoptionism] can be detected in a carefiil thinker like 
Tertullian, who in one context refers to God as crucified {De Carne 5) but in another 
ridicules Praxeas for crucifying the Father {Adv. Prax. 1).”™^
(2) Tertullian believes that orthodoxy’s account of God and the Son accords 
with the rule of faith handed down since the inception of Christianity.™'* The ardent 
African’s formulation of the régula jidei may differ from other versions of the so- 
called rule of faith. However, Morgan points out that the prima facie disparateness of
appears to be little substance to the “inventions” that Johnson and Olson recount.
A dv Prax  1.28-30.
Ibid., 1.32.
A pology 1.127.
Ehrman, Orthodox Corruption, 87.
M etzger explains that the régula f id e i  signifies that which has been orally transmitted by the apostles 
and received or handed down by the church. The rule o f  faith is; “the immemorial belief o f  Christians,
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Tertullian’s articulation of the régula fidei lies in the fact that the pre-Nicenes do not 
stress verbatim symbolic (symbolum) phrases; they place more emphasis on the 
concepts contained in early creedal formulae?^^ Even the famed Symbol of Nicea was 
“loosely quoted in later years.”^^  ^Basing his dicta on the antiquity of apostolic belief, 
Tertullian thus reasons that “whatever is earliest is true and whatever is later is 
counterfeit.”^^  ^ He exalts the apostolic Christological proclamation (Kepuypa) in his 
work against Praxeas?^^
(3) Finally, Praxeas erroneously rejects the divine economy (oikonomia). 
Offering a riposte to his opponent, Tertullian retorts that although God is one vis-à-vis 
His substance, He “disposes the unity into trinity” for the purpose o f redeeming 
humankind.^^^ But the plurality manifested in salvation history {Heilsgeschichte) does 
not admit division with respect to God’s unitive substance since family connections 
(pignora) do not dissolve God’s solitary rule {monarchia) anymore than a King’s 
regal officials undermine his sovereign sphere of influence, Tertullian reasons.
Tertullian’s opening argument against his formidable adversary seems to drive 
a lethal shaft in the Monarchian Christology o f Praxeas. Nevertheless, the apologist 
deems it necessary to marshal further evidence against his influential adversary. We 
will witness his rational demonstrations (aîToÔeiÇis) for the sake of Christianity as we
derived from the Scriptures” and that content set forth in the A postles’ Creed (M etzger, Canon, 158).
Kelly also observes that the “rule o f  faith” {régu la  f id e i)  is “the intrinsic shape and pattern” o f  G od’s 
revelation to the apostles. The régula provides the basis for an accurate interpretation o f  the holy 
writings, see Kelly, E arly Christian D octrine, 40.
Morgan, The Im portance o f  Tertullian, 49. See appendix I.
A dv Prax  2. Robert Wilken, The M yth o f  C hristian Beginnings (London: SCM Press, 1979) 47-51 
illustrates how the claim “truth is older than error” was not restricted to Christianity since the entire 
Greco-Roman world stressed the importance o f  tradition and antiquity. The Romans even emphasized 
the importance o f  ancestral custom {m os maiorum ) as part o f  a proper education. At any rate, 
“Tradition,” writes Wilken, “needed no justification; it authenticated itself simply by being old. 
Antiquity itse lf was a sign o f  truth, for what is older is better.” Obviously, such a view  was not meant to 
serve as a strict logical form o f  argumentation but Tertullian was wisely appealing to a notion that 
permeated the spirit o f  the times (Zeitgeist).
Grillmeier, C hrist in Christian Tradition, 140.
60
now progress to a discussion o f sections {capita) 5-7 of Adversus Praxean. The 
primary reason for examining these particular capita will be to elucidate the 
differentiae between the eternal Àoyoa-aocjïta and the temporal Son qua Son. Making 
this epistemological distinction will prove to be vital when we review Tertullian’s 
exegesis o f Ps 8:5. Additionally, understanding the differentiation between the Son 
qua Son and the Logos will elucidate Tertullian’s motivation for believing that the 
pre-existent and pre-angelophanic Son is lower than the angels.
A dv Prax  2.
6 1
Chapter 4
The Distinction between the Serm o  D ei and Son qua  Son
In order to understand the basis for Tertullian’s belief that the preexistent Son qua Son 
was lower than the angels, one must initially make some important distinctions 
between the Ratio (Sermo) dei and the Filius dei. A failure to discern such 
differentiations explains why certain commentators insist that Tertullian posits an 
eternal generatio for the pre-eminent Son of God. In other words, several scholars 
have argued that Tertullian thinks the Ratio dei is an eternal res et persona 
However, the evidence appears to suggest otherwise.
Tertullian presents an extended description of the Ratio, Sermo et Filius dei in 
capita 5-8 o ï Adversus Praxean. We will first identify how he applies these terms to 
the Son before we proceed with a discussion of Tertullian’s Logos theology set forth 
in his treatise opposing Praxean Christology.
A . R atio
Lewis and Short provide one of the most useful definitions for ratio as Tertullian 
employs the term in his polemic contra Praxeas. Acording to this lexical source, ratio 
can refer to “that faculty of the mind which forms the basis of computation and 
calculation, and hence of mental action in general, i. e. judgment, understanding, 
reason.” This lexical delineation of the Latin signifier appropriately describes how 
Tertullian uses the word ratio vis-à-vis God.
The Greek equivalent o f ratio is Àoyoç. Hellenistic philosophers sometimes 
utilize this term to delineate an “aspect” o f God, that is, a divine emanation or 
effluence that is simultaneously an individuated deific hypostasis.^*’ In the Stoic
Evans, A dversus Praxean, 224-225.
Edward V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism: Being Lectures on the H istory o f  the Stoic P hilosophy with
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system of Zeno, for example, Aoyoy  is the “divine word.” *^^  Regardless of how Greek
theoreticians understood the term, however, “The Romans were unable to translate
logos with one term. They therefore embraced the phrase ratio et ratio (reason and
speech) to delineate the signification of logosP^^^ Thought, rationality, and speech are
thus associated with the concept of ratio?^'^ Nevertheless, humans are not the only
beings that possess the faculty o f reason. Almighty God is the supreme locus of
rationality: “The God o f biblical revelation is the God of reason, not Ultimate
Irrationality; all he does is rational.” *^^  Tertullian also indicates that God is not
“Ultimate Irrationality.” Hence, if reason is a divine property, it seems that one can
justly infer that the Most High determined and created everything by means of His
own Ratio (Xoyos’). Tertullian possesses just such a view of the created cosmos:
Reason, in fact, is a thing [property] of God, inasmuch as there is 
nothing which God the Maker of all has not provided, disposed, 
ordained by reason-nothing which He has not willed should be handled 
and understood by reason.
Furthermore, Tertullian refers to the ratio Dei as a divine attribute or property in
Adversus Praxean. 'Ratio is an eternal quality of God. There was a time, however,
when the Son of God did not exist as such {Adv Herm 3.18). Through His own reason
{ratio), the Most High produced the cosmos and all that Is therein. It would seem that
one must therefore make a distinction between the Ratio and Filius dei.
Specia l Reference to Its D evelopm ent within the Rom an Empire (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1911), 12.
Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 37.
See Philo, Vit M os 2.X29.
Carl F. H. Henry, G od, Revelation, and Authority, 4 vols. (Waco: Word, 1976), 1:232. See James E. 
White, What is Truth?'. A C om parative Study o f  the P ositions o f  Cornelius Van Til, F rancis Schaeffer, 
C arl F. H. H enry, D on a ld  Bloesch, M illard  Erickson  (Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1994), 103.
D e P aen  1. Ceterum  a  ratione eius tanium absunt quantum  ah ipso rationis auctore. Q uippe res de i 
ra tio  qu ia  deus omnium conditor nihil non ratione p ro v id it disposuit ordinavit nihilque non ratione 
tractari intellegique voluit.
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B. Sermo
Tertullian uses Sermo to translate the Greek Aoyos. Evans renders Sermo as 
“Discourse.” It is indeed significant that the noted church apologist opts for the Latin 
Sermo (Discourse) instead of verbum, implying that God mentally discourses with 
Himself and does not simply articulate a mere word in the protological setting of 
creation. Tertullian thus emphasizes divine cognition qua interior discourse when he 
employs Sermo throughout his writings. At any rate, we should not strictly correlate 
Sermo with Filius as these terms apply to Jesus Christ. The importance of observing 
this distinction will emerge later in the present investaigation.
C  Sophia
In Adv Prax 6 Tertullian reminds his opponent that the function and ordinance of 
God’s consciousness is “in the Scriptures also displayed under the name of Wisdom” 
{Haec vis et haec divini sensus dispositio apud scripturas etaim in sophiae nomine 
ostenditur). As the Latin portion of this citation makes clear, Tertullian uses the Greek 
equivalent Sophia to depict Wisdom personified. The ancient writings of Judaism may 
also heavily influence Tertullian’s utilization of Wisdom motifs apparently culled 
from canonical, deuterocanonical, and pseudepigraphical works.
Regardless of where Tertullian’s Sophia concept traces her origins, Adv Prax 6 
reveals that Tertullian is primarily interested in harmonizing his Christological 
teachings with Scripture. He desires to meet his antagonist on the common ground of 
Holy Writ. Moreover, Tertullian employs Prov 8:22-31 to prove that the Logos 
became a Son to God in tempo, referring to God’s Aoyos as “Discourse, who became 
Son o f God when by proceeding fi*om him [the Father] he was begotten” {qui filius
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factus est dei, de quo prodeundo generatus est)?^^ This “perfect nativity of 
Discourse” {nativitas perfecta sermonis) was in fact the beginning of the Son’s 
minoration. The Father, at that momentous point, brought forth the Son in tempo.
Note that the previously mentioned passage highlights both the differentiation 
and minoration of the Son in relation to the Father. Tertullian there invokes the term 
ao(pia to refer to that inward form o f Discourse (Aoyos £V0ia0ETos) that God begets, 
so that it becomes God’s expressed Word (Aoyos Trpoc))opiKos) for the sake of 
creation: ‘The Sermo becomes person in so far as he makes known the Father and he 
is distinct from the Father by virtue o f his temporal generation.” '^^ It is necessary to 
comprehend the theological distinction between Ratio and Filius.
D. Distinguishing the Eternal R aiio  from the Temporal F iliu s  
Tertullian seeks to establish that the Son and Father are hypostatically differentiable 
by turning to the holy scriptures of Judaism and Christianity. He is eager to establish 
his case forensically: “by the advocacy of the scriptures and the interpretations of 
them” {et ita res ipsa formam suam scripturis et interpretationibus earum 
patrocinantibus vindicabit)?^^ In Adv Prax 11, he places a similar challenge before 
his formidable opponent, declaring: “But it will be your duty to prove it 
[Monarchianism] as openly from the scriptures as we prove that he made his own 
Word his Son” {Probare autem tarn aperte debebis ex scripturis quam nos probamus 
ilium sibi ftlium fecisse sermonem suum). The apologist is accordingly intent on 
substantiating his belief from Scripture (both the OT and the NT). Tertullian shrewdly 
turns the tables on his antagonist, who supposedly appeals to the sacred writings in 
order to support his opposing case. But ex hypothesi Tertullian has already shown that
A dv Prax  7.1.
Daniélou, Latin Christianity, 364.
6 5
Praxeas does not rightly explicate God’s Word of truth (2 Tim 2:15). The heresiarch is 
an unwitting satanic pawn actually trying to undermine Christian truth by putting on a 
pretense o f defending it. Tertullian subsequently appeals to the Scriptures while at the 
same time invoking the régula fidei in order to prove his case.
The first text that the skilled Christian rhetorician considers is Gen 1:1: “In the 
beginning, God created the heavens and the earth” {In principio creavit Deus caelum 
et terram). He then discloses that “certain people” think the Hebrew account of 
Moses’ first pentateuchal book reads: “In the beginning God made for himself a Son” 
{aiunt quidam et Genesim in Hebraico ita incipere in principio deus fecit sibi 
filium)?^^ However, Evans suggests that Tertullian has “misunderstood his informant” 
since this imaginative reading does not seem to reoccur in other Patristic writings.^^' 
Bernard Lonergan, on the other hand, defends Tertullian’s account citing Clement of 
Alexandria {Stromata 6.7.58; 6.39.2), Jerome {Quaest Hebr In Gen 1:1),^^  ^ and 
Irenaeus.^^^
In any event, Tertullian (for sound theological and textual reasons) rightly 
rejects such a reading of Gen 1:1 and concludes that God subsisted in a solitary but 
self-sufficient condition before the creation of the cosmos: “until the generation of the 
Son” {fuit ante mundi constitutionem as usque filii generationem)?^^ This last 
sentence indicates that there was a time when God the Father was all alone, before the 
generation of the Son. However, Evans thinks that this concept—God the Father
A dv Prax  5.
‘^ '^^Ibid., 5 .9-11.
E. Evans, A dversus Praxean, 209.
Marcel Simon also provides evidence for the reading cited by Tertullian in The Bible in Greek  
Christian A ntiquity, trans. Paul M. Blow ers (Notre Dame: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1997), 62.
See Lonergan, The Way to Nicea: The D ia lectica l D evelopm ent o f  Trinitarian Theology, trans. Conn 
O ’Donovan (London: Dartman, Longman, and Todd, 1976), 23-4. VL reads: In prin cip io  fe c it  deus 
caelum  et terram . The Latin V g says: In prin cip io  creavit D eus caelum et terram.
A dv Prax 5. \ 2 - U .
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subsisting without His Son {filius)—\s utterly unthinkable. Nonetheless, it is important 
to ask what the evidence from Adversus Praxean suggests.
Evans states that Tertullian immediately corrects any possibility of 
misunderstanding what he writes concerning God’s eternal precosmic solitariness 
when he immediately qualifies his theological dicta by declaring: “Yet not even then 
was he alone” {ceterum ne tunc quidem solus)?^^ Parting exegetical ways with the 
eminent translator, we maintain that Tertullian believes the transcendent God (who 
becomes the Father) was initially alone in a hypostatic sense, personally subsisting as 
a self-sufficient world to His own self. Both Minucius Felix and Athenagoras of 
Antioch also posit a solitary hypostatic deity who is alone before He generates the 
Logos.^^^ There is thus ample historical evidence pointing to an early Christian belief 
that God was all alone (hypostatically) until He brought forth Discourse {Sermo)?^^
Granted, Tertullian explicitly writes that God was alone since “there was 
nothing external beside him” {solus autem quia nihil aliud extrinsecus praeter ilium), 
implying that there was an entity internal beside Him, namely, His own eternal Reason 
{ratio)?^^ Hence, one could justly conclude that Tertullian affirmed that an eternal 
divine hypostasis existed internally next to God the Father before the creation of all 
things in the capacity of an opposed subsistent relation. The context o f Adv Prax 5,
225 Ibid. 5.15
Tertullian writes: For before all things God was alone, he was a world and place and all things” {ante 
om nia enim deus erat solus, ipse sib i e t mundus et locus e t omnia). In O ctavius 18.7, Minucius 
expresses the following viewpoints: “Before the world, he was a world to h im self’ {ante m undum fuerit 
sib i ipse p ro  mundo) and “By his word he orders all things that exist, by means o f  his reason he 
arranges them and by his perfect goodness he perfects them” ( Verbo iubet, ratione dispensât, virtute 
consum m at). See Daniélou, Latin Christianity, 190. Similarly, Athenagoras writes: “You sovereigns, 
indeed, rear and adorn your palaces for yourselves; but the world was not created because God needed  
it; for God is H im self everything to Himself, light unapproachable, a perfect world, spirit, power, 
reason.” {Leg p ro  16). The context suggests that the God Athenagoras has in mind is the one who, 
according to Tertullian, becom es a Father to the Xoyoç. Municius Felix seem s to have the same 
referent in mind.
Cyril C. Richardson, The D octrine o f  the Trinity (N ew  York: Abingdon, 1958), 57.
A dv Prax 5AA-M.
6 7
however, suggests a different understanding of m a t t e r s W e  will now assess the 
evidence that indicates Tertullian does not think the Ratio dei is an eternal res el 
persona.
Tertullian maintains that God the Father was not alone before He created the 
world since he had his own Reason {ratio) within Him. Nevertheless, the ancient 
Carthaginian’s main point here seems to be that in a manner analogous to humans 
participating in the act of reasoning or discoursing inwardly, consequently making 
themselves objects of contemplation for and to themselves, God from all eternity past, 
deliberated or ratiocinated interiorly. In this manner, the deity made Himself the 
supreme object of contemplation for Himself.^^^ Tertullian insists that such inward, 
rational discourse befits the Most High God {Summus Deus): “For God is rational, and 
reason is primarily in him, and thus from him are all things; and that Reason is his 
consciousness” {rationalis enim deus, et ratio in ipso prius, et ita ab ipso omnia: quae 
ratio sensus ipsius est).^^^ Yet the Ratio internal beside God ante creation was not yet 
a res et persona (a particular object and présentâtion)^^  ^ as Tertullian goes on to 
illustrate.^^^
Tatian provides a similar account o f  the pre-cosm ic Sitz-im -Leben  o f  the Father and Son; “The Lord 
o f  all things who was h im self the foundation o f  the whole was alone in relation to the creation which 
had not yet com e into being” (6  yap SeOTTOTTlS TCOV oXcoV aU T O g qUTTapXCOV TOU 
T ta v T o s  f | U T T o a r a o is  K a x a  p eu  r q v  pqÔETrco y sy E u q p E v q u  T T oiqaiv  p o v o s  f]V). See 
O ratio  5 .16-21. Nevertheless, Tatian makes it clear that the pre-generated Xoyoç is not a person a  but 
refers to G od’s rational power.
A d olf Hamack, H istory o f  Dogma, trans. N eil Buchanan, 7 vols. (N ew  York: Dover, 1961), 2:259. 
In order to help us somewhat grasp the workings o f  the divine precosmic rationating activity, Tertullian, 
anticipating the later Augustine {De Trin V III-XV ), asks us to reflect on the inner discourse (i.e. 
discursive activities) that take place in the human mind.
A d\’ Prax 5.11-n .
George L. Prestige, G od  in P atristic  Thought (London: SPCK, 1969), 221.
We find a similar Logos theory posited in Hippolytus. According to the apologetic writer based in 
Rome, God once existed alone, having nothing contemporaneous with h im self {Contra N oet 10.1-2). 
Hippolytus, however, declares that “alone though he was” God was “manifold” (aU T O $ 5 e  pouoç 
COV TToXus FjV) in that “he was not W ord-less (OUTE aXoyos) nor W isdom-less (OUTE 
a a o T r q o s )  nor Power-less (OUTE à Ô U V a r o s )  nor M ind-less (OUTE àpouX E U T O S). But 
everything was in him, and he was h im self the A ll.” The previously mentioned delineation outlined by
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Tertullian reasons that since humans are made in God’s image {imago dei) and 
are rational beings^^'’ fashioned out of God’s own substance^^^ into living s o u l s , t h e  
activity that occurs when human cognizers through the act of contemplation “by 
reason argue silently”^^  ^resembles the pre-generational act of God whereby He “made 
another beside himself by activity within himself.” That is, God made Reason {Ratio) 
Discourse {Sermo) and subsequently it became His own Son.^^* The partner that one 
encounters in mental discourse, however, is neither a reality nor a person. One’s 
inward discourse partner is only quasi-personal, not being a hypostatic entity in 
relation. When one reflects ad intra, there is not another distinct persona within him 
or her. He or she only possesses a figurative interlocutor at such contemplative 
periods. Tertullian reinforces this point by penning the following words: “So in a sort 
o f a way you have in you as a second <person> discourse by means o f which you 
speak by thinking and by means o f which you think by speaking: discourse itself is 
another <than you>.^^^
Hippolytus suggests that the À o y o ç  residing in God from all eternity was not a res or distinct persona . 
Furthermore, God w ills the Logos into existence {C ontra  N oet 10.3). This aspect o f  H ippolytus’ theory 
is problematic since it implies that the Son is not an essential divine hypostasis, see E. Fortman, Triune 
G od, 118. I f  Hippolytus is correct, then the L ogos is a creature temporarily and arbitrarily deified for a 
time, see W. H, C. Frend, The Rise o f  C hristianity, 344-345. Fortman carefully delineates both the 
impersonal and subsequent personal stages o f  the Logos in The Triune G od, 118.
The tradition o f  man subisting as a rational being finds a place in the Stoic and Aristotelian 
traditions. Clement o f  Alexandria also thinks that man is the image o f  God in that he is rational 
(X oyiK O S): “Hence, man is G od’s image by virtue o f  his mind (VOUS), his reasoning faculty, not 
because o f  any sensible, to say nothing o f  anatomical, resemblance,” see William E. G. Floyd, Clem ent 
o f  A lexandria 's Treatm ent o f  the Problem  o f  E vil (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 20.
Evans tries to downplay Tertullian’s language here by noting that the apologist uses ex  when 
referring to the Son’s generation from G od’s substance and de  when talking about humanity. However, 
w e are not so sure that Tertullian has such prepositional distinctions in mind. For he employs ex and de 
interchangeably with reference to the Son’s deriva tio  from the substantia  o f  the Father.
A dv Prax  5 .32-34. Tu in tim etipso rationem  qui es anim al rationale, a  ra tionaii scilicet artifice non 
tantum fa c tu s  se d  etiam  ex substantia ipsius anim atus.
Ibid. 5 .34-35
Ibid. 5.12-13.
ita  secundus quoam m odo in te est serm o p e r  quern loqueris cogitando et p e r  quern cogitas 
loquendo: ipse serm o alius est.
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Based on the foregoing information, we seem warranted in concluding that 
Tertullian believes that God the Father subsisted alone previous to the founding of the 
universe, with no other personae internal or external beside Him. He simply possessed 
Ratio (i.e. His own faculty o f reason) or Sermo (Discourse) that was eternally in the 
Ratio dei, acting as {quasi) another person beside Him, Hence, the Latin apologist 
from North Africa notes that while God eternally had the potential for plurality or 
differentiation in se. He did not fully actualize this potential until the complete 
nativity o f the Word {nativitas perfecta sermonis)}"^^ This is why Tertullian could 
proclaim in yet another document: “There was, however, a time when neither sin 
existed with him, nor the Son” {fuit autem tempus, cum et delictum et filius non 
fuitŸ^^', or as Hamack expresses matters: “The Logos came into existence as a real 
being, before the world and for the sake of the world.” '^*^  God became Father to the 
Logos when He externally expressed Discourse qua ÀoyoF npotpopiKos.
Concerning Tertullian’s fuller statement o f God’s existence antecedent to the 
generation of His Son, Hamack perspicuously observes that although the Ratio et 
Sermo dei eternally resided within God since “he thought and spoke inwardly,” God
One can read about the perfect nativity o f  the Son in A dv Prax  7.34-35. It is also important to 
remember that Tertullian’s God is not the God o f  Thomas Aquinas. He is not strictly pure act {actus 
purus), since it is possible for Him to have unactualized potential. Nor is Tertullian’s God hilly 
im passible, since He is ontologically mutable. For instance. He becom es a Father and expresses 
em otions the Thomist deity seem s incapable o f  showing. See John Sanders, The G o d  Who Risks: A 
Theology o f  Providence  (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 143.
A dv Herm  3.18.
Hamack, H istory o f  D ogm a, 2 .259. Tatian’s X o y o s  theology is based on similar notions. Tatian’s 
doctrine o f  the Logos corresponds with Justin Martyr’s, for the most part. He loves to speak o f  the 
Word in terms o f  “Logos-Potency” (X o y o u  5 u v a p lV )  or potentia . This Word o f  God is first 
immanent in the Omnipotent deity but in time becom es the agent o f  creation as well as G od’s agent o f  
revelation. X o y O S  is depicted in Tatian as “the D ivine Reason considered as potentially capable o f  
acting in conditions wherein the Transcendent Father does not move, viz: in the phenomenal world 
which the Logos originates as the Father’s intermediary,” see Spence Little, The C hristo logy o f  the 
A pologists: Doctrinal (London: Duckworth, 1934), 181-182. The Logos, as the rational potentiality o f  
the Father, contains creation within h im self ideally. The Word springs forth as reason does from the 
human mind (Ibid., 183-184). The X o y o g  in Tatian is an abstract conception o f  divine rationality that 
assumes hypostaticity prior to and for the purpose o f  creation. The criticisms o f  Irenaeus and 
, JbR .In': tided , j n .4 t^?8________________________ _____
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the Father was still “the only person” before the Son’s begettal. '^*^ Edmund Fortman 
also reasons that the Son of God “was generated, not from eternity but before and for 
creation, and then became a second person.” "^''' Preceding His generatio, however, 
Discourse (according to Tertullian) was not “clearly and fully personalized.” '^'^
Stead further discerns that Tertullian depicts God as a Mind (nous) containing 
Word in the sense of “plan” or “thought” within it. '^'  ^ Moreover, he further states: 
“This latter is sufficiently distinct to be addressed as a ‘partner in d i a l o g u e . Y e t  
this Sermo does not become Son until God utters the words, “Let there be light” (fiat 
lux) as recorded in Gen 1:3. Stead writes that it is only at this point that one can speak 
of Discourse (Sermo) as Son in the fullest sense. '^'® It might, therefore, be inaccurate 
to argue that Tertullian thinks the Son is a timeless res et persona internal beside God.
Findings
Earlier, in Adv Prax 11, we read that God made His own word a Son (sibi filium  
fecisse sermonem suum). The famous passage in Adv Herm 3.18 also affirms: “there 
was, however, a time when neither sin existed with him, nor the Son” (fuit autem 
tempus, cum et delictum et filius non fuit). These texts illustrate that there is a marked 
distinction between the Reason or Word o f God and the Son qua Son. Whereas Ratio 
et Sermo are applied to the everlasting divine ratiocinating activity as immanent or 
expressed, Tertullian unequivocally reveals that there was not an eternal or timeless 
res et persona internal beside God anterior to the Most High making His own Word a
Hamack, H istory o f  Dogma, 2:259. 
The Triune God, 111.
Ibid.245
D ivine Substance, 228. Sydney M eilone writes: “Tertullian holds that the term L ogos is a legitimate 
metaphor involving a vital truth, because the Greek term Logos and the Latin Sermo (used as its 
equivalent) imply both a necessary distinction and a necessary relation between the thought or reason 
and its expression,” see Leaders, 122).
G. C. Stead, D ivine Substance, 228.
Ibid.
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Son to Him. Ergo, Tertullian uses the word “Son” {filius) to describe the Reason or 
Discourse of God (Ratio sive Sermo dei) expressed as a personalized and temporal 
res. Nevertheless antecedent to the “Complete nativity of Discourse (nativitas perfecta 
sermonis), the Logos, in the manner o f ancient Judaism’s hokhmah was simply a 
personification of a divine attribute or faculty.^''^ Worded another way, the Sermo dei 
is not an eternal hypostasis, a timeless res et persona.
Pagels, Gnostic Gospels, 53-54 discusses the Gnostic characterization o f  the divine mother in the 
TTÂripcopa as 0 0 () ) ia . Pagels then recounts how  early Gnostic interpreters wondered if  God creating 
the world in wisdom (Proverbs 3 and 8) meant that God “conceived” creation using a fem inine cosm ic 
principle. Valentinus also employs the 0 0 ( |) ta  m otif to explain in what way lady wisdom  became the 
“Mother o f  all living” sans a masculine principle. In this way, she marred creation and had to bring 
forth a demiurge.
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Chapter 5
Tertullian’s Exegesis of Ps 8:5 in Adversus Praxean 
In a previous chapter, we evaluated every pre-Nicene occurrence of Ps 8:5. We then 
learned that Tertullian only applies the hymnodic doxology in the eighth psalm to the 
Messiah. However, he believes that there are three distinct ways in which the Son 
became lower than angels. Sermo became inferior to the angels when it became God’s 
Son.^^® That is, when God exclaimed, "fiat lu x f  He made the impersonal Ratio Dei 
His Son.^^' Furthermore, when the Son o f God appears in OT and NT angelophanies, 
He condescends or humbles Himself.^^^ Lastly, the Father makes the Son lower than 
the angels are when Discourse assumes flesh, thus becoming a man with a human 
body and a rational soul.^^^ This study has evaluated the foregoing exegetical 
construals of Tertullian in a general manner. We will now consider how Tertullian 
explains the relevance of Ps 8:5 in his momentous theological treatise, Adversus 
Praxean.
A. The Preexistent Son and Adversus Praxean 9
Praxeas maintains that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are hypostatically identical. In
other words, the deific subsistencies of the Trinity are three successive modes of the
same divine person. Theologians generally label this view— Monarchianistic
Modalism. Tertullian deems this theological notion heretical, and the church
ultimately agreed with him. To combat Praxeas’ Modalistic Christology, he avers:
For look now, I say that the Father is one, and the Son another, and the 
Spirit another (every unlearned or self-willed person takes this 
statement in bad part, as though it proclaimed diversity and because of 
diversity threatened a separation o f Father and Son and Spirit: but I am 
bound to make it, so long as they maintain that Father and Son and
A dv M arc 2:21 
A dv Prax 5 - \ \
De Carne 14 
A dv Judaeos 14
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Spirit are identical, favouring the monarchy at the expense o f the 
economy), not however that the Son is other than the Father by 
diversity, but by distribution, not by division but by distinction, 
because the Father is not identical with the Son, they even being 
numerically one and another.
Kelly remarks that even in Justin’s day, there were reports of certain Christian
believers objecting to the teaching that the Xoyos is “something numerically other”
{arithmwi heteron ti) than the Father (Dial 128.3).^^^ Tertullian also writes that the
“simple people” (simplices) o f his time, whom he insists always constitute the
majority of God’s worshipers, normally do not grasp that they must both believe God
is one and that He is three according to the dispensation of the e c onomyTe r t u l l i a n
maintains that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct, diverse, and differentiated
Persons. But the personae do not experience abscission per the divine substance.
Tertullian thereby simultaneously tries to uphold the divine monarchy and economy.
Conversely, he declares that the “unlearned” (simplices) believers unwarrantedly
reject the economy in favor o f the monarchy. They do not comprehend, Tertullian
asseverates, in what manner the Father is identical to the Son and differentiable from
Him.
The Son is other than the Father by “distribution” (distributione) and 
“distinction” (dis tine done). Distribudo “appears to mean an assignment, or allocation, 
of functions (and so forth) among persons fundamentally alike.”^^  ^The Latin word is 
basically an overlapping relation o f dispensado. Disdncdo suggests that there are
A dv Prax  9. Hanc me regulam  professum , qua im epara to s ab a lten itro  patrem  et filiu m  et spiritum  
testor, tene ubique, et ita q u id  quom odo d ica tu r agnosces. ecce enim dico alium esse pa trem  e t alium  
filiu m  et alium spiritum  (male accep it id io tes quisque aut perversus hoc dictum, quasi diversitatem  
sonei e t ex diversitate separationem  p ro ten da t p a tr is  e t f i l i i  e t spiritus: necessitate autem hoc dico cum 
eundem  pa trem  et ftlium  et spiritum  contendunt, adversus oeconomiam m onarchiae adulantes) non 
tam en diversita te  alium filiu m  a  pa tre  se d  distributione, nec divisione alium se d  distinctione, quia non 
s it idem p a ter  e t filius, vel m odulo a lias ab  alio.
Kelly, E arly Christian D octrine, 119.
A dv Prax  3.
Evans, A dversus Praxean, 244.
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discernable disparities between two entities in relation that consequently form the
basis for otherness (i.e. differentiation). Tertullian consequently means that the Son is
another Person than the Father, being numerically other than the paternal figure o f the
Godhead, but He is not another God than the Father. Not only is he numerically
alterior to the Father, however, He is also subordinate to Him. Tertullian demonstrates
the point by exegeting Ps 8:5 and applying it to the preincamate heavenly Logos:
For the Father is the whole substance, while the Son is an outflow and 
assignment o f the whole, as he himself professes, Because my Father is 
greater than I: and by him, it is sung in the psalm, he has also been 
made less, a little on this side o f  the angels. So also the Father is other 
than the Son as being greater than the Son, as he who begets is other 
than he who is begotten, as he who sends is other than he who is sent, 
as he who makes is other than he through whom a thing is made.^^^
Tertullian writes that the Father is the entire divine substance, the Son but an “outflow
and assignment of the whole” substance.^^^ The Son is a “portion” or “derivation” of
the full divine reality. While Tertullian frequently employs the term “substance”
(substantia) in his writings, what he means by the word is still a source of
disagreement among Tertullian scholars.^^'' This study will not attempt to solve the
conundrum introduced by the famed Carthaginian.^^' Nevertheless, it is fitting to
A dv Prax  9. p a ter  enim  to ta  substan tia  est, f i l iu s  vero, deriva tio  totius et poriio , sicu t ipse profitetur. 
Q uia p a te r  m aior me est: a  quo et m inorants canitur in psalm o, M odicum qu id  c itra  angelos. sic et 
p a te r  a lias a  filio , dum filio  maior. d im  a lias qui generat alius qui generatur, dum alius qu i m ittit alius 
qui rnittitur, d im  alius qu i fa c i t  alius p e r  quem  fit.
“It must, certainly, be admitted that Tertullian cannot escape the charge o f  subordinationism. He 
bluntly calls the Father the whole divine substance, and the Son a part o f  it” (Morgan, The Im portance 
o f  Tertullian, 264-265). Morgan notes that Tertullian illustrates the relationship between the Father and 
the Son by appealing to the sun, the “parent m ass” which has beams o f  light functioning as extensions. 
A beam, Morgan observes, is obviously part o f  the sun, these two substances being two “distinct things 
{species).'” His subordinationism is thus evident, see Ibid.
Osborn (Tertullian, 131) continues; “Unity was a matter o f  substance. G od’s substance might mean 
God him self, his m ode o f  existence, his rank or character, his divinity or eternity. Another meaning 
suggests ‘the unique stuff which is, or com poses, the divine corpus, and which Tertullian denotes 
spiritus.’” See G.C. Stead “D ivine Substance in Tertullian,” JTS  NS 14 (1963) 46-66. For further study, 
consult Tertullian’s A dv Prax  31.1; Ad\' H erm  3; A pol 21. Tertullian posits a notion o f  non-material 
{stoffloses Staff), according to Osborn, Tertullian, 132.
“Y et Tertullian, like many others, never succeeds in defining his concept o f  being. A first reading o f  
A gainst P raxeas suggests that Tertullian has not avoided a division o f  the divine substance, and more
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examine Tertiillian’s use o f substantia in relation to the tres personae trinitatis.
According to Tertullian, humans are rational souls wrought out o f God’s 
substance in that a rational Creator has produced humanity in His image (Adv Prax 5). 
Tertullian also employs substantia to illustrate the relationship between the Father and 
the Son: “For though I make two suns, yet the sun and its beam I shall count as two 
objects, and two manifestations of one undivided substance, in the same sense as <1 
count> God and his Word, the Father and the Son” (Adv Prax 13). In another famous 
passage concerning the incarnate Christ, Tertullian contends that Jesus is “in one 
Person God and Man.”^^  ^That is, Christ is one Person subsisting in two substances, 
man and God “because neither is the Word anything else but God nor the flesh 
anything else but man.”^^  ^ It seems that one needs to construe these statements about 
substantia against the backdrop of Stoicism. Concerning substantia, Osborn reports: 
“While Tertullian may use the term for a particular thing, his more exact use points to 
the constitutive material of a thing. This Stoic definition is always behind the concept 
o f God’s substance and is not purely material in the commonly accepted sense of 
today.”^^ '' With Osborn, we too think that knowledge of Stoic metaphysics elucidates 
Tertullian’s utilization of substantia?^^ This fact means that Tertullian’s usage differs 
somewhat from the later ecclesiastical employment o f substantia or essentia.
Substantia does not mean “nature” in Tertullian: it signifies discrete 
particulars. The Carthaginian exemplifies this usage in De Anima 32. Tertullian there 
reasons that substance differs from nature since “a substance is one thing, and the
exact scrutiny indicates that he may not have given the Son and Spirit a totality o f  divine substance” 
(Osborn, Tertullian, 132).
A dv Prax  27.
Ibid. The Son is an effluence o f  the divine substance, see Tertullian’s A pology  21.
E. Osborn, Tertullian, 131.
The four Stoic categories are substance, quality, disposition and relative disposition (Osborn, 
Tertullian, 125-126). Stoic m etaphysics deals with “individually qualified entities.” See appendix IV.
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nature of that substance is another thing; inasmuch as the substance is the special 
property o f one given thing, whereas the nature thereof may possibly belong to many 
things.” He then provides two practical examples in order to highlight the 
dissimilarity between substance and nature.
For instance, the stoically influenced apologist observes that a piece o f stone 
or a piece of iron are two distinct substances; nevertheless, the quality o f hardness 
inhering in both differentiable substances constitutes the common nature o f both 
substantiae. While hardness unites the particulars, however, the substances 
themselves (stone and rock) provide a basis for regarding the two concreta as diverse 
metaphysical entities. The same principle applies to wool, feathers, and the quality of 
softness. Wool and feathers are substances. Softness is the nature that obtains between 
the two particulars.
Tertullian himself supplies an example of how he employs substantia to 
delineate particulars, when he contends that the Father and the Son are comparable to 
the sun and its beam.^^^ From one perspective, the sun and its beam are synonymous. 
When one considers a ray of light in isolation from the sun, he or she may call the ray 
“the sun.”^^  ^ Mentally, however, most humans pre-theoretically distinguish the sun 
from its rays. This is especially the case when one considers the sun as one undivided 
substance. We usually recognize that the sun is not its beam and a beam is not the sun 
simpliciter. Nevertheless, there is another sense in which the sun and its beam are one: 
a ray o f light emanating from the sun is an extension of the sun’s substantia, 
Tertullian applies this same principle to God and His Son.^^^
The Father is comparable to the sun and Christ is akin to a ray of light
A dv Prax  13 
Ibid.
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emanating from the sun. As such, Christ is an extension, prolation, and manifestation 
o f deity. He shares in the “one undivided substance” of the Father, who is the fullness 
o f divinity. But since we can view the sun as one entity or two entities (one sun or two 
suns), Tertullian can likewise speak o f one God or two gods without contradicting 
himself. When Tertullian therefore writes that the Father is the entire divine 
substance, he evidently means that in the strictest sense, the Father is God. Other 
divine beings such as the Son only possess a relative type of divinity in a derivative 
and inferior sense: “The Father is the whole substance, while the Son is only a 
derivation who participates in the divine substance in a lesser degree than the 
Father.”^^  ^ The Father is thus greater than the Son is—both in the economy and 
immanently.
There are two salient points that we can learn from Tertullian’s exegesis of Ps 
8:5 in Adv Prax 9. First, Tertullian makes it clear that the Father is the whole 
substance of the Godhead, the Son but a derivation and portion of the whole. These 
words apply to the preincamate Xoyos who becomes a Son to God before and for the 
purpose o f creation.^^'^ Adv Prax 9 indicates that the preincamate Christ is the subject 
of discussion, and not Discourse (Sermd) enfleshed. Tertullian reasons: “So also the 
Father is other than the Son as being greater than the Son, as he who sends is other 
than he who is sent, as he who begets is other than he who is begotten, as he who 
makes is other than he through whom a thing is made.”^^ '
Ibid.
J. L. N eve and Otto W. Heick, A H istory o f  C hristian Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965-1966). 
108.
“The Son and the Spirit are distinguished, therefore, from the Father in that they have their own 
subsistent being, which is not, however, based on their eternal specific individuality, but rather on their 
function in relation to G od’s creation. Tertullian does not manage to get beyond the combination o f  a 
modalism with regard to the distinctness o f  the individual persons and a subordinationism with regard 
to their existential plurality” (Daniélou, Latin C hristianity, 364).
A dv P rax  9.
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By articulating his Christology in the aforesaid terms, Tertullian also 
provides a basis for introducing the notion of subordination and otherness vis-à-vis 
the economic Trinity. The economy is not utterly reducible to the incarnatio Christi, 
however. While Tertullian therefore evokes Jn 14:28, he does so to demonstrate how 
the Son relates to the Father in the Godhead. Tertullian then appeals to Ps 8:5 which 
delineates the temporary minoration o f God’s Son.
A second point we want to draw attention to is that Tertullian’s exegesis o f Ps 
8:5 in Adv Prax 9 reveals that he believes God the Father made the preexistent Son 
lower than the angels for a time, by generating Him antecedent to creation. This study 
thus urges that the Son became lower than the angels before His Incarnation. This 
means that Tertullian affirms the superiority of the Father over against the Son 
independently of the Son’s human state. If Tertullian does indeed posit the view that 
this investigation argues, one wonders how he can concomitantly affirm the absolute 
(i.e. unqualified) deity o f the Son. How can one who is fully God be lower than the 
angels in his preincamate state? How can the Son be truly God (vere deus), if He is 
only a “portion” of the entire divine substance?
To address these questions, one might reason that the Son decided to submit 
Himself eternally to the Father’s omnipotent Will without relinquishing his absolute 
deity.“’  ^ Ergo, although the Son had an ab initio according to Tertullian, He remains 
fully God since he originates from the Father’s very substance.^^^ It is possible, 
however, that the most convincing explanation to this seeming quandary is provided 
in Adv Marc 2.27, a text that we analyzed earlier chapter 2: “He is the Son of the 
Creator, his Word whom by bringing him forth from himself he caused to be his Son.
G eorge R. B. Murray, John, WBC (W aco: Word, 1987), 262. 
E. Fortman, Triune G od, 114-115.
79
From then onwards he put him in authority over his whole design and purpose, 
reducing him a little below the angels, as it is written in David.” Based on this 
passage, we can tentatively conclude that Tertullian affirms that the Son of God was 
made lower than the angels by means o f His temporal preincamate generation. The 
Son consequently experiences a “lessening” when God brings Him forth ante creation 
as filius qua filius?^^ From henceforth, the Son qua Son becomes lower than the 
angels. Additionally, Tertullian also deals with the Son as He appears to the 
patriarchs, namely, in an Angelomorphic or angelophanic setting. The angelophanies 
in the OT thence serve as further evidence that the Son’s temporal minoration 
occurred before His Incarnation. We will now consider Tertullian’s treatment of such 
angelophanies delineated m Adv Prax 16.
B. Adversus Praxean 16 
Tertullian relates that the Son is the agent of every divine judicial act described in the 
OT. The preexistent Son confounded the languages at Babel, brought forth the deluge 
o f waters upon the incorrigible generation o f Noah’s day, and rained down fire and 
brimstone on the two cities of Sodom and Gommorah.^^^ Furthermore, “he it always 
was who came down to converse with men, from Adam even to the patriarchs and 
prophets, always from the beginning preparing beforehand in dream and in a mirror 
and in an enigma that course which he was going to follow out to the end.”^^ ^
Tertullian’s position regarding the Son’s angelophanies is admittedly 
inconsistent. In certain passages, he avers that the Father is utterly transcendent and
Bethune-Baker also observes that the preincamate Son Is “made less” than the Father (A dv Prax  9). 
B ut he overlooks the fact that the preincarnate Christ is also made inferior to the angels (E arly History, 
142).
A dv Prax  16.
A d v  Prax  16.28-32. ipse enim e t a d  humana sem per colloqu ia  descendit, ab Adam  usque a d  
p a tr ia rch a s  e t proph etas, in visione in som nio in specu la  in aenigm ate ordinem suum praestruens ab 
in itio  sem per quem era t persecu tors in finem .
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completely invisible to human eyes. The Father, Tertullian insists, is wholly incapable
o f condescending to manifest Himself to beings o f flesh.^^^ The preincarnate Son, on
the other hand, is able to assume flesh. He literally takes on a human corpus and
converses with the ancient Hebrew patriarchs and prophets in preparation for His first
century Incarnation, Tertullian claims.^^^ However, the apologist adjusts his stance in
Adv Prax 14. There we witness Tertullian having difficulty believing that the Son
really assumes a body of flesh when he appears to the Hebrew patriarchs and prophets
in angelophanies.^^^ As an alternative, he suggests that the Angelomorphic Son
actually appeared “in dream and in a mirror and in an enigma that course which he
was going to follow out to the end.”^^ '^  Evans observes:
Tertullian therefore in the present passage [Adv Prax 14], while 
retaining the traditional theory that the theophanies were appearances 
o f the Son, denies their substantive reality and suggests that they were 
no more than visions and dreams, ‘as in a glass darkly’ and will have it 
that in his own Person the Son was not seen until the Incarnation.^^'
There is clearly evidence of a dialectical tension in Tertullian’s thought regarding the
Father’s relationship with the Son. If the apologist holds that God the Father is the
invisible deity while the Son is the visible aspect of deity, his views are reminiscent of
Gnosticism and they border on inadvertently dividing the divine substance he hitherto
affirms in Adversus Praxean?^^ To ameliorate the tension, Tertullian declares that the
Father made the Son lower than the angels for a time. In this way, Christ was able to
converse with men through various divine media in order that He might learn how to
A dv Prax  14.
Tertullian writes: “But the Lord H im self at that very time appeared to Abraham amongst those 
angels without being bom , and yet in the flesh without doubt, in virtue o f  the before-mentioned 
diversity o f  cause. You, however, cannot admit this, since you do not receive that Christ, who was even 
then rehearsing how to converse with, and liberate, and judge the human race, in the habit o f  a flesh 
w hich as yet was not bom , because it did not yet mean to die until both its nativity and mortality were 
previously (by prophecy) announced.” (D e C arne  6).
M. W iles, M aking, 125-126.
A d v  P rax  16.
E. Evans. A dversus Praxean, 269.
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subsist as a man through intercourse with men. Hence, the Son’s preincamate 
visionary activity supposedly explains God’s prima facie nescience in the OT. Such 
angelophanies were precursors of the Son’s incarnate existential state.
The Son’s OT pre incarnate minoration further serves as evidence of His 
otherness (i.e. alterity) vis-à-vis the Father. It provides the basis for imputing a 
subordinate status for the preexistent Christ in relation to the whole divine substance. 
The taking on of human passions and emotions before Christ became fully human also 
achieves another divine intent. It served as evidence that human passions and 
psychical affections “befitted the Son, who was also going to undergo human 
passions, both thirst and hunger and tears and nativity itself and death itself, for this 
purpose made by the Father a little lower than the angels
As this section of the study illustrates, a second way in which Tertullian 
applies Ps 8:5 to the Son in Adversus Praxean is with reference to His angelophanic 
appearances. So far, however, there is sufficient evidence to contend that Tertullian 
describes the Son qua Son being lower than the angels are. We will now examine 
Tertullian’s third exegetical approach to Ps 8:5 to discern how he links the Son’s 
Incarnation with the well-known psalm.
C. Adversus Praxean 23
By far, Tertullian’s most common exegetical approach is to relate Ps 8:5 to the
Incarnation. One discovers this usage in Adv Prax 23:
And thither also the Son looked up and prayed and made request of the 
Father-where also he taught us to lift ourselves up and pray, Our 
Father which art in heaven-Xhowgh he is also everywhere. This the 
Father would have for his abode: The heaven, he says, is my throne.
From this also he made the Son a little less than the angels by sending 
him down to earth, yet with the intention of crowning him with glory
H. Brown, H eresies, 42-60.
A dv M arc  2.16,
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and honour by taking him back into heaven. This he was already 
granting him when he said, I  have both glorified it and will glorify it.
God the Father causes the enfleshed Logos to be inferior to the angels for a time. Of
course, the Son’s temporary minoration eventually culminates in His subsequent
glorification and exaltation. Nevertheless, one must recall that the Son’s minoration
actually begins before and in anticipation of His Incarnation. Its starting point is at the
very commencement of God’s creative activity {Adv Marc 2.27). The Aoyos- who
becomes God’s Son is made lower than the angels by virtue of His temporal
generation {Adv Herm 3.18). Adv Prax 9 seems to bear this point out as well.
However, there are some objections to the interpretation essayed in this study that we
want to consider at this point. Is it possible that texts such as Adv Prax 9 regarding the
Son’s momentai-y state of inferiority vis-à-vis the angels does not refer to His
preexistent state but only possess economic significance? Kearsley has argued that
Tertullian restricts the application of Ps 8:5 to the Son’s role in God’s redemptive
historical dealings. More specifically, he claims that the verse has reference to the
incarnate Son and not to Christ in his préexistence.^^'' We will now examine
Kearsley’s line of argumentation and offer a critical assessment of it.
D. Kearsley and Tertullian’s Interpretation of Ps 8:5 in Adv Prax 9
Roy Kearsley has written a groundbreaking and informative work setting forth
Tertullian’s theology o f divine power. He argues that the Father communicates the
substance (substantia) spoken of in Adv Prax 9 to the Son without division or
separation. He transmits the “whole substance of the Deity” to Christ without the
Colish thinks that Tertullian teaches the consubstantiality o f  the Son or at least provides a basis for 
later tliinkers to define the hypostatic union. She writes: “He wants to emphasize the consubstantiality 
o f  the Son with the Father over against heretics who reject the principle that the fullness o f  divinity 
dw ells in Christ,” see C olish’s The S toic Tradition, 2:22-23.
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substance undergoing any diminution.^^^ Furthermore, Kearsley contends that 
substantia may denote “a substratum” (reality) indigenous to the three opposed 
relations constituting the Trinity, even though the Father appears to be the total 
substance of the Godhead/^^ Kearsley then cites the pregnant phrase pater enim tota 
substantia est, filius vero derivatio totius et portio that defines the relationship 
between the Father and one of His lesser prolations?^^ With regard to the Son’s 
derivation (derivatio) from the Father, Kearsley notes: “Evans concludes that a certain 
lessening o f the Son in his divine being occurs here.”^^® He seems reluctant, however, 
to concur with Evans since Kearsley thinks one should avoid interpreting Tertullian in 
a crude materialistic manner/^^
In addition to the foregoing, Kearsley resists the notion that Tertullian posits a 
“minor portion” (the Son) being “cut off from the larger and superior mass called the 
Father.”^^ ° He recommends stressing derivatio more so than portio, although 
according to Kearsley, portio does not merely signify “portion” in Adv Prax 9. He 
evidently bases this intepretation on Tertullian’s employment o fprolatio to depict the 
relationship between the Father and the Son in Adv Prax 14. Moreover, he attributes 
Tertullian’s use of prolatio to the Stoic tradition. He then infers that prolatio should 
be equated with p o r t i o P o r t i o  then takes on the signification, “assignment.”
In addition to the foregoing, Kearsley thinks that Jn 14:28, a text that 
Tertullian cites in both Adv Prax 9 and 14, pertains to God’s historical redemptive
R. Kearsley, Tertullian's Theology, 122.
Ibid.
A dv Prax  9 .34. This section o f  A dversus Praxean  also contains an allusion to Jn 14:28 indicating 
that the Son is, in som e fashion, subordinate to the Father. We will later discuss Tertullian’s application 
o f  Jn 14:28.
R. Kearsley, Tertullian's Theology, 122.
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scheme (Heiîsgeschichte). That is, God’s modus operandi for effecting salvation in 
human history. Supposedly, Tertullian’s quote from Ps 8:5 supports Kearsley’s line of 
argumentation. Worded another way, Kearsley suggests that the psalm implemented 
by Tertullian does not pertain to the Son’s pre-cosmic generation but has as its locus 
o f referential significance, the Incarnation of the God-Man. The Son is, consequently, 
an “assignment of the whole” in the work of redemption: Christ is only an 
“assignment and outflow” {partie et derivatio) as the incarnate Son o f God. If 
Kearsley’s contentions are warranted, then the thesis set forth in this study regarding 
the pre-existent Son being lower than the angels appears to be in jeopardy. We shall 
now assess Kearsley’s treatment of Tertullian’s concept of substantia in the light of 
Adv Prox 9 to ascertain its historical validity. Our investigation will critique 
Kearsley’s contentions in the order that this section has outlined them.
E. Critique of Kearsley’s Treatment 
Kearsley states that both the Son and the Holy Spirit are “equal possessors” 
(consortes) of the Father’s substance.^^^ The Father is the whole substance while the 
Son is an eternal expression and outflow of the whole substance. Tertullian thus 
teaches that each Person is fully God, Kearsley maintains. He concludes: “Son and 
Spirit possess parity in divine power because they come forth from the divine 
substance.”^^ ^
As mentioned above, it is very difficult to ascertain what Tertullian precisely 
means by the term substantia. Regardless of what the Latin expression signifies, 
however, it is almost certain that Tertullian does not believe that the Son or Holy 
Spirit possesses divinity in its fullness. The Father is not simply the entire divine
Ibid., 124. 
”^ lbid.
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substance; He is the plenitude of divinity. Moreover, Tertullian exclaims that God has 
not always been a Father or a Judge since there was a time when neither sin nor the 
Son existed beside Him (Adv Herm 3.18). God became a Father before the creation. 
For this reason, Fortman finds Tertullian’s doctrine o f Christ wanting. The ancient 
Christian rhetorician does not accept the eternal generation of the Son.^ "^^  Yet, he 
articulates so clearly, there was never a time when God was not.
Bernard Lonergan points to the seemingly contradictory elements in 
Tertullian’s Christology, noting that the Carthaginian rightly believes that the Father is 
not the Son nor is the Son the Father, yet both hypostases are God. However, 
Tertullian also thinks that the Son is temporal, says that the Father is the whole 
substance of divinity, and he confirms that the Father commands while the Son obeys 
the dictates of the Father as the Son mediates creation. In short, Tertullian gainsays his 
own argument in Adversus Praxean, Lonergan w r i t e s . F o r ,  if God is eternal and the 
Son is God, then the Son must be eternal. Furthermore, if God is the whole divine 
substance and the Son is God, then the Son must also be the entire substance. 
Otherwise, Tertullian is putting forth contradictory propositions.^^^
One may proffer a solution regarding Lonergan’s charge that Tertullian’s 
Christology is logically inconsistent by noting that Tertullian does not think the Son is 
fully God. Tertullian may believe that the Son possesses a relative type of divinity,
E, Fortman, Triune G od, 115.
For a discussion o f  Tertullian’s efforts to remove the material principle (objective contradiction) 
from his thought, see Lonergan, The W ay to N icea, 48-49. Lonergan further explains the means 
em ployed by Tertullian and other pre-Nicenes to eradicate theological inconsistences. According to 
Lonergan, the necessary elements for resolving dialectical tension in one’s system are the formal 
principle (i.e. the rational subject illumined by natural reason or the light o f  faith) and the dialectic 
process (i.e. the actual act itself o f  eliminating contradictions). Furthermore, Lonergan speaks about the 
“term” or the final result o f  the dialectical process (either heresy or advance in theology or orthodoxy). 
The result o f  Christian dialectical movem ent w ill depend on whether natural reason is involved or 
reason illumined by faith, according to Lonergan, ibid.
Lonergan show s further logical incongruities in Tertullian’s thought through the use o f  sim ple 
syllogism s: “i f  the Son is God, and God is the w hole divine substance, then the Son also is the w hole
8 6
thereby making Christ dependent on the Father’s absolute and unqualified ousia?'^^ 
Mellone thus appears to be correct when he observes that Tertullian affirms a 
subordination of essence for the Son by uttering the words recorded in Adv Prax 9 
about the Father being the whole substance.^^^
1. Kearsley’s Argument in Favor of Portio 
Kearsley next contends that portio does not simply mean “portion” in Adv Prax 9. By 
positing this thetic judgment, inter alia, he is endeavoring to avoid a materialistic 
construal of portio. Nevertheless, it is quite possible for one to understand portio as 
pars without imputing a crass materialistic stance to Tertullian. Tertullian’s 
employment of portio appears to be metaphorical.^^^ Consequently, it seems apropos 
for Latin writers to use portio as a semantic equivalent for pars: the two tenus are 
overlapping relations. Portio denotes “part, portion” in Tacitus and Pliny.^^^ 
Augustine uses it to signify partie, and Tertullian utilizes it metaphorically to denote 
“resemblance.” The term means: “part” (i.e. soin pre'fere’ or objet pre'fere) in other 
ecclesiastical writings as well.^°' Portio may well signify “part” or “portion” in a 
metaphorical sense; it need not and probably does not mean “assignment” in Adv Prax 
9.6. The syntax of the passage further suggests that portio denotes “portion” in Adv 
Prax 9,
Evans thinks that Tertullian qualifies portio with totius, hence making this 
construction syntactically a descriptive instead o f a partitive genitive (i.e. genitive of
divine substance; if  the Son is God, and God commands, then the Son also commands,” see ibid., 48.
C. Richardson, The C hristianity o f  Ignatius o f  Antioch  (N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 
1935), 45.
M ellone, Leaders, 178.
See Bertrand de Margerie, The Christian Trinity in H istory  (Still River: St. Bede, 1982), 78-81. 
Albert Blaise, D ictionnaire Latin-F rancais D es Auteurs Chrétiens: Revu Spécialem ent P our le 
Vocabulaire Théologique (Brepolis: de Strasbourg 1954 [1993]), 635.
'°' Ibid, 635.
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303the whole)/^^ The Son is not a part, but a “purtenance o f divinity,” Evans argues. 
Christ does not exhaust deity but is, nevertheless, fully God.^ "^^
Evans cites a number o f texts that appear to support understanding portio 
totius as a descriptive genitive.^^^ For instance, he quotes Adv Prax 26 to buttress the 
notion that portio totius may be a descriptive genitive in Adv Prax 9. Adv Prax 26.11- 
13 reads; “For when he said The Spirit o f God, although God is spirit, yet since he did 
not mention God in the nominative case he wished there to be understood an 
assignment o f the whole which was to go to the Son’s account.” '^^  ^ While one could 
read this passage as a descriptive genitive, one could equally construe the text as a 
genitive of the who l e . It is difficult to settle this issue based on grammar alone. 
However, the way that Tertullian and other pre-Nicenes employ portio lends credence 
to the view that the construction, “portion of the whole” {portio totius) is a genitive of 
the whole. Two texts that suggest portio is a partitive genitive in Adv Prax 9 are 
Novatian’s De Trin 11 and Tertullian’s Adv Marc 3.6.^°^ In the final analysis, we must 
admit that a certain amount of obscurity surrounds the issue.
Kearsley not only contends that the phrase, portio totius, should be translated 
“assignment o f the whole,” (descriptive genitive), he also argues that Tertullian 
applies Jn 14:28 to the incarnate Son only in Adv Prax 9. We will now critically 
assess Kearsley’s remarks in the next section of this study.
E. Evans, A dversus Praxean, 247.
™  Ibid 246.
See/It/v  Prax  26; cf. Kearsley, T ertu llian’s Theology, 123.
E. Evans, Ach’ersus Praxean, 246.
D icens autem , Spiritus del, etsi sp iritus del, tamen non directo  deum nominans portionem  totius 
in tellegi voluit quae cessura era t in Jilii nomen.
Compare Juvenal’s Satura  ix .I28ff; fes tin a t enim decurrere veloxJlosculus angustae m iseraeque 
breuissim a uitae portio \ dum bibimus, dum serta , unguenta, pa e lla s  p o se imus, obrepit non in tellecta  
senectus Satura.
D e Trin 11 : “because any one who should exclude one portion  o f  the truth will never hold the 
perfect truth” (quoniam  nec tenebit perfectam  veritatem  quisquis aliquam veritatis excluserit 
portionem ). See De Res 16.
2. Kearsley’s Application of John 14:28
Lastly, Kearsley avers that Tertullian refers to the incarnate Son when he references Jn 
14:28 in Adv Prax 9. The text, he declares, applies to the economy and the economy 
only. However, the context of Adv Prax 9 indicates that neither Ps 8:5 nor Jn 14:28 
only apply to the Son’s incarnate state. This point seems evident from Tertullian’s 
exegesis of Ps 8:5 \n Adv Marc 2.27 and the ante-Nicene exegesis of Jn 14:28.
While some church fathers choose to apply Jn 14:28 exclusively to the human 
nature of Christ, Barrett demonstrates that this textual reading is neither the earliest 
interpretation nor the predominant explanation of the Johannine text among the pre- 
Nicenes. '^^^ Most early church writers think that Jn 14:28 is to be explained 
“independently o f the circumstances of the incarnation.”^ B a r re t t’s evaluation of the 
exegetical history of Jn 14:28 is confirmed in Adv Prax 14, where Tertullian 
unambiguously applies the Johannine passage to the Son without restricting it to the 
Incarnation.
In Adv Prax 22, Tertullian refers Jn 10:30 to the heavenly Aoyos". Origen also 
thinks Jn 14:28 teaches that the Father is greater than the Son according to “their 
proper being and intrinsic relationship.” '^  ^ Irenaeus seems to hold a similar doctrinal 
view.^'^ Additionally, Tertullian believes that Jn 1:9 is a reference to the preexistent
CK Barrett’s E ssays on John  (London; SPCK, 1982), 27. See the Tome o f  Leo {A d  Flavianum, 
E pis to i a  4) and A ugustine’s Tractate on John  78.2.
Barrett lists Tertullian’s A dv Prax  9 as one example o f  a pre-Nicene who thinks that Jn 14:28 refers 
to the Son independently o f  His incarnate state. Barrett, Essays, 27.
Ibid., 27-28.
Irenaeus reasons: “For if  any one should inquire the reason why the Father, who has fellow ship with 
the Son in all things, has been declared by the Lord alone to know the hour and the day [o f  judgment], 
he w ill find at present no more suitable, or becom ing, or safe reason than this (since, indeed, the Lord is 
the only true Master), that w e may learn through Him that the Father is above all things. For "the 
Father," says He, "is greater than 1." The Father, therefore, has been declared by our Lord to excel with 
respect to knowledge; for this reason, that w e, too, as long as w e are connected with the schem e o f  
things in this world, should leave perfect know ledge, and such questions [as have been mentioned], to 
God, and should not by any chance, while we seek to investigate the sublime nature o f  the Father, fall 
into the danger o f  starting the question whether there is another God above God.” Adv H aer  2.28.3.
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Son in Adv Prax 12, Christ, in his preexistent state, is there called “assistant and 
minister” of the Father. It should therefore be no surprise that verses commonly 
interpreted as references to the human ousia o f Christ in post-Nicene times, were 
viewed as references to the immanent relationship of the Father and Son by most pre- 
Nicenes. We therefore conclude that Tertullian follows a pre-Nicene pattern and 
interprets Jn 14:28 “independently of the circumstances of the incarnation.”
Now that we have assessed Kearsley’s arguments, we will report the findings 
o f this study and conclude by showing the relevance o f the investigation we have 
undertaken. In doing so, we will further summarize the main points emphasized 
throughout this thesis.
Conclusion 
Findings Regarding Tertullian, Psalm 8:5 and Angelomorphic Christology
The initial goal of the present investigation was to explore three questions dealing 
with Angelomorphic Christology and Ps 8:5. We will now outline three findings of 
this inquiry in succession.
(1) Daniélou writes that Tertullian rejects all angelopmorphic Christology. 
After exploring Tertullian’s writings, however, we are inclined to think that either 
Daniélou’s reading o f Tertullian needs to be corrected or the ecclesiastical historian is 
employing the standard nomenclature of Angelomrphic studies in an imprecise 
manner. For while Tertullian is reluctant to call Christ an angel and he has a manifest 
“distate” for Angelomorphic Christology, the Carthaginian does not repudiate 
angelopmorphism in toto. His writings show that he believes there is a sense in which 
Christ is or appears as an angel. Tertullian explicitly calls Christ an angel in De Carne 
and avails himself of Angelomorphic themes. Maybe, as Stuckenbriick suggests, one 
should speak of Tertullian’s angelophanic Christology in view of his depiction of
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Christ as the angel of the Lord who appeared to the Hebrew patriarchs and prophets. 
At any rate, we can safely propose that Tertullian does not reject all Angelomorphic 
Christology.
(2) More than one commentator has stated that Tertullian thinks there is an 
ontological divide between Christ and the holy angels of God. Daniélou appeals to 
Adv Prax 3.4-10 to buttress this contention. However, this particular section of 
Tertullian’s work may not provide sufficient warrant for positing an ontological 
chasm between Christ and the angels since the translation o f this passage is 
definitively uncertain. Furthermore, other parts o f Tertullian’s work indicate that the 
angels probably share in the substance, though not the being of God. If man, as a finite 
rational agent, partakes of the substantia of God, then should not the angels also share 
in the Father’s substance? After all, they are superior in status and substance to man. 
Additionally, Tertullian indicates that the angels administer God’s monarchia: 
myriads and myriads of spirit beings attend God’s throne. They are thus officials of 
the esteemed divine monarchy. Tertullian does not posit an ontological chasm vis-à- 
vis the angels and the two prolationes o f the Trinity.
(3) The main contention of this study is that God made the Son qua Son lower 
than the angels are. We base this argument on two texts from Tertullian’s corpus, 
namely, Adv Marc 2.27 and Adv Prax 9. Tertullian primarily invokes Ps 8:5 with 
reference to the incarnate Son and he further applies the text to the Son as He appears 
in angelophanies. However, Adv Marc 2.27 unambiguously declares that the 
preincarnate Son became lower than the angels when God generated Him for and 
before creation. Therefore, it seems that God made the Son as such inferior to the 
angels for a time. It is imperative to remember that God made the Son inferior before 
He became a man. Ergo, the basis for such a lesser position in relation to the angels is
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the perfecta nativitas sermonis, an event antecedent to creation. This complete 
nativity occurs when God exclaims, lux, at the ab initio creationis. Additionally, 
Tertullian argues that the Son is both inferior to and other than the Father in Adv Prax 
9. His comments apply to the preincarnate Son in view of how Tertullian and other 
pre-Nicenes elsewhere exegete Jn 14:28.
Implications of This Study 
Tertullian is well-versed in the OT writings. He shows familiarity with the divine 
appellatives and readily invokes the titles appertaining to deity that the Law and 
Prophets contain. The zealous spokesman for Christianity teaches that the Son is 
omnipotem  and is literally the self-designation {nomen) o f the Father, in some 
contexts, since He comes in the Father’s name.^'^ Despite formulating a somewhat 
“high Christology” and interpreting OT references concerning YHWH as references to 
Christ, Tertullian is nevertheless careful to note that the two deific beings that he so 
clearly affirms in Adversus Praxean are nonetheless unequal in eternity, power and 
divininity.
The divinity of the second Lord is relative, being dependent on the Father. 
Furthermore, the second Lord is subordinate to the Father before His Incarnation: the 
Son qua Son is inferior to the angels preceding His enfleshment. Christ the Lord is 
also not an eternal persona. He becomes a Son in tempo when God sounds forth His 
own Aoyos". All of this means that there is a marked disparity between the two Lords 
toward whom Tertullian displays reverence. Wilken’s observation comes to mind, 
when he writes that the pre-Nicenes thought Christ was God, in some sense, but they 
did not believe that He was “fully God.” in particular, he writes:
During these years [the first three centuries of Christianity’s
See Tertullian’s De O ratïo.
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existence], most Christians vaguely thought of Jesus as God; yet they 
did not actually think of him in the same way as they thought of God 
the Father. They seldom addressed prayers to him, and thought of him 
somehow as second to God—divine, yes, but not fully God.^'''
Two fundamental tenets of Christianity are that God is one deity and that He has
revealed Himself through Jesus Christ at the fullness of time (Gal 4:4). Similarly,
Richardson points out that the basis of Christian belief is God’s unicity and the
revelation of Himself “in Jesus Christ.”^ H e  then adds:
When the early Christians found it necessary to consider the 
implications of this conviction they did not find it difficult to suppose 
that the God qui est super omnia allowed his monarchy to be 
administered by the Son, who was dependent upon Him for 
immortality and a relative divinity.^
At this point, Richardson unequivocally has Tertullian in mind. He explictly writes:
“This is the basis of the argument o f Tertullian against Praxeas. The popular idea of
the relative divinity of the ‘created gods’ can be found in Plato (Tim. 41), and, in
Stoicism, man is 'o  0eos because he possesses reason, or part of the essence of the
Godhead."^"
The conclusion that we thus draw from the research undertaken here is that 
Tertullian’s doctrine of Christ does not escape a subordination of essence. Tertullian 
presents Christ as a deity, who only possesses a relative form of divinity. He nuances 
and qualifies the Son’s deity, distinguishing Him from the Father, “who is over all” 
{qui est super omnia). There is also a sense in which the preexistent Christ may be 
spoken of as a “created god” in view of Tertullian’s leanings towards Stoicism and his 
detailed interpretation of Prov 8:22-31.
In conclusion, we may say that while his particular form of Christian teaching
R. Wilken, Christian Beginnings, 179. 
C. Richardson, Ignatius o f  Antioch, 44.
"'^Ibid., 44-45.
Ibid., ftn 70, page 98
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did not permanently influence the Christian Church, the theological language that he 
utilized to delineate the three persons o f the Trinity {tres personae trinitatis) did have 
a lasting effect on the subsequent formulation of the Trinity doctrine and the Church’s 
theological doctrine of Christ.^'* Hence, Milman does not speak hyperbolically, when 
he notes that Tertullian was the first Latin writer to gain a public hearing and, in view 
of his activities, one can conclude: “Africa, not Rome, gave birth to Latin 
Christianity.”^'^
J. Quasten notes: “It is in the doctrine o f  the Trinity and the intimately connected Christology that 
Tertullian made the greatest contribution to theology” {Patrology, 324), W hile the present author 
concurs with Quasten’s analysis somewhat, he thinks it is important to make a distinction between 
Tertullian’s contribution to Trinitarian language and his contribution to the ontological dogma itself. 
W e seem  justified in concluding that Tertullian is a long way from Nicaea in his thinking and treatment 
o f  the Trinity, a point apparently admitted by Quasten h im self (326). We do well, therefore, to avoid 
retrojecting Nicaean language or post-N icene ontological categories back onto Tertullian’s A dversus 
P raxean . Contra Osborn, Tertullian does not believe that the “econom ic Trinity is the immanent Trinity 
(a phrase popularized by Karl Rahner)” and v ice  versa (Osborn, Tertullian, 121) Hamack appears to be 
correct when he limits Tertullian’s Trinity to G od’s econom y or Heiîsgeschichte.
Henry Milman, H istory o f  Latin Christianity: Including that o f  the Popes to the Pontificate o f  
N icolas V, 8 vols. (N ew  York: W. J. W iddleton, 1870), 1:56-59.
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Appendices
I. Persona a n d  Tertullian
What does Tertullian intend to say when he categorizes the three metaphysical 
supposita, which presumably constitute the Trinity, as personae! Does he thereby 
impute consciousness to each divine Person?
Grillmeier examines Tertullian’s use of the Latin signifier and remarks that he 
rarely utilizes persona to mean: “mask” or “theatre role.”^^  ^ He adds that there are 
about thirty occurrences of the term, having the denotation, “person.” The 
ecclesiastical historian suggests that the Latin church father ascribes individuality or 
concreteness to the expression at times. Tertullian may also perceive a nexus per 
significatio between persona and substantia in Adv Praxean. Nevertheless, Grillmeier 
points out that Tertullian does not develop his treatment of the terminus technicus 
beyond the denotation, concrete presentation. Persona is “ultimate individualization,” 
according to Tertullian.^^' He emphatically rejects the Modalist understanding of the 
three divine persons as successive temporary modes of being.
We are not sure if Tertullian was the first theologian to use persona. He 
certainly brought it to the fore by attributing a number of different senses {Sinnen) to 
the word, however. Fortman notes that in Tertullian’s literary corpus, persona 
signifies “mask,” “face,” and is “in a sense equivalent to homo or vi>.” Persona 
further connotes “the concrete presentation of an individual as such.”^^  ^Nevertheless, 
Fortman points out that “the idea of self-consciousness” is not prominent in 
Tertullian’s usage of the word.^^^ The Carthaginian rhetorician evidently does not
Grillmeier, Christ in Christian T ra d itio n ,\2 6 -\2 1 . See D e Spec 22.
Kelly wi’ites that persona came to denote “individual” as it transitioned from its signification “mask.” 
Tertullian may use it to connote the “concrete presentation oFan individual as such” (115).
E. Fortman, Triune G od, 113.
J. N . D. Kelly, H istory o f  E arly D octrine, 115.
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impute consciousness, at least not clearly and explicitly, to the three Persons.
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IL  Substantia a n d  Tertullian
Bethune-Baker maintains that Tertullian may posit a juristic denotation for substance 
ala Harnack, although this can hardly be what Tertullian means, in view of what he 
writes in De Anima 32 and Adv Herm 3. He rightly notes that Tertullian uses 
substantia to denote “a particular form o f existence” though he still curiously seems to 
argue in favor of the juristic understanding of substance in Tertullian/^''
Substance and nature are two distinct modes in Tertullian/^^ Stone and iron 
are two distinct substances {substantiae). But they share the common nature of 
hardness. Substance demarcates stone and iron; the nature of firmness unites the 
particulars.^^^ Baker thus rightly argues that substance can never mean “nature” in 
Tertullian.^^^ Substance as it pertains to the Father, says Baker, can also function as an 
“exegetical periphrasis” for the Father Himself. That is, as a delineation o f “His own 
being” in view o f Adv Prax 8.^ ^^  Conversely, Grillmeier thinks that “By the substance 
of God, Tertullian understands a light, fine, invisible matter which while being a unity 
is differentiated within itself.”^^  ^ Father, Son and Holy Spirit thus constitute the “one 
total reality of God.”^^*^
Blaise^^' supplies the following definitions for substantia: substance, matière 
{Adv Prax 14), existence {vie), ouata  or realité (Adv Prax 7), être {Adv Prax 26);
Bethune-Baker, E arly H istory  , 140 
De Anim a  32
326 Bethune-Baker, E arly H istory, 140-141.
™  Ibid., 141. Prestige further observes: “It may be argued that to Tertullian substantia  did not exclude 
the notion o f  secondary substance,” see P atristic  Thought, 220. He makes a distinction between  
substan tia  and natura substantiae. He notes that substantia  in Tertullian refers to particulars, but 
natura  may be a common feature that obtains between disparate objects. Cattle thus resemble mankind 
in nature but not substance. Substance is “individualised in a particular instance.”
Bethune-Baker, E arly H istory, 141. See A dv P rax  4 where substantia  could have this sense.
Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 142.
Ibid.
D ictionnaire, 786-787.
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essence, nature, qualité {Adv Prax 16), personne, hypostasis/^^ Coupled with the 
aforesaid observations in this Appendix, the proofs in this section provide ample 
evidence that Olson’s suggestion regarding substantia in Tertullian’s Adversus 
Praxean signifiying “that fundamental ontological being-ness that makes something 
what it is” (i.e. the nature of an e n t i t y ) . Mo r e  than likely, substantia in Tertullian is 
not what Aristotle calls, secondary substance {substantia secundo). Ergo, while one 
may not be able to settle with definiteness what Tertullian meant by substantia, we 
can confidently argue that Stoicism influenced his theory of being and doctrine of 
Christ.
See Augustine’s D e Trin 5 .8.10.
Olson, Story o f  Christian Theology, 96.
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n i. Sophia and  A n g e lo m o rp h ic  Christology in A d versu s  P raxean  
Tertullian follows his theological predecessors in that he posits a precosmic Sophia 
that is an impersonal attribute o f God, and not an eternal hypostasis/^'' While Charles 
Gieschen thinks that Prov 8:22-31 portrays Sophia as: “an hypostasis, an aspect of 
God that has a degree o f independent personhood” or that she is the protological 
“master craftsman” of YHWH, being “beside” God and in his presence—Tertullian 
maintains that Sophia is a divine attribute God uses to bring about the cosmos/^^ 
When the Most High God speaks the momentous words, 'fia t lu x f  Sophia then 
becomes fully personalized and God makes Sophia His Son. Can one speak of 
Wisdom’s generation in terms of a creative act, however?
Gieschen proposes that the MT language of Prov 8:22 {qanah) introduces a 
procreative motif. He thinks that one should distinguish this particular usage of qanah 
in the MT from ektisen in the LXX.^^^ Gieschen also contends that the Sophia 
depicted as “begotten” in Proverbs 8:22-31 is a “divine agent” over against being a
That Tertullian thinks o f  Sophia  as a divine attribute is evident from his exegesis o f  Prov 8:22-31 in 
A dv Herm  20.1: “When W isdom, however, w as referred to, it was quite right to say, in the beginning. 
For it was in W isdom that He made ail things at first, because by meditating and arranging His plans 
therein, He had in fact already done (the work o f  creation); and i f  He had even intended to create out o f  
matter. He would yet have effected His creation when H e previously meditated on it and arranged it in 
H is W isdom, since It was in fact the beginning o f  His ways: this meditation and arrangement being the 
primal operation o f  W isdom, opening as it does the way to the works by the act o f  meditation and 
thought.”
Gieschen, A ngelom orphic C hristology, 90-91.
K u p to s  8KTI06V [iE GpXfiV oS coV  QUTOU 61 S p y a  aUTOUS ITpO TOU QICOVOS 
errjE iJEÀ icoaev pe ev  a p x f t  Trpo t o u  t t ]V  y p v  TTOTTipoat Kai ir p o  t o u t q s  
a P o u o a o u s  i r o i r ia a i  ir p o  r o u  TrpoEA0Eiv TC(^ ir r i y a s  t c o v  u ô a T c o v  Trpo 
TOU opri E 0 p a o 0 q v a i  Trpo ÔE rra v T c o v  p o u u c o v  y e  w o e  p s K U p io s  
ETTOlpOEU X ^ P ^ ^  KOI àoïKrjTOUÇ KQl Q K pa OIKOUpEVOt TT]S UTT OVJpavOV (Prov 
8:22-26 LXX , Rahils). V g reads: D om inas p o sse d it me initium viarum suanim  antequam  quicquam  
fa c e re t a  prin cip io  ab aeterno ordita  sum e t ex antiquis antequam  terra fie re t necdum erant abyssi et 
ego  iam concepta  eram  necdum fo n tes  aquarum  eruperan t (Prov 8:22-24).
Justin, evidently influenced by the LXX reading, uses the term “created” when delineating the 
generation o f  the Logos: “And it is written in the book o f  Wisdom: 'If I should tell you daily events, I 
w ould be mindful to enumerate them from the beginning. The Lord created me the beginning o f  His 
ways for His works. From everlasting He established me in the beginning, before He formed the earth, 
and before He made the depths, and before the springs o f  waters came forth, before the mountains were 
settled; He begets me before all the hills’” (D ia l 129.3). See Hengel, Judaism an d  Hellenism , 1.162-
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deific attribute: “some depictions o f Wisdom go beyond the bounds o f literary 
personification and present her as an hypostatized aspect o f God.”^^  ^ Gieschen also 
suggests that Angelomorphic motifs significantly influence certain Wisdom traditions: 
“some Wisdom traditions are dependent upon and were shaped by Angelomorphic 
traditions.”^^  ^ James Dunn, on the other hand, insists that there is no clear sign that 
Wisdom language goes beyond “vivid personification” in Proverbs, Sirach or any 
other Wisdom writings/^^
When critically assessing the Arian Controversy, Wiles submits that according 
to the language of Scripture: “Wisdom derives its being from God, and the languages 
of creation and begetting are alternative designations for the same reality.” '^'^  The two 
expressions are actually interchanged in Isa 1:2; Deut 32:18 and Job 38:28. Create is 
accordingly a generic term that overlaps with beget implying “the unique and intimate 
nature of this primary act of creation.” '^" Eusebius of Nicomedia reasoned in this way. 
The previously mentioned Bible texts may uphold his interpretation.^''^
Werner notes that although Tertullian opposed “Angel-Christology” he did not 
dispute the putative Christological tradition that had obtained for two eenturies 
earlier.^''^ He argues that Tertullian referred to the creation of the Son in Prov 8:22-25: 
“Tertullian could even maintain, quite impartially, that there was no essential 
difference between 'natum' and 'factum \ Thus the creation of Logos-Christ found
163. Cf. Sir 1.4, 9; 24.3. A lso Prov 8:24-25.
GvQSchQn. A ngelom orphic C hristology, 89.
Ibid.
James D. G. Dunn, C hristology in the M aking: A New Testament Inquiry into the O rigins o f  the 
D octrine o f  the Incarnation  (London: SCM , 1980), 170-173. See Prov 2:6; 3:19; Sir 14.26-15.2; 42:21; 
W isdom o f  Sol 7:22; Song o f  Sol 8 .21-9 .6 .
Maurice W iles, A rchetypal Heresy: A rianism  through the Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), 13.
Ibid.
Theodore!, Church H istory, 1.5.
VIemcv. F orm ation, 138-139.
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expression in a twofold manner.” '^'''
Depending on what one means by “creation,” he or she can probably employ 
such language to describe Tertullian’s Christology. Nevertheless, it is important to 
point out that Tertullian does not say that the Son came forth ex nihilo.
344 Ibid., 139-140.
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IV. Stoicism and Substance
The ontological basis for Tertullian’s notion o f substance is the Stoic theory of being. 
The four categories {Karrjyopiai) o f Stoic metaphysics are as follows: substance, 
quality, disposition and relative position/''^
Arnold notes that the Stoics considered both substance (i.e. the substrate or 
underlying reality) and quality to be c o r p o r e a l . T h e  two categories are essentially 
two aspects o f the same reality in Stoicism. We might then say that there is only a 
formal distinction {distinctio formalis) between the two metaphysical classifications 
of substance and quality Since substance ( t o  no tow uttokeim evov)  implies 
existence, however, the Stoics were able to prescind from quality and exclusively 
contemplate the ontological substance or subject.^''^
The predications that the Stoics call “quality” ( t o  no tow , qualitatis) determine 
substance, making it entity x  or Examples of quality are sweetness, redness, and 
roundness.^^^ These qualities, say the Stoics, are also examples of body {corpus). They 
do not exist independently of substance and are therefore corpora in a secondary 
sense.^^' The Stoics consequently define qualitative causality in terms of motive 
rarefaction.
Disposition (ncoç exoutq, res quodammodo se habens) is associated with the
Arnold, Stoicism , 165-169 . Frederick Copleston in A History o f  Philosophy. G reece a n d  Rome 
(Garden City: Image Books, 1962), 130 notes that the four Stoic categories derive from the ten 
Aristotelian categories. He then classifies the four Stoic categories as the substrate (TO 
UTTOKEIpEWOV), the essential constitution (TO TTOIOV UTTOKEtpEWOW), the accidental constitution 
(TO TTOS EXOW), and the relative accidental constitution (TO T ip o s  T1 TTCOS EXOV).
Arnold, Stoicism , 165.
See John D. Caputo’s H eidegger and  Aquinas: An E ssay on O vercom ing M etaphysics  (N ew  York: 
Fordham University Press, 1982), 68. He notes that Duns Scotus suggests that essence and existence are 
two non-distinct realities. Scotus then posits there is only a distinctio form alis  between existence and 
essence. Existence is therefore: “a formally different aspect o f  the selfsam e reality which is both 
essence and existence.” Hence, Scotus concludes: “Existence is real, but not a reality (a res)."'
Arnold, Stoicism , 165.
Ibid.
35 0 Ibid., 166
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GupTTTcopaTa (i.e. accidents) which vary in their nature (sleep, stand, walk, run).^^^ 
An accident, in Aristotelian and Stoic language, is a mode of being that can only exist 
in another being. It is non-essential or non-substantial.^^^ Therefore, the self-same 
entity may alternately sit, stand, walk or run. Sitting, sleeping, walking, and running 
are not essential properties of a substance. The Stoics thus classify such activities as 
oupiTTcopaTa.
We can illustrate relative position (irpoo x i  t t c o ç  e x o v )  or “relative accidental 
constitution” by pointing to right and left hand oppositions that are dependent on 
opposed relations such as father and son or husband and wife, with each relation being 
dependent on the other relative position. Slave and master or king and subject are 
other examples of relative dispositions.^^'' We should also mention that relative 
position is a function of corpus. Understanding Stoic metaphysics elucidates 
Tertullian’s use of substantia. In the manner of the Stoics, Tertullian emphasizes 
corpora and particulars.
Rex Warner, The G reek Philosophers Signet, 1958), 166.
Arnold, Stoicism , 167-168. F. Copleston labels this category, “aceidental constitution” (A H istory o f  
Philosophy, 130).
Peter Kreeft, A Shorter Summa: The M ost E ssen tia l P h ilosophical P assages o f  St. Thomas Aquinas ’
Sum m a Theologica  (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993) 27. 
Arnold, Stoicism , 169.
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V. Carthage and Christianity
The Libyans inhabited North Africa when the Phoenicians arrived there/^^ The 
Phoenicians eventually settled in Tunisia, a fecund area with two vast rivers named 
Miliana and Medjerda. The traditional date for the founding of Carthage north of 
Medjerda is 1101 BCE/^^ From that point, Punic Carthage eventually became a 
nautical force that waged war with the Greeks. This area of North Africa began to 
expand in the fifth century, and after the three momentous Punic wars, it fell to 
Rome’s Scipio Africanus in 146 BCE. The Romans then commandeered the 
territory-distributing it as they willed.
Although the Romans conquered Carthage, it “became the seat o f the 
provincial governor and thus the administrative centre of this new p r o v i n c e . R o m e  
granted the city exemption from taxation, so that Carthage enjoyed immunitas. 
Consequently, the city prospered, being as prosperous as “any city in Libya.”^^  ^
Tertullian, using characteristic hyperbole implied that Carthage was primarily 
composed of Christians in his day. At the very least, it seems that we may infer that 
there was a thriving Christian community there in his day.^^  ^Christians were no doubt 
active in Carthage by 150 CE and even before that time. Christianity may have come 
to Carthage from the east.^^ ®
Regardless of how Christianity originated in Carthage, the historical starting 
point for the Christian religion in North Africa is the martyrdom of a few Christians at
J, B. R ives. R eligion a n d  A uthority in Roman C arthage fro m  Augustus to Constantine (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 17.
Ibid.
Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 22-26.
D e Scap 3 A: 5.2.
Rives, C arthage, 225.
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Scilli in 180 C E /^ ' The martyrdom of this small group of Christians (seven men and 
five women), who refused to offer sacrifices to gods other than the Christian one or 
swear to the “genius” of the Emperor of Rome/^^ adumbrated developments that 
transpired as Christianity expanded throughout North Affica/^^
See H. M ilman, Latin  Christianity, 1:56-59.
Metzger, Canon, 156-157. See Acts o f  the Sci/litan  M atyrs.
3 6 3 W. H. C. Frend. The D onatist Church'. A M ovem ent o f  P ro test in Roman North Africa  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952), 87.
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VI. Tertullian and the R égula  F idei
N. T. Wright points out that the Latin term for “creed” {symbolum) is not
accidental/^'' He reports that the first Christian statements of belief functioned as
symbols, identifying the community as worshipers of the God revealed through Christ
Jesus. Therefore, the early creeds were a matter of a “community seeking
definition.”^^  ^ That is why these symbols do not stress verbatim phrases or abstract
theological formulations. They function as ecclesiastical markers (i.e. signs) nourished
in a liturgical context shaped by the ancient Christian c o m m u n i t y T h i s  detail
accounts for differences in wording of the régula fidei. We provide Tertullian’s
wording of the “rule o f faith” below so that the reader may see both the
complementaiy ideas expressed in the régula that Tertullian outlines as well as the
disparate notions articulated:
Now, with regard to this rule of faith—that we may from this point
acknowledge what it is which we defend—it is, you must know, that
which prescribes the belief that there is one only God, and that He is 
none other than the Creator of the world, who produced all things out 
of nothing through His own Word, first of all sent forth; that this Word 
is called His Son, and, under the name of God, was seen "in diverse 
manners" by the patriarchs, heard at all times in the prophets, at last 
brought down by the Spirit and Power o f the Father into the Virgin 
Mary, was made flesh in her womb, and, being born of her, went forth 
as Jesus Christ; thenceforth He preached the new law and the new 
promise of the kingdom of heaven, worked miracles; having been 
crucified, He rose again the third day; (then) having ascended into the 
heavens, He sat at the right hand of the Father; sent instead of Himself 
the Power of the Holy Ghost to lead such as believe; will come with 
glory to take the saints to the enjoyment of everlasting life and of the 
heavenly promises, and to condemn the wicked to everlasting fire, after 
the resurrection o f both these classes shall have happened, together 
with the restoration of their flesh. This rule, as it will be proved, was 
taught by Christ, and raises amongst ourselves no other questions than 
those which heresies introduce, and which make men heretics. {De 
Praescr Haer 13.1 -5)^^^
364
365
Ibid.
3 67
N . T. Wright, The New Testam ent a n d  the P eop le  o f  G o d  (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 368  
Ibid.
R egida est autem fidei, ut iam hinc q u id  defendam us profiteam ur, ilia scilicet qua creditor. Vnum
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Notice the different emphases in the following text:
The rule o f faith, indeed, is altogether one, alone immoveable and 
irreformable; the rule, to wit, o f believing in one only God omnipotent, 
the Creator of the universe, and His Son Jesus Christ, bom o f the 
Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, raised again the third day 
from the dead, received in the heavens, sitting now at the right (hand) 
of the Father, destined to come to judge quick and dead through the 
resurrection o f the flesh as well (as o f the spirit). This law o f faith 
being constant, the other succeeding points of discipline and 
conversation admit the "novelty" o f correction; the grace of God, to 
wit, operating and advancing even to the end. {De Vir Vel 1.3)
Bray points out that the régula fidei recorded in De Praescriptione is generally “more
detailed, except, interestingly enough, in the clauses which deal with the crucifixion
and the resurrection” than Tertullian’s delineation of the régula fidei elsewhere^^^
Bray concludes that Tertullian did not view the rule of faith as a “proto-creed.”^^ ^
om nino D eum  esse nec alium p ra e te r  m undi conditorem  qu i uniuersa de nihilo produxerit p e r  uerbum  
suum  p rim o  omnium emissum. Id  uerbum fd iu m  eius appellatum  in nomine D ei uarie uisum a  
pa tr ia rch is, in p roph etis  sem per auditum, postrem o delatum  ex spiritu  p a tr is  D ei el uirtute in uirginem  
M ariam , carnem  factum  in utero eius et ex ea  natum egisse  lesum  Christum. Exinde praed icasse  
nouam  legem  e t nouam prom issionem  regn i caelorum , uirtutes fecisse, cruci fixum , tertia  die  
resurrexisse, in caelos ereptum  sed isse  a d  dexteram  pa tris, m isisse uicariam turn spiritus sancti qui 
creden tes agat, uenturum cum clarita te  a d  sum endos san ctos in uitae aeternae et prom issorum  
caelestiu m  fru ctum  e t a d  profanos ad iudicandos igni perpetuo, fa c ta  utriusque p a rtis  resuscitatione  
cum  carn is restitutione. H aec régu la  a  Christo, ut probabitur, instituta nullas habet apu d  
n o s quaestiones nisi quas haereses inferunt e t quae h aereticos faciun t.
Bray, H oliness, 100-101 .
^^^Ibid., 102.
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VIL Consors
Consors may denote one who shares an inheritance; it can also signify a partner, 
colleague, or sharer (e.g. a brother, sister, wife) in other contexts.^^® The term further 
delineates living in a community of goods or partaking of property in common. Latin 
writer employ the word to describe common heirs and the act of dividing something 
with one; having an equal share or partaking of a particular substance. Consors is also 
used o f a partner or o f subjects that share the same condition.^^' Suetonius utilizes the 
term to depict colleagues in power.^^^
370
371
372
OLD 1:418.
V irgil, G eorgicon  4 .153. 
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VIII, O m nipotence o f  C hrist in Tertullian
Despite Kearsley’s insistence to the contrary, it seems that Tertullian believes the Son 
o f God is Omnipotent in a qualified sense/^^ Tertullian reasons that “the Father’s 
name is God Almighty, the Most High, the Lord of hosts, the King of Israel, I am.”^^ '' 
Nevertheless, these names also apply to the Son. The Scriptures attribute divine titles 
to Him insofar as he became man, “and in these [names] always acted, and thus in 
himself manifested them to men.”^^ ^
One name that the Son makes known and functions as the representative for, is 
God Almighty. The Son is only Omipotent in a limited sense, however. Tertullian 
explains the Son’s omnipotence by appealing to Mt 28:18 and Acts 2:33. The 
Matthean text shows that Christ received His omnipotence after God raised him from 
the dead. The Synoptic account declares that God vouchsafed such power to Him, In 
Acts 2:33, the apostle Peter proclaims that God has seated Christ at His right hand. 
Thus, the Father has subjected all things to the Son. He is accordingly Almighty in a 
qualified sense.
On the other hand, Kearsley argues that the Son’s omnipotence is not 
accidental since the quality of almightiness “belongs to the Son on account o f both 
substance and economy.^^^ He bases this conclusion in part on the fact that Christ by 
virtue of his sonship and status, as Aoyos" rou deou is omnipotens. Admittedly, 
Tertullian does attribute almightiness to the Word as such, though it appears the Son 
qua Son only possesses omnipotence derivatively.
See R, Kearsley, T ertu llian’s  Theology, 115. 
A dv Prax  17.
Ibid.
R. Kearsley, Tertullian's Theology, 128.
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